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TO BE OR NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE
THAT IS NOT THE QUESTION
SAM SANDERS
Abstract. In the early twentieth century, L.E.J. Brouwer pioneered a new
philosophy of mathematics, called intuitionism. Intuitionism was revolution-
ary in many respects but stands out -mathematically speaking- for its chal-
lenge of Hilbert’s formalist philosophy of mathematics and rejection of the law
of excluded middle from the ‘classical’ logic used in mainstream mathemat-
ics. Out of intuitionism grew intuitionistic logic and the associated Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation by which ‘there exists x’ intuitively means
‘an algorithm to compute x is given’. A number of schools of constructive
mathematics were developed, inspired by Brouwer’s intuitionism and invari-
ably based on intuitionistic logic, but with varying interpretations of what
constitutes an algorithm. This paper deals with the dichotomy between con-
structive and non-constructive mathematics, or rather the absence of such an
‘excluded middle’. In particular, we challenge the ‘binary’ view that mathe-
matics is either constructive or not. To this end, we identify a part of classical
mathematics, namely classical Nonstandard Analysis, and show it inhabits the
twilight-zone between the constructive and non-constructive. Intuitively, the
predicate ‘x is standard’ typical of Nonstandard Analysis can be interpreted
as ‘x is computable’, giving rise to computable (and sometimes constructive)
mathematics obtained directly from classical Nonstandard Analysis. Our re-
sults formalise Osswald’s longstanding conjecture that classical Nonstandard
Analysis is locally constructive. Finally, an alternative explanation of our re-
sults is provided by Brouwer’s thesis that logic depends upon mathematics.
1. Introduction
This volume is dedicated to the founder of intuitionism, L.E.J. Brouwer, who
pursued this revolutionary programme with great passion and against his time’s re-
ceived view of mathematics and its foundations ([20,21,50,116,119]). We therefore
find it fitting that our paper attempts to subvert (part of) our time’s received view
of mathematics and its foundations. As suggested by the title, we wish to challenge
the binary distinction constructive1 versus non-constructive mathematics. We shall
assume basic familiarity with constructive mathematics and intuitionistic logic with
its Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation.
Surprising as this may be to the outsider, the quest for the (ultimate) foundations
of mathematics was and is an ongoing and often highly emotional affair. The
Grundlagenstreit between Hilbert and Brouwer is perhaps the textbook example
(See e.g. [119, II.13]) of a fierce struggle between competing views on the foundations
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1The noun ‘constructive’ is often used as a synonym for ‘effective’, while it refers to the foun-
dational framework constructive mathematics in logic and the foundations of mathematics ([115]).
Context determines the meaning of ‘constructive’ in this paper (usually the latter).
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of mathematics, namely Hilbert’s formalism and Brouwer’s intuitionism. Einstein
was apparently disturbed by this controversy and exclaimed the following:
What is this frog and mouse battle among the mathematicians?
([38, p. 133])
More recently, Bishop mercilessly attacked Nonstandard Analysis in his review [15]
of Keisler’s monograph [64], even going as far as debasing Nonstandard Analysis2
to a debasement of meaning in [16]. Bishop, as Brouwer, believed that to state
the existence of an object, one has to provide a construction for it, while Nonstan-
dard Analysis cheerfully includes ideal/non-constructive objects at the fundamental
level, the textbook example being infinitesimals. Note that Brouwer’s student, the
intuitionist Arend Heyting, had a higher opinion of Nonstandard Analysis ([51]).
A lot of ink has been spilt over the aforementioned struggles, and we do not wish
to add to that literature. By contrast, the previous paragraph is merely meant
to establish the well-known juxtaposition of classical/mainstream/non-constructive
versus constructive mathematics3. The following quote by Bishop emphasises this
‘two poles’ view for the specific case of Nonstandard Analysis, which Bishop believed
to be the worst exponent of classical mathematics.
[Constructive mathematics and Nonstandard Analysis] are at op-
posite poles. Constructivism is an attempt to deepen the meaning
of mathematics; non-standard analysis, an attempt to dilute it fur-
ther. ([14, p. 1-2])
To be absolutely clear, lest we be misunderstood, we only wish to point out
the current state-of-affairs in contemporary mathematics: On one hand, there
is mainstream mathematics with its classical logic and other fundamentally non-
constructive features, of which Nonstandard Analysis is the nec plus ultra according
to some; on the other hand, there is constructive mathematics with its intuitionistic
logic and computational-content-by-design. In short, there are two opposing camps
(classical and constructive) in mathematics separated by a no-man’s land, with the
occasional volley exchanged as in e.g. [6, 87, 106, 107].
Stimulated by Brouwer’s revolutionary spirit, our goal is to subvert the above
received view. To this end, we will identify a field of classical mathematics which
occupies the twilight-zone between constructive and classical mathematics. Perhaps
ironically, this very field is Nonstandard Analysis, so vilified by Bishop for its alleged
fundamentally non-constructive nature. We introduce a well-known axiomatic4
approach to Nonstandard Analysis, Nelson’s internal set theory, in Section 2. We
discuss past claims regarding the constructive nature of Nonstandard Analysis in
Section 3, in particular Osswald’s notion of local constructivity.
In Section 4, we establish that Nonstandard Analysis occupies the twilight-zone
between constructive and classical mathematics. As part of this endeavour, we show
that a major part of classical Nonstandard Analysis has computational content,
2The naked noun Nonstandard Analysis will always implicitly include the adjective classical,
i.e. based on classical logic. We shall not directly deal with constructive Nonstandard Analysis,
i.e. based on intuitionistic logic, but do discuss its relationship with our results in Section 5.3.
3A number of approaches to constructive mathematics exist ([7, III], [115, I.4], [19]), and both
Brouwer’s intuitionism and Bishop’s Constructive Analysis ([13]) represent a school therein.
4Hrbacek ([55]) and Nelson ([76]) independently introduced an axiomatic approach to Non-
standard Analysis in the mid-seventies (See [59] for more details).
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much like constructive mathematics itself. Intuitively, the predicate ‘x is standard’
unique to Nonstandard Analysis can be interpreted as ‘x is computable’, giving rise
to computable (and even constructive) mathematics obtained directly from classical
Nonstandard Analysis. Our results formalise Osswald’s longstanding conjecture
from Section 3.4 that classical Nonstandard Analysis is locally constructive. By
way of reversal, we establish in Section 4.5 that certain highly constructive results
extracted from Nonstandard Analysis in turn imply the nonstandard theorems from
which they were obtained. Advanced results regarding the constructive nature of
Nonstandard Analysis may be found in Section 5.
In Section 6, we shall offer an alternative interpretation of our results based on
Brouwer’s view that logic is dependent on mathematics. Indeed, Brouwer already
explicitly stated in his dissertation that logic depends upon mathematics as follows:
While thus mathematics is independent of logic, logic does depend
upon mathematics: in the first place intuitive logical reasoning is
that special kind of mathematical reasoning which remains if, con-
sidering mathematical structures, one restricts oneself to relations
of whole and part; ([22, p. 127]; emphasis in Dutch original)
This leads us to the following alternative interpretation: If one fundamentally
changes mathematics, as one arguably does when introducing Nonstandard Anal-
ysis, it stands to reason that the associated logic will change along as the latter
depends on the former, in Brouwer’s view. By way of an example, we shall observe
in Section 4.1 that when introducing the notion of ‘being standard’ fundamental to
Nonstandard Analysis, the law of excluded middle of classical mathematics moves
from ‘the original sin of non-constructivity’ to a computationally inert principle
which does not have any real non-constructive consequences anymore.
Thus, our results vindicate Brouwer’s thesis that logic depends upon mathemat-
ics by showing that classical logic becomes ‘much more constructive’ when shifting
from ‘usual’ mathematics to Nonstandard Analysis, as discussed in Section 6.1. As
also discussed in the latter, Nelson and Robinson have indeed claimed that Non-
standard Analysis constitutes a new kind of mathematics and logic. We also discuss
the connection between Nonstandard Analysis and Troelstra’s views of intuitionism,
and Brouwer’s first act of intuitionism.
Finally, we point out a veritable Catch22 connected to this paper. On one
hand, if we were to emphasise that large parts of Nonstandard Analysis give rise
to computable mathematics (and vice versa), then certain readers will be inclined
to dismiss Nonstandard Analysis as ‘nothing new’, like Halmos was wont to:
it’s a special tool, too special, and other tools can do everything it
does. It’s all a matter of taste. ([48, p. 204])
On the other hand, if we were to emphasise the new mathematical objects (no
longer involving Nonstandard Analysis) with strange properties one can obtain from
Nonstandard Analysis, then certain readers will be inclined to dismiss Nonstandard
Analysis as ‘weird’ or ‘fundamentally different’ from (mainstream) mathematics, as
suggested by Bishop and Connes (See Section 3.5). To solve this conundrum, we
shall walk a tightrope between new and known results, and hope all readers agree
that neither of the aforementioned two views is correct.
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2. An introduction to Nonstandard Analysis
We provide an informal introduction to Nonstandard Analysis in Section 2.1.
Furthermore, we discuss Nelson’s internal set theory, an axiomatic approach to
Nonstandard Analysis, in detail in Section 2.2. Fragments of internal set theory
based on Peano and Heyting arithmetic are studied in Section 2.3.
2.1. An informal introduction to Nonstandard Analysis. In a nutshell, Non-
standard Analysis is the best-known5 formalisation of the intuitive infinitesimal cal-
culus. The latter is used to date in large parts of physics and engineering, and was
used historically in mathematics by e.g. Archimedes, Leibniz, Euler, and Newton
until the advent of the Weierstraß ‘epsilon-delta’ framework, as detailed in [36].
Robinson first formulated the semantic approach to Nonstandard Analysis (NSA
for short) around 1960 using nonstandard models, which are nowadays built using
free ultrafilters ([89, 124]). Hrbacek ([55]) and Nelson ([76]) independently intro-
duced an axiomatic approach to NSA in the mid-seventies (See [59]). We will work
in axiomatic systems that can be viewed as subsystems of either approach. We
will use the terminology and notation of Nelson’s approach. In all cases, there is a
universe of standard (usual/everyday) mathematical objects and a universe of non-
standard (new/other-worldly) mathematical objects, including infinitesimals. Tao
has formulated a pragmatic view of NSA in [111, 112] which summarises as:
NSA is another tool for mathematics.
A sketch of Tao’s view is as follows: given a hard problem in (usual/standard)
mathematics, pushing this problem into the nonstandard universe of NSA generally
converts it to a different and easier problem, a basic example being ‘epsilon-delta’
definitions. A nonstandard solution can then be formulated and pushed back into
the universe of standard/usual mathematics.
This ‘pushing back-and-forth’ between the standard and nonstandard universe
is enabled by Transfer and Standard Part (aka Standardisation). Robinson es-
tablished the latter as properties of his nonstandard models, while Nelson adopts
them as axioms of IST. The following figure illustrates Tao’s view and the practice
of NSA, as also discussed in Section 3.2 to 3.4. Note that Transfer is also used
sometimes in tandem with Standard Part, and vice versa.
Transfer
standard universe/usual mathematics nonstandard universe
hard problem easy problem with nonstandard solution
epsilon-delta definitions nonstandard definitions involving infinitesimals
Standard Part
Figure 1. The practice of NSA
We shall study a number of basic examples of the scheme from Figure 1 in Section 4
for notions as continuity and Riemann integration. Furthermore, the following ta-
ble lists some correspondences between the standard and nonstandard universe:
5We briefly discuss alternative formalisations of the infinitesimal calculus in Section 5.3.
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When pushed from the standard to the nonstandard universe, an object on the left
corresponds to (or is included in) an object on the right side of the following table.
standard universe nonstandard universe
continuous object discrete object
infinite set finite set
epsilon-delta definition universal definition using infinitesimals
quantitative result qualitative result
Finally, both Transfer and Standard Part are highly non-constructive in each ap-
proach to NSA, i.e. these principles imply the existence of non-computable objects.
By contrast, the mathematics in the nonstandard universe is usually very basic,
involving little more than discrete sums and products of nonstandard length. Var-
ious authors have made similar observations, which we discuss in Sections 3.2 to
3.4. In particular, Osswald has characterised this observation as NSA is locally
constructive or the local constructivity of NSA as discussed in Section 3.4,
and this view will be vindicated by our results in Section 4.
2.2. An axiomatic approach to Nonstandard Analysis. We shall introduce
Nelson’s internal set theory IST in this section.
2.2.1. Internal Set Theory. In Nelson’s syntactic (or ‘axiomatic’) approach to Non-
standard Analysis ([76]), a new predicate ‘st(x)’, read as ‘x is standard’ is added to
the language of ZFC, the usual foundation of mathematics6. The notations (∀stx)
and (∃sty) are short for (∀x)(st(x)→ . . . ) and (∃y)(st(y)∧ . . . ). A formula is called
internal if it does not involve ‘st’, and external otherwise.
The external axioms Idealisation, Standardisation, and Transfer govern the new
predicate ‘st’; we state these axioms7 as follows:
(I) (∀st finx)(∃y)(∀z ∈ x)ϕ(z, y) → (∃y)(∀stx)ϕ(x, y), for internal ϕ with any
(possibly nonstandard) parameters.
(S) (∀stx)(∃sty)(∀stz)
(
(z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z))↔ z ∈ y
)
, for any ϕ.
(T) (∀stt)
[
(∀stx)ϕ(x, t) → (∀x)ϕ(x, t)
]
, where ϕ(x, t) is internal, and only has
free variables t, x.
The system IST is the internal system ZFC extended with the aforementioned ex-
ternal axioms; Internal set theory IST is a conservative extension of ZFC for the
internal language ([76, §8]), i.e. these systems prove the same internal sentences.
Note that Nelson’s IST inherits non-constructive objects from ZFC, like the stan-
dard Turing jump8, and axioms like the internal law of excluded middle A ∨ ¬A.
For those familiar with Robinson’s approach to Nonstandard Analysis, we point
out one fundamental difference with Nelson’s view of internal set theory: In the
former one studies extensions of structures provided by nonstandard models, while
6The acronym ZFC stands for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice.
7The superscript ‘fin’ in (I) means that x is finite, i.e. its number of elements is bounded by a
natural number.
8That the Turing jump is standard follows from applying Transfer to the internal statement
‘there is a set of natural numbers which solves the Halting problem’ formalised inside ZFC.
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in the latter one studies the original structures, in which certain objects happen to
be standard, as identified by ‘st’. Nelson formulates this view9 as follows:
All theorems of conventional mathematics remain valid. No change
in terminology is required. What is new in internal set theory is
only an addition, not a change. We choose to call certain sets stan-
dard (and we recall that in ZFC every mathematical object-a real
number, a function, etc.-is a set), but the theorems of conventional
mathematics apply to all sets, nonstandard as well as standard.
([76, p. 1165]; emphasis in original)
Every specific object of conventional mathematics is a standard set.
It remains unchanged in the new theory. For example, in internal
set theory there is only one real number system, the system R with
which we are already familiar. ([76, p. 1166]; emphasis in original)
By way of an example, IST just inherits R from ZFC and calls some real numbers
standard and some nonstandard. All the ‘specific’ numbers like 0, 1, pi, e, . . . are
standard, while there are also nonstandard ones (in IST). By contrast, Robinson’s
approach starts with R and extends this set to the much bigger ∗R which is such
that R ⊂ ∗R and which satisfies the axioms of the real numbers too; the objects in
∗R\R are called ‘nonstandard’. Thus, both approaches have a different universe (or
‘world’) of standard objects, which however only matters for advanced applications
of NSA (See Section 5.1). In each approach, the intuitive picture as in Figure 1 is
valid, bearing in mind the right interpretation of the standard world.
It goes without saying that the step from ZFC to IST can be done for a large
spectrum of logical systems weaker than ZFC. In Section 2.3, we study this ex-
tension of the usual classical and constructive axiomatisation of arithmetic, called
Peano Arithmetic and Heyting Arithmetic. In the next sections, we discuss the
intuitive meaning of the external axioms.
2.2.2. Intuitive meaning of Idealisation. First, the contraposition of I implies that
(∀y)(∃stx)ϕ(x, y)→ (∃st finx)(∀y)(∃z ∈ x)ϕ(z, y), (2.1)
for all internal ϕ, and where the underlined part is thus also internal. Hence,
intuitively speaking, Idealisation allows us to ‘pull a standard quantifiers like (∃stx)
in (2.1) through a normal quantifier (∀y)’. We will also refer to (2.1) as Idealisation,
as the latter axiom is usually used in this contraposed form.
Note that the axioms BΣn of Peano arithmetic ([26, II]) play a similar role: The
former allow one to ‘pull an unbounded number quantifier through a bounded num-
ber quantifier’. In each case, one obtains a formula in a kind of ‘normal form’ with
a block of certain quantifiers (resp. external/unbounded) up front followed by an-
other block of different quantifiers (resp. internal/bounded). Example 2.1 involving
nonstandard continuity in IST is illustrative (See [76, §5] for more examples).
Example 2.1. We say that f is nonstandard continuous on the set X ⊆ R if
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀y ∈ X)(x ≈ y → f(x) ≈ f(y)), (2.2)
9As discussed in [39], one does not have to share Nelson’s view to study IST: the latter is a
logical system while the former is a possible philosophical point of view regarding IST. However,
like Nelson, we will (mostly) view the mathematics and this point of view as one package.
TO BE OR NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE 7
where z ≈ w is (∀stn ∈ N)(|z − w| < 1
n
). Resolving ‘≈’ in (2.2), we obtain
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀y ∈ X)
(
(∀stN ∈ N)(|x− y| < 1
N
)→ (∀stk ∈ N)(|f(x) − f(y)| < 1
k
)
)
.
We may bring out the ‘(∀stk ∈ N)’ and ‘(∀stN ∈ N)’ quantifiers as follows:
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀stk ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)(∃stN ∈ N)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x) − f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
Applying I as in (2.1) to the underlined formula, we obtain a finite and standard
set z ⊂ N such that (∀y ∈ X)(∃N ∈ z) in the previous formula. Now let N0 be the
maximum of all numbers in z, and note that for N = N0
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀stk ∈ N)(∃stN ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x) − f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
The previous formula has all standard quantifiers up front and is very close to the
‘epsilon-delta’ definition of continuity from mainstream mathematics. Hence, we
observe the role of I: to connect the worlds of nonstandard mathematics (as in (2.2))
and mainstream mathematics.
2.2.3. Intuitive meaning of Transfer. The axiom Transfer expresses that certain
statements about standard objects are also true for all objects. This property
is essential in proving the equivalence between epsilon-delta statements and their
nonstandard formulation. The following example involving continuity is illustrative.
Example 2.2. Recall Example 2.1, the definition of nonstandard continuity (2.2)
and the final equation in particular. Dropping the ‘st’ for N in the latter:
(∀stx ∈ X)(∀stk ∈ N)(∃N ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
Assuming X and f to be standard, we can apply T to the previous to obtain
(∀x ∈ X)(∀k ∈ N)(∃N ∈ N)(∀y ∈ X)|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
(2.3)
Note that (2.3) is just the usual epsilon-delta definition of continuity. In turn, to
prove that (2.3) implies nonstandard continuity as in (2.2), fix standard X, f, k
in (2.3) and apply the contraposition of T to ‘(∃N ∈ N)ϕ(N)’ where ϕ is the
underlined formula in (2.3). The resulting formula (∃stN ∈ N)ϕ(N) immediately
implies nonstandard continuity as in (2.2).
By the previous example, nonstandard continuity (2.2) and epsilon-delta con-
tinuity (2.3) are equivalent for standard functions in IST. However, the former
involves far less quantifier alternations and is close to the intuitive understanding
of continuity as ‘no jumps in the graph of the function’. Hence, we observe the role
of T: to connect the worlds of nonstandard mathematics (as in (2.2)) and main-
stream mathematics (as in (2.3)), and we also have our first example of the practice
of NSA from Figure 1 involving nonstandard and epsilon-delta definitions.
2.2.4. Intuitive meaning of Standardisation. The axiom Standardisation (also called
Standard Part) is useful as follows: It is in general easy to build nonstandard and
approximate solutions to mathematical problems in IST, but a standard solution
is needed as the latter also exists in ‘normal’ mathematics (as it is suitable for
Transfer). Intuitively, the axiom S tells us that from a nonstandard approximate
solution, we can always find a standard one. Since we may (only) apply Transfer
to formulas involving the latter, we can then also prove the latter is an object of
normal mathematics. The following example is highly illustrative.
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Example 2.3. The intermediate value theorem states that for every continuous
function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that f(0)f(1) < 0, there is x ∈ [0, 1] such that
f(x) = 0. Assuming f is standard, it is easy10 to find a nonstandard real y in the
unit interval such that f(y) ≈ 0, i.e. y is an intermediate value ‘up to infinitesimals’.
The axiom S then tells11 us that there is a standard real x such that x ≈ y, and by
the nonstandard continuity of f (See previous example), we have f(x) ≈ 0. Now
apply T to the latter12 to obtain f(x) = 0. Hence, we have obtain the (internal)
intermediate value theorem for standard functions, and T yields the full theorem.
Hence, we observe the role of S: to connect the worlds of nonstandard math-
ematics and mainstream (standard) mathematics by providing standard objects
‘close to’ nonstandard ones. We shall observe another natural interpretation of S
in Section 6.4 in terms of Tao’s notion metastability.
In conclusion, the external axioms of IST provide a connection between non-
standard and mainstream mathematics: They allow one to ‘jump back and forth’
between the standard and nonstandard world as sketched in Figure 1. This tech-
nique is useful as some problems (like switching limits and integrals) may be easier
to solve in the discrete/finite world of nonstandard mathematics than in the con-
tinuous/infinite world of standard mathematics (or vice versa). This observation
lies at the heart of Nonstandard Analysis and is a first step towards understanding
its power. Nelson formulated this observation nicely as follows:
Part of the power of nonstandard analysis is due to the fact that a
complicated internal notion is frequently equivalent, on the standard
sets, to a simple external notion. ([76, p. 1169])
2.3. Fragments of Internal Set Theory. Fragments of IST have been studied
before and we are interested in the systems P and H introduced in [10].
In a nutshell, P and H are versions of IST based on the usual classical and intu-
itionistic axiomatisations of arithmetic, namely Peano and Heyting arithmetic. We
refer to [66] for the exact definitions of our version of Peano and Heyting arithmetic,
commonly abbreviated respectively as E-PAω and E-HAω. In particular, the sys-
tems P and H are conservative13 extensions of Peano arithmetic E-PAω and Heyting
arithmetic E-HAω, as also follows from Theorem 4.1. We discuss the systems P and
H in detail in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, and list the axioms in full detail in Section A.
We discuss why P and H are important to our enterprise in Section 4.1. Notations
and definitions in P and H of common mathematical notions like natural and real
numbers may be found in Section A.4.
10Since [0, 1] is compact, we may assume that f is uniformly continuous there. Similar to
Example 2.2, we may assume f is nonstandard uniformly continuous as in (∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])[x ≈ y →
f(x) ≈ f(y)]. Let N be a nonstandard natural number and let j ≤ N be the least number such
that f( j
N
)f( j+1
N
) ≤ 0. Then f(j/N) ≈ 0 by nonstandard uniform continuity, and we are done.
11Let y ∈ [0, 1] be such that f(y) ≈ 0 and consider the set of rationals z = {q1, q1, q2, . . . , qN}
where qi is a rational such that |y − qi| <
1
i
and qi =
j
2i
for some j ≤ i, and N is a nonstandard
number. Applying S, there is a standard set w such that (∀stq)(q ∈ w ↔ q ∈ z). The standard
sequence provided by w thus converges to a standard real x ≈ y.
12Recall that ‘f(x) ≈ 0’ is short for (∀stk ∈ N)(|f(x)| < 1
k
).
13Like for ZFC and IST, if the system P (resp. H) proves an internal sentence, then this sentence
is provable in E-PAω (resp. E-HAω).
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2.3.1. The classical system P. We discuss the fragment P of IST from [10]. Similar
to the way IST is an extension of ZFC, P is just the internal system E-PAω with the
language extended with a new standardness predicate ‘st’ and with some special
cases of the external axioms of IST. The technical details of this extension may be
found in Section A.2 while we now provide an intuitive motivation for the external
axioms of P, assuming basic familiarity with the finite type system of Go¨del’s system
T , also discussed in Section A.1.
First of all, the system P does not include any fragment of Transfer. The mo-
tivation for this omission is as follows: The system ACA0 proves the existence of
the non-computable Turing jump ([103, III]) and very weak fragments of T already
imply versions of ACA0. In particular, the following axiom is the Transfer axiom
limited to universal number quantifiers:
(∀stf1)
[
(∀stn0)f(n) 6= 0→ (∀m)f(m) 6= 0
]
. (Π01-TRANS)
As proved in [97, §4.1] and Section 4.3, Π01-TRANS is essentially the nonstandard
version of the Turing jump. Hence, no Transfer is present in P as this axiom is
fundamentally non-constructive, and would result in a non-conservative extension.
Secondly, the system P involves the full axiom Idealisation in the language of P
as follows: For any internal formula in the language of P:
(∀stxσ
∗
)(∃yτ )(∀zσ ∈ x)ϕ(z, y)→ (∃yτ )(∀stxσ)ϕ(x, y), (2.4)
As it turns out, the axiom I does not yield any ‘non-constructive’ consequences,
which also follows from Theorem 4.1 below. As for (2.1), we will also refer to the
contraposition of (2.4) as Idealisation, as the latter is used mostly in the contra-
posed form similar to (2.1) (but with finite sequences rather than finite sets).
Thirdly, the system P involves a weakening of Standardisation, which is moti-
vated as follows: The axiom S may be equivalently formulated as follows:
(∀stx)(∃sty)Φ(x, y)→
(
∃stF
)
(∀stx)Φ(x, F (x)), (S′)
for any formula Φ (possible involving nonstandard parameters) in the language IST,
i.e. we observe that S implies14 a fragment of the axiom of choice (relative to ‘st’).
In light of the possible non-constructive content of the latter (See e.g. [32]), it is no
surprise that S has to be weakened. In particular, P includes the following version
of S, called the Herbrandised Axiom of Choice:
(∀stxρ)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y)→
(
∃stGρ→τ
∗)
(∀stxρ)(∃yτ ∈ G(x))ϕ(x, y), (HACint)
where ϕ is any internal formula in the language of P. Note that G does not output
a witness for y, but a finite list of potential witnesses to y. This is quite similar to
Herbrand’s theorem ([26, I.2.5]), hence the name of HACint.
Finally, we list two basic but important axioms of P from Definition A.3 below.
These axioms are inspired by Nelson’s claim about IST as follows:
Every specific object of conventional mathematics is a standard set.
It remains unchanged in the new theory [IST]. ([76, p. 1166])
14We point out that the relationship between S and the axiom of choice is non-trivial: in
ZF+ I+ S+ T one can only prove that every filter can be extended to an ultrafilter, but not the
full axiom of choice (See [54]). On the other hand, the system IST \ S does prove S ↔ S′.
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Specific objects of the system P obviously include the constants 0, 1,×,+, and
anything built from those. Thus, the system P includes the following three axioms;
we refer to Definition A.3 for the exact technical details.
(i) All constants in the language of E-PAω are standard.
(ii) A standard functional applied to a standard input yields a standard output.
(iii) If two objects are equal and one is standard, so is the other one.
As a result, the system P proves that any term of E-PAω is standard, which will turn
out to be essential in Section 4.5. Note that ‘equality’ as in item (iii) only applies
to ‘actual’ equality and not equality on the reals in P, as discussed in Remark A.12.
2.3.2. The constructive system H. We discuss the fragment H of IST from [10].
Similar to the way IST is an extension of ZFC, H is just the internal system E-HAω
with the language extended with a new standardness predicate ‘st’ and with some
special cases of the external and internal axioms of IST.
The technical details of this extension may be found in Section A.3; we now
provide an intuitive motivation for the external axioms of H, assuming basic famil-
iarity with the finite type system of Go¨del’s system T (See Section A.1). Note that
E-HAω and H are based on intuitionistic logic.
First of all, the system H does not involve Transfer for the same reasons P
does not. By contrast, the axioms HACint and Idealisation as in (2.4) (and its
contraposition) are included in H, with the restrictions on ϕ lifted even.
Secondly, the system H includes some ‘non-constructive’ axioms relativised to
‘st’. We just mention the names of these axioms and refer to Section A.3 for a full
description. The system H involves nonstandard versions of the following axioms:
Markov’s principle (See e.g. [7, p. 47]) and the independence of premises principle
(See e.g. [66, §5]). Nonetheless, H proves the same internal sentence as E-HAω by
Theorem 4.1, i.e. the nonstandard versions are not really non-constructive.
Finally, H also includes the basic axioms from Definition A.3 as listed at the end
of Section 2.3.1. In particular, H proves that any term of E-HAω is standard.
3. The (non-)constructive nature of Nonstandard Analysis
3.1. Introduction. A number of informal claims have over the years been made
about the constructive nature of Nonstandard Analysis. These claims range from
short quotes, three of which listed below, to more detailed conjectures. Regarding
the latter, we discuss in Sections 3.2 to 3.4 observations by Keisler, Wattenberg,
and Osswald on the constructive nature of Nonstandard Analysis. Note that ‘con-
structive’ is often used as a synonym of ‘effective’ in this context.
It has often been held that nonstandard analysis is highly non-
constructive, thus somewhat suspect, depending as it does upon
the ultrapower construction to produce a model [. . . ] On the other
hand, nonstandard praxis is remarkably constructive; having the
extended number set we can proceed with explicit calculations.
(Emphasis in original: [2, p. 31])
On the other hand, nonstandard arguments often have in practice
a very constructive flavor, much more than do the corresponding
standard proofs. Indeed, those who use nonstandard arguments
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often say of their proofs that they are “constructive modulo an
ultrafilter.” This is especially true in measure theory. ([91, p. 230])
The aim of this section is to describe a nonstandard map “explic-
itly”. There is only one inconstructive step in the proof, namely
the choice of a so-called ultrafilter. [. . . ] Moreover, the fact that
the approach is “almost constructive” has the advantage that in
special cases one can better see what happens: Up to the ultrafilter
one can “calculate” the nonstandard embedding ∗. ([120, p. 44])
By contrast, Connes and Bishop have claimed that Nonstandard Analysis is some-
how fundamentally non-constructive; their views are discussed briefly in Section 3.5
for the sake of completeness, while a detailed study may be found in [98].
Finally, the attentive reader has noted that we choose not to discuss the claims
of the ‘French school’ of Nonstandard Analysis, in particular Reeb and Harthong’s
Intuitionnisme 84 ([49]), regarding the constructive nature of Nonstandard Anal-
ysis. We motivate this choice by the observation that the associated literature is
difficult to access (even in the digital age) and is written in large part in rather
academic French, which (no pun intended) has long ceased to be the lingua franca.
3.2. Keisler’s lifting method. We discuss Keisler lifting method which is a tem-
plate for the practice of Nonstandard Analysis involving the hyperreal line, and a
special case of the scheme in Figure 1. Keisler formulates the lifting method as:
The following strategy, sometimes called the lifting method, has
been used to prove results [. . . ] on the ordinary real line.
Step 1 Lift the given ‘real’ objects up to internal approximations on
the hyperfinite grid.
Step 2 Make a series of hyperfinite computations to construct some
new internal object on the hyperfinite grid.
Step 3 Come back down to the real line by taking standard parts of
the results of the computations.
The hyperfinite computations in Step 2 will typically replace more
problematic infinite computations on the real line. ([63, p. 234])
Keisler’s description of the lifting method involves the words constructive and com-
putations, which are elaborated upon as follows by Keisler:
[. . . ] hyperreal proofs seem to be more ‘constructive’ than clas-
sical proofs. For example, the solution of a stochastic differential
equation given by the hyperreal proof is obtained by solving a hy-
perfinite difference equation by a simple induction and taking the
standard part. The hyperreal proof is not constructive in the usual
sense, because in ZFC the axiom of choice is needed even to get the
existence of a hyperreal line. What often happens is that a proof
within RZ or IST of a statement of the form (∃x)φ(x) will produce
an x which is definable from H , where H is an arbitrary infinite
hypernatural number. Thus instead of a pure existence proof, one
obtains an explicit solution except for the dependence on H . The
extra information one gets from the explicit construction of the so-
lution from H makes the proof easier to understand and may lead
to additional results. ([63, p. 235])
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We conclude that Keisler’s lifting method reflects the ideas behind the scheme in
Figure 1. Furthermore, we stress that one can define the notion of (non-)standard
real number in the systems P and H from Section 2.3 and develop Nonstandard
Analysis there including the Stone-Weierstraß theorem as in [97, §3-4]. In particu-
lar, most of ZFC is not needed to do (large parts of) Nonstandard Analysis, though
one could (wrongly so) get the opposite impression from Keisler’s previous quote.
3.3. Wattenberg’s algorithms. Almost two decades ago, Wattenberg published
the paper Nonstandard Analysis and Constructivism? in which he speculates on a
connection between Nonstandard Analysis and constructive mathematics ([122]).
This is a speculative paper. For some time the author has been
struck by an apparent affinity between two rather unlikely areas of
mathematics - nonstandard analysis and constructivism. [. . . ] The
purpose of this paper is to investigate these ideas by examining
several examples. ([122, p. 303])
On one hand, with only slight modification, some of Wattenberg’s theorems in Non-
standard Analysis are seen to yield effective and constructive theorems using the
systems P and H from Section 2.3. On the other hand, some of Wattenberg’s (ex-
plicit and implicit) claims regarding the constructive status of the axioms Transfer
and Standard Part from Nonstandard Analysis can be shown to be incorrect. These
results will be explored in [96], but we can make preliminary observations.
Wattenberg digs deeper than the quotes in Section 3.1 by making the following
important observation regarding the praxis of Nonstandard Analysis.
Despite an essential nonconstructive kernel, many nonstandard ar-
guments are constructive until the final step, a step that frequently
involves the standard part map. ([122, p. 303])
Wattenberg’s observation echoes the scheme in Figure 1 from Section 2.1, namely
that the axiom Standardisation (aka Standard Part) is used to push nonstandard
solutions down to the world of standard/usual mathematics at the end of a non-
standard proof. However, in either approach to Nonstandard Analysis this axiom
is highly non-constructive, and even very weak instances are such: Consider Stan-
dardisation as in (S′) from Section 2.3.1 weakened as follows:
(∀f1)
[
(∀stx0)(∃sty0)(f(x) =0 y)→
(
∃stF
)
(∀stx)(f(x) =0 F (x))
]
. (S′′)
It is proved in Section A.5 that P + S′′ proves the non-constructive weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma. Furthermore, (S′′) is translated to the special fan functional (First intro-
duced in [94]; see Section 4.4) during term extraction, an object which is extremely
hard15 to compute, as studied in [79].
In a nutshell, Wattenberg suggests that the mathematics in the nonstandard
universe in Figure 1 from Section 2.1 is rich in constructive content, but that
stepping from the nonstandard to the standard universe using Standardisation is
fundamentally non-constructive. Thus, the latter axiom should be avoided if one
is interested in obtaining the constructive content of Nonstandard Analysis. Note
however that Wattenberg (explicitly and implicitly) makes use of Transfer in [122],
which is also highly non-constructive, as established in Section 4.3 and [97, §4]. In
15In particular, the special fan functional Θ from [94] is not computable (in the sense of
Kleene’s S1-S9) from the Suslin functional, the functional version of Π11-CA0, as proved in [79].
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other words, the picture Wattenberg tries to paint is somewhat imperfect, which
shall be remedied in the next section.
3.4. Osswald’s local constructivity. We discuss the notion local constructivity,
originally formulated by Osswald (See e.g. [124, §7], [82, §1-2], or [83, §17.5]). The
following heuristic principle describes the notion of local constructivity.
Principle 3.1. A mathematical proof is locally constructive if the core, the
essential part, of the proof is constructive in nature.
Intuitively, a proof P of a theorem T is locally constructive if we can omit a small
number of non-constructive initial and/or final steps in P and obtain a proof Q of
a constructive theorem T ′ very similar to T . In other words, a locally constructive
proof has the form P = (P ′, P ′′, P ′′′), where P ′, P ′′′ are inessential and may be non-
constructive, and the ‘main part’ P ′′ is constructive. As it happens, isolating the
constructive part P ′′ can lead to new results, as in the paper16 [82] and Section 4.
Osswald has conjectured the local constructivity of (proofs in) classicalNon-
standard Analysis. This conjecture is based on the following three observations
regarding the praxis of Nonstandard Analysis:
(1) The first step in a proof in Nonstandard Analysis often involves Transfer
to enter the nonstandard universe, e.g. to convert epsilon-delta definitions
to nonstandard ones, like for epsilon-delta continuity as in Example 2.2.
However, Transfer is non-constructive as established in Section 4.3.
(2) The mathematical practice of Nonstandard Analysis after entering the
nonstandard world in large part consists of the manipulation of (non-
standard) universal formulas not involving existential quantifiers. This ma-
nipulation amounts to mere computation, in many cases nothing more than
hyperdiscrete sums and products.
(3) The final step in a proof of Nonstandard Analysis often involves Standardi-
sation to push nonstandard objects back into the standard universe, as also
observed by Keisler and Wattenberg in the previous sections. However, this
axiom is also non-constructive.
These three observations suggest the following: If we take a proof P = (P ′, P ′′, P ′′′)
in Nonstandard Analysis where P ′ (resp. P ′′′) collects the initial (resp. final) appli-
cations of Transfer (resp. of Standardisation), then P ′′ is a proof rich in constructive
content. The proof P is thus locally constructive in the sense that P ′′ contains
the core argument, and is constructive in a certain as-yet-undefined sense (which
will be formalised in Section 4). Furthermore, to avoid the use of Transfer, we
should avoid epsilon-definitions and work instead directly with the nonstandard
definitions involving infinitesimals, as also discussed in Section 5.3.
In conclusion, Osswald has conjectured that Nonstandard Analysis is lo-
cally constructive, suggesting that what remains of Nonstandard Analysis after
stripping away Transfer and Standardisation is constructive. We will formalise this
observation by introducing‘ pure Nonstandard Analysis’ in Definition 4.29.
16As a tentative example, the anonymous referee of [82] wrote in his report that techniques in
the paper produce ‘results, substantially extending those in the literature’.
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3.5. The Bishop-Connes critique of Nonstandard Analysis. For complete-
ness, we briefly discuss the critique of Nonstandard Analysis by Bishop and Connes,
relating to the Bishop quote in Section 1. Their critique may be summarised as:
The presence of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in Nonstandard
Analysis yields the absence of computational content.
In particular, for rather different reasons and in different contexts, Bishop and
Connes equate ‘meaningful mathematics’ and ‘mathematics with computational
content’, and therefore claim Nonstandard Analysis is devoid of meaning as it lacks
-in their view- any and all computational content. A detailed study of this topic
by the author, debunking the Bishop-Connes critique, may be found in [98].
The often harsh criticism of Nonstandard Analysis by Bishop and Connes is a
matter of the historical record and discussed in remarkable detail in [3, 30, 31, 58,
60, 61, 110]. Furthermore, the arguments by Connes and Bishop for this critique
have been dissected in surprising detail and found wanting in the aforementioned
references, but establishing the opposite of the Bishop-Connes critique, namely that
Nonstandard Analysis is rich in computational content, first took place in [97, 98].
As noted in Section 1, we are not interested in adding to this literature, but we
shall examine the motivations of Connes and Bishop for their critique, as this will
provide more insight into Nonstandard Analysis. To this end, recall that Bishop
considers his mathematics to be concerned with constructive objects, i.e. those de-
scribed by algorithms on the integers. The following quote is telltale.
Everything attaches itself to number, and every mathematical state-
ment ultimately expresses the fact that if we perform certain com-
putations within the set of positive integers, we shall get certain
results. ([13, §1.1])
This quote suggests a fundamental ontological divide between Bishop’s mathematics
and Nonstandard Analysis, as the latter by design is based on ideal objects (like
infinitesimals) with prima facie no algorithmic description at all. In this light, it is
not a stretch of the imagination to classify Nonstandard Analysis as fundamentally
non-constructive, i.e. antipodal to Bishop’s mathematics, or to paraphrase Bishop:
an attempt to dilute meaning/computational content further.
Furthermore, this ‘non-constructive first impression’ is confirmed by the fact that
the ‘usual’ development of Nonstandard Analysis involves quite non-constructive17
axioms. The latter is formulated by Katz and Katz as:
[. . . ] the hyperreal approach incorporates an element of non-constructivity
at the basic level of the very number system itself. ([61, §3.3])
Finally, the aforementioned ‘first impression’ does not seem to disappear if one
considers more basic mathematics, e.g. arithmetic rather than set theory. Indeed,
Tennenbaum’s theorem [62, §11.3] ‘literally’ states that any nonstandard model of
Peano Arithmetic is not computable. What is meant is that for a nonstandard
modelM of Peano Arithmetic, the operations +M and ×M cannot be computably
defined in terms of the operations +N and ×N of the standard model N of Peano
17The usual development of Robinson’s Nonstandard Analysis proceeds via the construction
of a nonstandard model using a free ultrafilter. The existence of the latter is only slightly weaker
than the axiom of choice of ZFC ([124]).
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Arithmetic. In light of the above, Nonstandard Analysis seems fundamentally non-
constructive even at the level of arithmetic.
Now, the Fields medallist Alain Connes has formulated similar negative criticism
of classical Nonstandard Analysis in print on at least seven occasions. The first table
in [58, §3.1] runs a tally for the period 1995-2007. Connes judgements range from
inadequate and disappointing, to a chimera and irremediable defect. Regarding the
effective content of Nonstandard Analysis, the following quote is also telltale.
Thus a non-standard number gives us canonically a non-measurable
subset of [0, 1]. This is the end of the rope for being ‘explicit’ since
(from another side of logics) one knows that it is just impossible to
construct explicitely a non-measurable subset of [0, 1]! (Verbatim
copy of the text in [27])
In contrast to Bishop, Connes does not take a foundational position but has more
pragmatic arguments in mind: According to Connes, Nonstandard Analysis is fun-
damentally non-constructive and thus useless for physics, as follows:
The point is that as soon as you have a non-standard number, you
get a non-measurable set. And in Choquet’s circle, having well
studied the Polish school, we knew that every set you can name is
measurable. So it seemed utterly doomed to failure to try to use
non-standard analysis to do physics. ([28, p. 26])
Indeed, a major aspect of physics is the testing of hypotheses against experimental
data, nowadays done on computers. But how can this testing be done if the math-
ematical formalism at hand is fundamentally non-constructive, as Connes claims?
In Section 4.1, we establish the opposite of the Bishop-Connes critique: rather
than being ‘fundamentally non-constructive’, infinitesimals and other nonstandard
objects provide an elegant shorthand for computational/constructive content.
4. Jenseits von Konstruktiv und Klassisch
In this section, we shall establish that Nonstandard Analysis occupies the twilight
zone between the constructive and non-constructive. Perhaps more accurately, as
also suggested by the title18 of this section, Nonstandard Analysis will be shown to
transcend the latter distinction.
To this end, we explore the constructive status of H extended with classical logic
in Section 4.1 and shall discover that these extensions can neither rightfully be called
non-constructive nor constructive. What is more, the observations from Section 4.1
pertaining to logic allow us to uncover the vast computational content of classical
Nonstandard Analysis. We shall consider three examples in Section 4.2 to 4.4 and
formulate a general template in Section 4.6 for obtaining computation from pure
Nonstandard Analysis, as defined in Definition 4.29. These results will establish
the local constructivity of Nonstandard Analysis as formulated in Section 3.4.
As a crowning achievement, we show in Section 4.5 that theorems of Nonstandard
Analysis are ‘meta-equivalent’ to theorems rich in computational content.
18We leave it to the reader to decide how our title corresponds to Nietzsche’s famous book.
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4.1. The twilight zone of mathematics. In this section, we study some com-
putational and constructive aspects of the systems H and P. During this study, it
will turn out that the latter occupies the twilight zone between the constructive
and non-constructive, as suggested in Section 1.
We first consider the system H, the conservative extension of the constructive
system E-HAω from the previous section. Now, if LEM consists of A ∨ ¬A for all
internal A, then E-HAω + LEM is just E-PAω. In other words, the addition of LEM
turns E-HAω into a classical system, losing the constructive (BHK) interpretation
of the quantifiers. Now consider H+ LEM and recall the following theorem, which
is called the main theorem on program extraction in [10, Theorem 5.9].
Theorem 4.1 (Term extraction I). Let ϕ be internal, i.e. not involving ‘st’, and
let ∆int be a collection of internal formulas. If H+∆int ⊢ (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y), then
we can extract a term t from this proof with E-HAω+∆int ⊢ (∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ϕ(x, y).
The term t is such that t(x) is a finite list and does not depend on ∆int.
Note that the conclusion of the theorem, namely ‘E-HAω + ∆int ⊢ (∀x)(∃y ∈
t(x))ϕ(x, y)’, does not involve Nonstandard Analysis anymore. The term t from
the previous theorem is part of Go¨del’s system T from Section A.1, i.e. essentially
a computer program formulated in e.g. Martin-Lo¨f type theory or Agda ([1, 73]).
What is more important is the following observation (stemming from the proof of
[10, Theorem 5.5]): Taking ∆int to be empty, we observe that constructive informa-
tion (the term t) can be obtained from proofs in H. This is a nice result, but hardly
surprising in light of the existing semantic approach to constructive Nonstandard
Analysis (See Section 5.3) and the realisability interpretation of constructive math-
ematics. What is surprising is the following: Taking ∆int to be LEM in Theorem 4.1,
we observe that proofs in H+ LEM or H provide the same kind of constructive in-
formation, namely the term t. Of course, the final system (namely E-HAω + LEM)
is non-constructive in the former case, but the fact remains that the original sin
of non-constructivity LEM does not influence the constructive information (in the
form of the term t) extracted from H, as is clear from Theorem 4.1.
Hence, while E-HAω loses its constructive nature when adding LEM, the system
H retains its ‘term extraction property’ by Theorem 4.1 when adding LEM. To be
absolutely clear, we do not claim that H+LEM is a constructive system, but observe
that it has the same term extraction property as the constructive system H. For
this reason, H+LEM is neither constructive (due to the presence LEM) nor can it be
called non-constructive (due to the presence of the same term extraction property
as the constructive system H). In conclusion, H + LEM is an example of a system
which inhabits the twilight zone between the constructive and non-constructive.
An alternative view based on Brouwer’s dictum logic depends upon mathematics
is that extending E-HAω to the nonstandard system H fundamentally changes the
mathematics. The logic, dependent as it is on mathematics according to Brouwer,
changes along too; an example of this change-in-logic is as follows: LEM changes
from the original sin of non-constructivity in the context of E-HAω to a computa-
tionally inert statement in the context of H by Theorem 4.1. We shall discuss this
view in more detail in Section 6.1.
As a logical next step, we discuss P, which is essentially H + LEMns and where
the latter is the law of excluded middle Φ ∨ ¬Φ for any formula (in the language
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of H). Note that LEMns is much more general than LEM. Nonetheless, we have the
following theorem, not proved explicitly in [10], and first formulated in [97].
Theorem 4.2 (Term extraction II). Let ϕ be internal, i.e. not involving ‘st’, and
let ∆int be a collection of internal formulas. If P+∆int ⊢ (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y), then
we can extract a term t from this proof with E-PAω +∆int ⊢ (∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ϕ(x, y).
The term t is such that t(x) is a finite list and does not depend on ∆int.
As for H+LEM, the system P is neither constructive due to the presence LEM and
LEMns, but it has the same term extraction property as the constructive system
H by Theorem 4.2, i.e. calling P non-constructive does not make sense in light of
(and does not do justice to) Theorem 4.1 for ∆int = ∅.
In short, the systems H + LEM and P share essential properties with classical
mathematics (in the form of LEM and LEMns) and with constructive mathemat-
ics (the term extraction property of H from Theorem 4.1). For this reason, these
systems can be said to occupy the twilight zone between the constructive and non-
constructive: They are neither one nor the other. More evidence for the latter claim
may be found in Section 5.2.1 where P is shown to satisfy a natural nonstandard
version of the existence property and related ‘hallmark’ properties of intuitionistic
systems. We show in Section 4.3 that adding Transfer to P results in an unambigu-
ously non-constructive system; the axiom Transfer will be shown to be the ‘real’
law of excluded middle of Nonstandard Analysis in a very concrete way.
Furthermore, on a more pragmatic note, the above results betray that we can
gain access to the computational/constructive content of classical Nonstandard
Analysis via the term extraction property formulated in Theorem 4.2. It is then
a natural question how wide the scope of the latter is. The rest of this section
is dedicated to showing that this scope encompasses pure Nonstandard Analysis.
The latter is Nonstandard Analysis restricted to nonstandard axioms (Transfer
and Standardisation) and nonstandard definitions (for continuity, compactness, in-
tegration, convergence, et cetera). This will establish the local constructivity of
Nonstandard Analysis as formulated in Section 3.4.
The above discussion deals with logic and we now discuss a first mathematical
example. In particular, we now consider an elementary application of Theorem 4.2
to nonstandard continuity as in Example 2.1. We shall refer to a formula of the
form (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y) with ϕ internal as a normal form.
Example 4.3 (Nonstandard and constructive continuity). Suppose f : R → R is
nonstandard continuous, provable in P. In other words, similar to Example 2.1, the
following is provable in our system P:
(∀stx ∈ R)(∀y ∈ R)(x ≈ y → f(x) ≈ f(y)). (4.1)
Since P includes Idealisation (essentially) as in IST, P also proves the following:
(∀stx ∈ R)(∀stk ∈ N)(∃stN ∈ N) (4.2)
(∀y ∈ R)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
)
,
in exactly the same way as proved in Example 2.1. Since the underlined formula
in (4.2) is internal, (4.2) is a normal form and we note that Theorem 4.2 applies to
‘P ⊢ (4.2)’. Applying the latter, we obtain a term t such that E-PAω proves:
(∀x ∈ R, k ∈ N)(∃N ∈ t(x, k))(∀y ∈ R)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
)
.
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Since t(x, k) is a finite list of natural numbers, define s(x, k) as the maximum of
t(x, k)(i) for i < |t(x, k)| where |t(x, k)| is the length of the finite list t(x, k). The
term s is called a modulus of continuity of f as it satisfies:
(∀x ∈ R, k ∈ N)(∀y ∈ R)
(
|x− y| < 1
s(x,k) → |f(x)− f(y)| <
1
k
)
. (4.3)
Similarly, from the proof in P that f is nonstandard uniform continuous, we may
extract a modulus of uniform continuity (See Section 4.2). This observation is
important : moduli are an essential part of Bishop’s Constructive Analysis (See e.g.
[13, p. 34]), so we just proved that such constructive information is implicit in the
nonstandard notion of continuity!
For the ‘reverse direction’, the basic axioms (See Definition A.3) of P state that
all constants in the language of E-PAω are standard. Hence, if E-PAω proves (4.3)
for some term s, then P proves (4.3) and that s is standard. Hence, P proves
(∀stx ∈ R, k ∈ N)(∃stN ∈ N)(∀y ∈ R)
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
)
, (4.4)
as we may take N = s(x, k). However, (4.4) clearly implies (4.1), i.e. nonstandard
continuity also follows from ‘constructive’ continuity with a modulus! Furthermore,
one establishes in exactly the same way that P ⊢ [(4.3)→ (4.1)] for any term t.
By the previous example, the nonstandard notion of (uniform) continuity amounts
to the same as the ‘constructive’ definition involving moduli. As discussed in
Section 4.6, other nonstandard definitions (of integration, differentiability, com-
pactness, convergence, et cetera) are also ‘meta-equivalent’ to their constructive
counterparts. Thus, rather than being ‘fundamentally non-constructive’ as claimed
by Bishop and Connes in Section 3.5, infinitesimals (and other nonstandard ob-
jects) provide an elegant shorthand for computational content, like moduli from
constructive mathematics. Furthermore, the types involved in nonstandard state-
ments are generally lower (than the associated statement not involving Nonstandard
Analysis), which should appeal to the practitioners of Reverse Mathematics where
higher-type objects are represented via so-called codes in second-order arithmetic.
Finally, Theorem 4.2 allows us to extract computational content (in the form of
the term t) from (classical) Nonstandard Analysis in the spirit of Kohlenbach’s proof
mining program. We refer to [66] for the latter, while we shall apply Theorem 4.2
in the next sections to establish the local constructivity of Nonstandard Analysis.
4.2. Two examples of local constructivity. In this section, we study two basic
examples of theorems proved using Nonstandard Analysis, namely the intermediate
value theorem and continuous functions on the unit interval are Riemann integrable.
We shall apply the heuristic provided by local constructivity, i.e. only consider the
parts of the proof in the nonstandard universe not involving Transfer and Standard
Part, and apply Theorem 4.2 to obtain the effective content.
4.2.1. Intermediate value theorem. In this section, we discuss the computational
content of a nonstandard proof of the intermediate value theorem; we shall make
use of the uniform notion of nonstandard continuity, defined as follows.
Definition 4.4. The function f is nonstandard uniformly continuous on [0, 1] if
(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])[x ≈ y → f(x) ≈ f(y)]. (4.5)
We first prove the intermediate value theorem in IST; all notions have their usual
(epsilon-delta/internal) meaning, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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Theorem 4.5 (IVT). For every continuous function f : [0, 1] → R such that
f(0)f(1) < 0, there is x ∈ [0, 1] such that f(x) = 0.
Proof. Clearly IVT is internal, and we may thus assume that f is standard, as
applying Transfer to this restriction yields full IVT. By Example 2.2, f is non-
standard continuous as in (2.2) for X = [0, 1] by Transfer. The latter can also be
used to show that f is nonstandard uniform continuous as in (4.1), but this follows
easiest from (∀x ∈ [0, 1])(∃sty ∈ [0, 1])(x ≈ y), i.e. the nonstandard compactness of
the unit interval, which follows in turn from applying Standard Part to the trivial
formula (∀stk ∈ N)(∃stq ∈ Q)(|x − q| < 1
2k
) and noting that the resulting sequence
converges (to a standard real). Now let N be a nonstandard natural number and
let j ≤ N be the least number such that f( j
N
)f( j+1
N
) ≤ 0 (whose existence is
guaranteed by f(0)f(1) < 0 and induction). Then f(j/N) ≈ 0 by nonstandard
uniform continuity. By nonstandard compactness there is standard y ∈ [0, 1] such
that y ≈ j/N . Then f(y) ≈ 0 by nonstandard uniform continuity, and the former
is short for (∀stk0)(|f(x)| < 1
k
). Finally, applying Transfer yields f(x) = 0. 
Local constructivity as in Section 3.4 dictates that we omit all instances of Trans-
fer and Standard Part to obtain the constructive core of the nonstandard proof of
IVT. Note that the former axioms were used to obtain nonstandard uniform con-
tinuity. Thus, we obtain the following version, which we prove in P.
Theorem 4.6 (IVTns). For every standard and nonstandard uniformly continuous
f : [0, 1]→ R such that f(0)f(1) < 0, there is x ∈ [0, 1] such that f(x) ≈ 0.
Proof. Let f be as in the theorem, fix N0 > 0 and suppose for all i ≤ N that
f( i
N
)f( i+1
N
) > 0. If f(0) > 0, let ϕ(i) be the formula i ≤ N → f(i/N) > 0. Then
ϕ(0) and ϕ(i) → ϕ(i + 1) for all i ∈ N, both by assumption. Induction now yields
that f(1) > 0, a contradiction. Thus, let N be a nonstandard natural number and
let j ≤ N be the least number such that f( j
N
)f( j+1
N
) ≤ 0. Then f(j/N) ≈ 0 by
nonstandard uniform continuity. The same approach works for f(0) < 0. 
Applying term extraction to IVTns as in Theorem 4.2, we obtain the following
theorem, which includes a constructive ‘approximate’ version of IVT (See [7, I.7]).
Theorem 4.7. From the proof ‘P ⊢ IVTns’, we obtain a term t such that E-PA
ω
proves that for all f, g where g is the modulus of uniform continuity of f , we have
(∀k ∈ N)(|f(t(f, g, k))| <R
1
k
).
Proof. We may apply Theorem 4.2 to normal forms only. Now, the nonstandard
uniform continuity of f on [0, 1] has the following normal form:
(∀stk ∈ N)(∃stN ∈ N)(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])
(
|x− y| < 1
N
→ |f(x)− f(y)| < 1
k
)
, (4.6)
which is proved in P exactly as for nonstandard continuity in Example 2.1; the un-
derlined formula is abbreviated A(f,N, k). The conclusion of IVTns is not a normal
form, but is equivalent19 to (∀stk ∈ N)(∃x ∈ [0, 1])(|f(x)| < 1
k
) by Idealisation. By
nonstandard uniform continuity, we also have (∀stk ∈ N)(∃stq ∈ [0, 1])(|f(q)| < 1
k
),
which is a normal form. Hence, taking ‘f ∈ D’ to mean that f : R → R satisfies
f(0)f(1) < 0, IVTns becomes
(∀stf ∈ D)
[
(∀stl0)(∃stN0)A(f,N, l)→ (∀stk0)(∃stq ∈ [0, 1])(|f(q)| < 1
k
)
]
. (4.7)
19Apply Idealisation to (∀stz0
∗
)(∃x ∈ [0, 1])(∀k ∈ z)(|f(x)| < 1
k
) to see this.
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Since standard functions output standard values for standard inputs, we obtain
(∀stf ∈ D, g)
[
(∀stl0)A(f, g(l), l)→ (∀stk0)(∃stq ∈ [0, 1])(|f(q)| < 1
k
)
]
, (4.8)
and dropping the remaining ‘st’ in the antecedent, we get
(∀stf ∈ D, g)
[
(∀l0)A(f, g(l), l)→ (∀stk0)(∃stq ∈ [0, 1])(|f(q)| < 1
k
)
]
, (4.9)
which becomes the following normal form:
(∀stf ∈ D, g, k)(∃stq ∈ [0, 1])
[
(∀l0)A(f, g(l), l)→ (|f(q)| < 1
k
)
]
. (4.10)
Applying Theorem 4.2 to ‘P ⊢ (4.10)’, we obtain a term s such that
(∀f ∈ D, g, k)(∃q ∈ s(f, g, k))
[
(∀l0)A(f, g(l), l)→ (|f(q)| < 1
k
)
]
. (4.11)
To obtain the term t from the theorem, note that we can decide if |f(q)| > 12k
or |f(q)| < 1
k
for any q, using the ‘law of comparison’ ([7, §1.3]) of constructive
mathematics. Indeed, this law states that (under the BHK-interpretation):
(∀x, y, z ∈ R)(x < y → x < z ∨ z < y). (4.12)
Thus, there is an effective procedure to decide which disjunct in (4.12) holds. Hence,
define t(f, g, k) as the first element q ∈ s(f, g, 2k) such that |f(q)| < 1
k
. We obtain
(∀f ∈ D, g)
[
(∀l0)A(f, g(l), l)→ (∀k0)(|f(t(f, g, k))| < 1
k
)
]
, (4.13)
from (4.11) by pushing the quantifier pertaining to k inside again. 
Approximate versions of IVT are of course well-known, but the previous is not
intended to be new, but merely to provide an example of local constructivity as
in Section 3.4: After stripping away Transfer and Standard Part in the proof
of Theorem 4.5, we are left with a proof of IVTns in P, which converts into a
constructive version of IVT after term extraction by Theorem 4.7.
Furthermore, we point out the (apparently innocent) use of proof-by-contradiction
in the proof of IVTns. Also, Theorem 4.7 is merely one of many possible results
obtainable by term extraction. Indeed, while the conclusion of the former theorem
has effective content, we can as well obtain relative computability results from the
proof of IVT in Theorem 4.5, e.g. by not removing the use of Transfer. We shall
explore this avenue further in Section 4.3.2.
Finally, it is also important to note that we wrote out the proof of Theorem 4.7
in full detail, while one readily skips from (4.7) to (4.13) with some practice. To
the latter end, we conclude this section with the following remark on normal forms;
we show that moduli (like in (4.10)) come about when converting an implication
between two normal forms into an normal form in P (See Theorem 5.5 for H).
Remark 4.8 (Normal forms and implication). As discussed in Example 4.3, the
nonstandard definition of continuity can be brought into a normal form (4.2), while
the nonstandard definition of uniform continuity has the normal form (4.6). These
observations are important as normal forms have computational content thanks to
Theorem 4.2. The proof of Theorem 4.7 suggests that normal forms are closed
under implication; indeed, the normal form (4.10) is derived from an implication
between two normal forms. We now establish the general case as follows. Let ϕ, ψ
be internal and consider the following implication between normal forms:
(∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y)→ (∀stz)(∃stw)ψ(z, w). (4.14)
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Since standard functionals have standard output for standard input, (4.14) implies
(∀stζ)
[
(∀stx)ϕ(x, ζ(x)) → (∀stz)(∃stw)ψ(z, w)
]
. (4.15)
Bringing all standard quantifiers outside, we obtain the following normal form:
(∀stζ, z)(∃stw, x)
[
ϕ(x, ζ(x))→ ψ(z, w)
]
, (4.16)
as the formula in square brackets is internal. Now, (4.16) is equivalent to (4.15),
but one usually (like in the proof of Theorem 4.7) weakens the latter as follows:
(∀stζ, z)(∃stw)
[
(∀x)ϕ(x, ζ(x)) → ψ(z, w)
]
, (4.17)
as (4.17) is closer to the usual mathematical definitions. For instance, if the an-
tecedent of (4.14) is (the normal form of) uniform continuity, then the antecedent
of (4.17) is the constructive definition of uniform-continuity-with-a-modulus, while
this is not the case for (4.16). We shall shorten the remaining proofs by just pro-
viding normal forms and jumping straight from (4.14) to (4.17) whenever possible.
4.2.2. Riemann integration. In this section, we discuss the computational content
of a nonstandard proof that continuous functions are Riemann integrable; we shall
make use of the usual definitions of Riemann integration as follows.
Definition 4.9. [Riemann Integration]
(1) A partition of [0, 1] is an increasing sequence pi = (0, t0, x1, t1, . . . , xM−1, tM−1, 1).
We write ‘pi ∈ P ([0, 1])’ to denote that pi is such a partition.
(2) For pi ∈ P ([0, 1]), ‖pi‖ is the mesh, i.e. the largest distance between two
adjacent partition points xi and xi+1.
(3) For pi ∈ P ([0, 1]) and f : R → R, the real Spi(f) :=
∑M−1
i=0 f(ti)(xi+1 − xi)
is the Riemann sum of f and pi.
(4) A function f is nonstandard integrable on [0, 1] if
(∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
[
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ ≈ 0→ Spi(f) ≈ Spi′(f)
]
. (4.18)
(5) A function f is integrable on [0, 1] if
(∀k0)(∃N0)(∀pi, ρ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
[
‖pi‖, ‖ρ‖ < 1
N
→ |Spi(f)− Sρ(f)| <
1
k
]
. (4.19)
A modulus of (Riemann) integration ω1 provides N = ω(k) as in (4.19).
Let RIE be the (internal) statement that a function is Riemann integrable on the
unit interval if it is (pointwise) continuous there.
Theorem 4.10. The system IST proves RIE.
Proof. In a nutshell, the proof in [56, p. 57] goes through with minimal modification
(from the Robinsonian framework). In the latter proof, Transfer and Standardi-
sation (although the latter can be avoided) are used to derive the nonstandard
definitions of uniform continuity and integration from the epsilon-delta definitions
of pointwise continuity and Riemann integration. We have proved the equivalence
between epsilon-delta and nonstandard continuity in Example 2.2, and the case for
Riemann integration is essentially identical. It thus remains to prove that nonstan-
dard uniform continuity implies nonstandard integrability.
Thus, let pi′ = (0, t′0, x
′
1, t
′
1, . . . , x
′
M−1, t
′
M−1, 1) be pi = (0, t0, x1, t1, . . . , xM−1, tM−1, 1)
with all reals replaced20 with their rational approximations of the form i
2M+1
. By
20Note that this can be done effectively by using the ‘law of comparison’ ([7, §1.3]) as in (4.12).
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nonstandard uniform continuity, we have maxi≤M−1 |f(t′i) − f(ti)| = ζ0 ≈ 0, and
define x′i+1 − x
′
i = xi+1 − xi + εi where 0 ≈ |εi| ≤
1
2M+1 by definition. Applying
(4.6) for k = 1 and suitable standard x ∈ [0, 1], we see that f(y) ≤ M for any
y ∈ [0, 1]. Thus |
∑M−1
i=0 f(t
′
i)εi| ≤
M2
2M+1 ≈ 0 and consider the following:
|Spi(f)− Spi′(f)| = |
∑M−1
i=0 f(ti)(xi+1 − xi)−
∑M−1
i=0 f(t
′
i)(x
′
i+1 − x
′
i)|
= |
∑M−1
i=0 (f(t
′
i)− f(ti)) · (xi+1 − xi) +
∑M−1
i=0 f(t
′
i)εi|
≤
∑M−1
i=0 |f(t
′
i)− f(ti)| · |xi+1 − xi|+ |
∑M−1
i=0 f(t
′
i)εi|
/
∑M−1
i=0 ζ0 · |xi+1 − xi|
= ζ0
∑M−1
i=0 ·|xi+1 − xi| = ζ0 ≈ 0. (4.20)
For two partitions pi, ρ ∈ P ([0, 1]), consider the associated ‘approximate’ partitions
pi′ and ρ′. Since the latter only consist of rationals, it is easy to define ‘refinements’
pi′′, ρ′′ of equal length and which contain all points with even index from both pi′
and ρ′; the points of odd index have to be repeated as necessary. We then have
Spi(f) ≈ Spi′(f) ≈ Spi′′(f) ≈ Sρ′′(f) ≈ Sρ′(f) ≈ Sρ(f),
where only the third ‘≈’ requires a proof, which is analogous to (4.20). 
Local constructivity as in Section 3.4 dictates that we omit all instances of Trans-
fer and Standard Part to obtain the constructive core of the nonstandard proof of
RIE. Note that the former axioms were used to obtain nonstandard uniform con-
tinuity and let RIEns be the statement that every function f which is nonstandard
uniformly continuous on the unit interval is nonstandard integrable.
Let RIEef(t) be the statement that t(g) is a modulus of integration if g is a
modulus of uniform continuity of f on the unit interval. The latter theorem may
be called ‘constructive’ as we copied it from Bishop’s constructive analysis (See
[18, p. 53]). The nonstandard version apparently yields the constructive version.
Theorem 4.11. From a proof of RIEns in P, a term t can be extracted such that
E-PAω proves RIEef(t).
Proof. A normal form for nonstandard uniform continuity is (4.6), while one derives
the following normal form for nonstandard integrability as in Example 2.1:
(∀stk′)(∃stN ′)
[
(∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))(‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ ≤ 1
N ′
→ |Spi(f)− Spi(f)| ≤
1
k′
)
]
,
where B(k′, N ′, f) is the (internal) formula in square brackets and the underlined
formula in (4.6) is abbreviated A(f,N, k). Then RIEns is the following implication
(∀f : R → R)
[
(∀stk)(∃stN)A(f,N, k)→ (∀stk′)(∃stN ′)B(k′, N ′, f)
]
. (4.21)
and applying Remark 4.8, i.e. the step from (4.14) to (4.17), to the underlined
formula in (4.21), we obtain the following:
(∀f : R → R)(∀stg, k′)(∃stN ′)
[
(∀k)A(f, g(k), k)→ B(k′, N ′, f)
]
. (4.22)
Now, (4.22) is not a normal form, but note that it trivially implies
(∀stg, k′)(∀f : R → R)(∃stN ′)
[
(∀k)A(f, g(k), k)→ B(k′, N ′, f)
]
, (4.23)
where the underlined formula has the right from to apply Idealisation I. We obtain:
(∀stg, k′)(∃stw0
∗
)(∀f : R → R)(∃N ′ ∈ w)
[
(∀k)A(f, g(k), k)→ B(k′, N ′, f)
]
,
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which is a normal form. Define N0 := maxi<|w| w(i) and note that
(∀stg, k′)(∃stN0)(∀f : R → R)
[
(∀k)A(f, g(k), k)→ B(k′, N0, f)
]
, (4.24)
since B(k′,M, f) → B(k′,K, f) for K > M by the definition of Riemann integra-
tion. Applying Theorem 4.2 to ‘P ⊢ (4.24)’, we obtain a term s such that
(∀g, k′)(∃N0 ∈ s(g, k
′))(∀f : R → R)
[
(∀k)A(f, g(k), k)→ B(k′, N0, f)
]
,
and defining t(g, k′) as maxi<|s(g,k′)| s(g, k
′)(i), we obtain RIEef(t) in light of the
definitions of A,B from the beginning of this proof. 
Note that the actual computation in RIEef(t) only takes place on the modulus g;
this is a consequence of RIEns applying to all functions, not just the standard ones.
Indeed, in the previous proof we could obtain (4.23) and then ‘pull the standard
existential quantifier (∃stN) through the internal one (∀f)’ thanks to Idealisation,
and then obtain (4.24) in which the quantifier (∀f) has no influence anymore on
term extraction as in Theorem 4.2.
Clearly, the same strategy as in the previous proof works for any normal form
in the scope of an internal quantifier. Indeed (∀z)(∀stx)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y, z) implies
(∀stx)(∃stwτ
∗
)(∀z)(∃y ∈ w)ϕ(x, y, z) by Idealisation. Furthermore, as is done in
the previous proof for τ = 0, if ϕ is (somehow) monotone in y, we may define y0 as
(some kind of) maximum of w(i) for i < |w|, and obtain (∀stx)(∃styτ0 )(∀z)ϕ(x, y, z).
We finish this section with an even stronger result: a normal form in the scope of
an external quantifier over all infinitesimals is again a normal form. This result
also sheds light on the correctness of the intuitive infinitesimal calculus.
Theorem 4.12 (P). For internal ϕ, (∀ε ≈ 0)(∀stx)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y, ε) is equivalent
to a normal form. If τ = 0 and (∀z0, w0)
(
z > w → (ϕ(x,w, ε)→ ϕ(x, z, ε))
)
, then
(∀ε ≈ 0)(∀stx)(∃sty0)ϕ(x, y, ε)↔ (∀stx)(∃sty0)(∀ε ≈ 0)ϕ(x, y, ε) (4.25)
↔ (∀stx)(∃sty0, N0)(∀ε)
[
|ε| < 1
N
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
.
Proof. Written out in full, the initial formula from the theorem is:
(∀ε)
[
(∀stk0)(|ε| < 1
k
)→ (∀stx)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
,
and bringing outside all standard quantifiers as far as possible:
(∀stx)(∀ε)(∃styτ , k0)
[
|ε| < 1
k
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
,
the underlined formula is suitable for Idealisation. Applying the latter yields
(∀stx)(∃stw0
∗
, zτ
∗
)(∀ε)(∃yτ ∈ z, k0 ∈ w)
[
|ε| < 1
k
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
,
and let N0 be the maximum of all w(i) for i < |w|. We obtain:
(∀stx)(∃stzτ
∗
, N)(∀ε)(∃yτ ∈ z)
[
|ε| < 1
N
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
.
If τ = 0 and ϕ is monotone as above, let y0 be maxi<|z| z(i) and obtain:
(∀stx)(∃sty0, N)(∀ε)
[
|ε| < 1
N
→ ϕ(x, y0, ε)
]
, (4.26)
which is as required by (4.25) when pushing (∃stN) inside the square brackets. 
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The monotonicity condition on ϕ in the theorem occurs a lot in analysis: In
any ‘epsilon-delta’ definition, the formula resulting from removing the ‘epsilon’ and
‘delta’ quantifiers is monotone (in the sense of the theorem) in the ‘delta’ variable.
Furthermore, (4.25) explains why correct results can be produced by the intuitive
infinitesimal calculus (from physics and engineering): Many arguments in the latter
calculus produce formulas in the same form as the left-hand side of (4.25). Applying
term extraction on the bottom normal form of (4.25), we obtain a term t such that:
(∀x)(∃y0, N0 ≤ t(x))(∀ε)
[
|ε| < 1
N
→ ϕ(x, y, ε)
]
, (4.27)
which does not involve Nonstandard Analysis. However, assuming x as in (4.27) is
only used in a certain (discrete) range, as seems typical of physics and engineering,
we can fix one ‘very large compared to the range of x’ value N0 for N and still
obtain correct results in that (∃y)ϕ(x, y, 1/N0) for x in the prescribed range.
In short: (4.25) and (4.27) explain why the practice ‘replacing infinitesimals by
very small numbers’ typical of physics and engineering can produce correct results.
4.3. An example involving Transfer .
4.3.1. Introduction. In the previous section, we provided examples of local construc-
tivity, i.e. we stripped the nonstandard proofs of Transfer and Standardisation and
obtained effective results using Theorem 4.2. A natural question, discussed in this
section for Transfer, is what happens if we do not omit these axioms. As we will see,
nonstandard proofs involving Transfer give rise to relative computability results.
By way of an elementary example, we study a nonstandard proof involving Trans-
fer of the intermediate value theorem in Section 4.3.2. By way of an advanced
example, we obtain in Section 4.3.3 effective results a` la Reverse Mathematics21.
In particular, we establish that P proves the equivalence between a fragment of
Transfer and a nonstandard version of the monotone convergence theorem (involv-
ing nonstandard convergence), in line with the equivalences from Reverse Mathe-
matics. From this nonstandard equivalence, we extract terms of Go¨del’s T which
-intuitively speaking- convert a solution to the Halting problem into a solution to
the monotone convergence theorem, and vice versa.
The above results, published first in part in [97], serve a dual purpose as follows:
(1) Transfer is shown to be fundamentally non-constructive, as it converts to
Feferman’s non-constructive mu-operator, i.e. essentially the Turing jump.
(2) Nonstandard equivalences as in Theorem 4.16 give rise to effective equiva-
lences like (4.36) which are rich in computational content.
The first item directly vindicates local constructivity from Section 3.4. The sec-
ond item is relevant as there is a field called constructive Reverse Mathematics
(See e.g. [57] for an overview) where equivalences are proved in a system based on
intuitionistic logic. In particular, the second item establishes that Reverse Mathe-
matics done in classical Nonstandard Analysis gives rise to ‘rather22 constructive’
21We refer to [102, 103] for an overview of Friedman’s foundational program Reverse Mathe-
matics, first introduced in [40, 41].
22Again, we do not claim that (4.36) counts as constructive mathematics (due to the classical
base theory E-PAω), but the former formula contains too much (automatically extracted from the
nonstandard equivalence) computational information to be dismissed as ‘non-constructive’.
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Reverse Mathematics, in line with the observations from Section 4.1 regarding the
semi-constructive status of classical Nonstandard Analysis.
We again stress that our results are only meant to illustrate the limits and
potential of local constructivity. While e.g. the effective equivalences in Section 4.3.3
are not necessarily new or surprising, it is surprising that we can obtain them from
nonstandard proofs without any attempt whatsoever at working constructively.
4.3.2. The intermediate value theorem. We study a nonstandard proof involving
Transfer of the intermediate value theorem from Section 4.2.1. To this end, let IVT′ns
be IVTns with ‘≈’ replaced by ‘=R’ in the conclusion. For the latter replacement,
the following restriction of Nelson’s axiom Transfer is needed:
(∀stf1)
[
(∀stn0)f(n) 6= 0→ (∀m)f(m) 6= 0
]
. (Π01-TRANS)
We also need Feferman’s non-constructive mu-operator ([5]) as follows:
(∃µ2)
[
(∀f1)((∃n)f(n) = 0→ f(µ(f)) = 0)
]
, (µ2)
where MU(µ) is the formula in square brackets in (µ2). Finally, let IVTef(t) state
that t(f, g) is the intermediate value for f with g its modulus of continuity.
Theorem 4.13. From the proof P ⊢ Π01-TRANS→ IVTns, we obtain a term t such
that E-PAω proves (∀µ2)(MU(µ)→ IVTef(t)).
Proof. Clearly, Π01-TRANS is equivalent to the following normal form:
(∀stg1)(∃stm)
[
(∃n0)g(n) = 0→ (∃i ≤ m)g(i) = 0
]
, (4.28)
while IVT′ns has a normal form (∀
stf, g)(∃stx)C(f, g, x), where C(f, g, x) expresses
that if g is a modulus of uniform continuity of f ∈ D, then f(x) =R 0. The
latter normal form is obtained in the same way as for IVTns in the proof of Theo-
rem 4.7. Now let D(g,m) be the formula in square brackets in (4.28) and note that
Π01-TRANS→ IVTns implies the following implication between normal forms:
(∀stg)(∃stm)D(g,m)→ (∀stf, g)(∃stx)C(f, g, x).
Following Remark 4.8, we may conclude that P proves:
(∀stf, g, µ2)(∃stx)
[
(∀g)D(g, µ(g))→ C(f, g, x)
]
,
and applying Theorem 4.2, we obtain a term s such that E-PAω proves:
(∀f, g, µ2)(∃x ∈ s(f, g, µ))
[
(∀g)D(g, µ(g))→ C(f, g, x)
]
. (4.29)
We recognise the antecedent of (4.29) as (a slight variation of) MU(µ) and note
that the implication in (µ2) is also an equivalence. In other words, Feferman’s mu-
operator allows us to decide Π01-formulas, which includes formulas like f(x) =R 0.
Thus, given (∃x ∈ s(f, g, µ))(f(x) =R 0) as in (4.29), we just use the mu-operator
to test which s(f, g, µ)(i) for i < |s(f, g, µ)| is an intermediate value of f . Let the
term t be such that t(f, g, µ) is such an intermediate value and note that (4.29)
implies (∀µ2)(MU(µ)→ IVTef(t)), i.e. we are done. 
In conclusion, nonstandard proofs involving Transfer give rise to relative com-
putability results such as in the previous theorem. The result in the latter is not
meant to be new or optimal (See [67] for such results), but merely illustrates why
we remove Transfer as dictated by local constructivity: Even a small fragment like
Π01-TRANS gives rise to (what is essentially) a solution to the Halting problem.
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The conclusion of Theorem 4.13 need also not be surprising: IVT is rejected
in constructive mathematics and it hence stands to reason that we need some
non-computable object, like e.g. Feferman’s mu-operator, to compute intermediate
values. In fact, Kohlenbach proves versions of (µ2)↔ (∃Φ)IVTef(Φ) in [67, §3].
4.3.3. The monotone convergence theorem. In this section, we extract (effective)
equivalences a` la Reverse Mathematics from (non-effective) equivalences in Non-
standard Analysis involving Transfer.
First, we introduce a nonstandard version of the monotone convergence theorem
MCT involving nonstandard convergence, as follows:
Definition 4.14. [MCTns] For every standard sequence xn of reals, we have
(∀n ∈ N)(0 ≤R xn ≤R xn+1 ≤R 1)→ (∀N,M ∈ N)[¬st(N) ∧ ¬st(M)→ xM ≈ xN ].
Note that the conclusion expresses the nonstandard convergence of xn. The
corresponding effective/constructive23 version is:
Definition 4.15. [MCTef(t)] For any sequence xn of reals, we have
(∀n ∈ N)(0 ≤R xn ≤R xn+1 ≤R 1)→ (∀k,N,M ∈ N)[N,M ≥ t(x(·))(k))→ |cM−cN | ≤
1
k
].
We also require the following functional, which is equivalent to (µ2) by ([67, §3]),
(∃ϕ2)
[
(∀f1)((∃n)f(n) = 0↔ ϕ(f) = 0)
]
, (∃2)
and which is called the Turing jump functional. Denote by TJ(ϕ) the formula in
square brackets in (∃2). We have the following theorem and corollary.
Theorem 4.16. The system P proves that MCTns ↔ Π
0
1-TRANS.
Proof. First of all, to establish MCTns → Π01-TRANS, fix standard f
1 such that
(∀stn)f(n) 6= 0 and define the standard sequence x(·) of reals as follows
xk :=
{
0 (∀i ≤ k)f(i) 6= 0∑k
i=1
1
2i otherwise
. (4.30)
Clearly, x(·) is weakly increasing and hence nonstandard convergent by MCTns.
However, if (∃m0)f(m0 + 1) = 0 and m0 is the least such number, we would have
0 = xm0 6≈ xm0+1 ≈ 1. The latter contradicts MCTns and we must therefore have
(∀n0)(f(n) 6= 0). Thus, Π01-TRANS follows and we now prove the other direction
in two different ways. To this end, let xn be as in MCTns and consider the formula
(∀stk ∈ N)(∃stm ∈ N)(∀stN,M ≥ m)[|xM − xN | ≤
1
k
], (4.31)
which expresses that xn ‘epsilon-delta’ converges relative to ‘st’. If (4.31) is false,
there is some k0 such that (∀stm ∈ N)(∃stM > N ≥ m)[xM > xN +
1
k0
]. However,
applying24 the latter formula k0+1 times, we obtain someM0 such that xM0 >R 1,
contradiction our assumptions. Hence, (4.31) holds and applying Π01-TRANS to the
innermost underlined formula yields that xn is nonstandard convergent.
23Similar to the case of continuity, a modulus of convergence is part and parcel of the con-
structive definition of convergence, as discussed in e.g. [13, p. 27].
24To ‘apply this formula k0 + 1 times’, replace all xn in (∀stm ∈ N)(∃stM > N ≥ m)[xM >
xN +
1
k0
] by approximations up to some fixed nonstandard number and apply HACint. Since all
numbers are rationals (due to the approximation), we can test which number is the correct one.
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For a second proof of Π01-TRANS→ MCTns based on the existing literature, note
that Π01-TRANS implies the following normal form:
(∀stf1)(∃stm)
[
(∃n0)f(n) = 0→ (∃i ≤ m)f(i) = 0
]
, (4.32)
to which HACint may be applied to obtain standard ν
1→0∗ such that
(∀stf1)(∃m ∈ ν(f))
[
(∃n0)f(n) = 0→ (∃i ≤ m)f(i) = 0
]
. (4.33)
Now define µ(f) as the maximum of ν(f)(i) for i < |ν(f)| and conclude that
(∀stf1)
[
(∃n0)f(n) = 0→ (∃i ≤ µ(f))f(i) = 0
]
. (4.34)
Note that we actually have equivalence in (4.34), i.e. µ allows us to decide existential
formulas as long as a standard function describes the quantifier-free part as in
the antecedent of (4.34). Hence, the system P + Π01-TRANS proves arithmetical
comprehension ACA0 (See [103, III]) relative to the ‘st’. A well-known result from
Reverse Mathematics (See [103, III.2.2]) is that RCA0 proves ACA0 ↔ MCT. Since
P also proves the axioms of RCA0 relative to ‘st’, the system P+Π
0
1-TRANS proves
MCTst. Hence, for xn as in the latter, there is standard x ∈ R such that
(∀stk ∈ N)(∃stm ∈ N)(∀stN,M ≥ m)[|xM − x| ≤
1
k
]. (4.35)
Applying Π01-TRANS to the underlined formula in (4.35) now finishes the proof. 
Corollary 4.17. From any proof of MCTns ↔ Π01-TRANS in P, two terms s, u can
be extracted such that E-PAω proves:
(∀µ2)
[
MU(µ)→ MCTef(s(µ))
]
∧ (∀t1→1)
[
MCTef(t)→ MU(u(t))
]
. (4.36)
Proof. We prove the corollary for the implication Π01-TRANS → MCTns and leave
the other one to the reader. The sentence MCTns is readily converted to
(∀stx0→1(·) , k)(∃
stm)
[
(∀n0)(0 ≤ xn ≤ xn+1 ≤ 1) (4.37)
→ (∀N,M ≥ m)[|xM − xN | ≤
1
k
],
in the same way as in Example 2.1. Now let A (resp. B) be the formula in square
brackets in (4.34) (resp. (4.37)) and note that the existence of standard µ2 as in
(4.34) implies Π01-TRANS. Hence, Π
0
1-TRANS→ MCTns gives rise to the following:[
(∃stµ2)(∀stf1)A(f, µ(f))
]
→ (∀stx0→1(·) , k
0)(∃stm0)B(x(·), k,m), (4.38)
and bringing outside the standard quantifiers, we obtain
(∀stx0→1(·) , k
0, µ2)(∃stm, f)[A(f, µ(f))→ B(x(·), k,m)], (4.39)
which is a normal form as the formula in square brackets is internal. Now applying
Theorem 4.2 to ‘P ⊢ (4.39)’ yields a term t such that E-PAω proves
(∀x0→1(·) , k
0, µ2)(∃m, f ∈ t(µ, x(·), k))[A(f, µ(f))→ B(x(·), k,m)], (4.40)
and define s(µ, x(·), k) to be the maximum of all entries for m in t(µ, x(·), k). We
immediately obtain, using classical logic, that
(∀µ2)[(∀f1)A(f, µ(f))→ (∀x0→1(·) , k
0)B(x(·), k, s(µ, x(·), k))],
which is exactly as required by the theorem, i.e. the first conjunct of (4.36). 
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With some effort, the proof of MCTns ↔ Π01-TRANS goes through in H, i.e.
the theorem is constructive, and the corollary then applies to H and E-HAω. The
axioms from Definition A.7 are crucial in this context. In any case, the previous
results indicate that Transfer is highly non-constructive, as it is converted into the
Turing jump (or stronger) after term extraction, thus lending credence to the local
constructivity of Nonstandard Analysis.
Furthermore, we stress that the results in (4.36) are not (necessarily) surprising
in and of themselves. What is surprising is that we can ‘algorithmically’ derive
these effective results from the quite simple classical proof of Π01-TRANS↔ MCTns,
in which no efforts towards effective results are made. Furthermore, while (4.36)
deals with higher types, it is possible to derive classical computability theory, i.e.
dealing only with subsets of N, as discussed in Section 5.4.
Finally, we point out one entertaining property of Transfer with regard to the
law of excluded middle: When working in P, there are in general three possibilities
for any internal formula A(x): (i) A(x) holds for all x, (ii) there is standard x such
that ¬A(x), and (iii) there is y such that ¬A(y), but no such standard number
exists. Hence, in the extended language of P there is a third25 possibility alongside
of the two usual ones, namely that there is a counterexample, but it is not standard.
Now, the Transfer axiom T excludes the aforementioned third possibility, i.e.
in IST we have (∃stx)¬A(x) ∨ (∀x)A(x). Similar to Section 4.1, we observe that
the fundamental change from mainstream Peano arithmetic E-PAω to the system
of Nonstandard Analysis P has an influence on the associated logic: The ‘usual’
law of excluded middle included in P allows for three possibilities as above, while
Transfer reduces this spectrum to two, i.e. the latter plays the role of the law of
excluded middle in the extended language of Nonstandard Analysis.
4.4. An example involving Standard Part . In Section 4.2, we provided ex-
amples of local constructivity, i.e. we stripped the nonstandard proofs of Transfer
and Standardisation and obtained effective results using Theorem 4.2. A natural
question is what happens if we do not omit the latter axiom.
To this end, we study in Section 4.4.1 a nonstandard proof involving Standard
Part of RIE formulated with pointwise continuity. As we will see, nonstandard
proofs involving Standard Part give rise to rather exotic relative computability
results. In particular, similar to Section 4.3.3, we establish that P proves the
equivalence between STP, a fragment of Standard Part, and a nonstandard version
of RIE. Applying Theorem 4.2 to this nonstandard equivalence, we observe that
STP is converted to the special fan functional, a cousin of Tait’s fan functional with
rather exotic computational properties, as discussed in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
However, the special fan functional is also quite natural from a different point of
view: it is implicit in Cousin’s lemma, as discussed in Section 4.4.4.
The above results serve a triple purpose as follows:
(1) Standard Part is non-constructive, as it gives rise to the special fan func-
tional, which is extremely hard to compute in classical mathematics.
25Note that one can prove using intuitionistic logic that ¬(¬Q ∧ ¬¬Q) for any Q, i.e. there is
no explicit ‘third option’ in which both Q and ¬Q are false ([20, 44]).
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(2) The combination of the fragments of Standard Part and Transfer corre-
sponding to WKL0 and ACA0 gives rise to ATR0. Thus, Standard Part is
‘even more’ non-constructive in the presence of Transfer.
(3) Nonstandard equivalences as in Theorem 4.19 give rise to effective equiva-
lences like in Theorem 4.21 which are rich in computational content.
The first and second items directly vindicate local constructivity from Section 3.4.
The final item is relevant for constructive Reverse Mathematics as discussed in the
previous section. By contrast, we discuss in Section 4.4.3 how results involving the
special fan functional give rise to ‘normal’ results involving known objects.
4.4.1. Weak Ko¨nig’s lemma and continuity. In this section, we study a nonstandard
proof involving a fragment of Standard Part. In particular, we study the theorem
RIEpw that a pointwise continuous function on the unit interval is integrable.
First of all, weak Ko¨nig’s lemma (WKL) is the statement every infinite binary tree
has a path and gives rise to the second ‘Big Five’ system of Reverse Mathematics
(See e.g. [103, IV]). The following fragments of Standard Part are equivalent (See
Theorem A.14) and constitute the nonstandard counterpart of weak Ko¨nig’s lemma.
Definition 4.18. [Equivalent fragments of Standard Part ]
(∀α1 ≤1 1)(∃
stβ1 ≤1 1)(α ≈1 β). (STP)
(∀x ∈ [0, 1])(∃sty ∈ [0, 1])(x ≈ y). (STPR)
(∀f1)(∃stg1)
(
(∀stn0)(∃stm0)(f(n) = m)→ f ≈1 g
)
. (4.41)
(∀T 1 ≤1 1)
[
(∀stn)(∃β0)(|β| = n ∧ β ∈ T )→ (∃stα1 ≤1 1)(∀
stn0)(αn ∈ T )
]
, (4.42)
(∀stg2)(∃stw)
[
(∀T 1 ≤1 1)
(
(∀α1 ∈w(1))(αg(α) 6∈ T ) (4.43)
→ (∀β ≤1 1)(∃i ≤ w(2))(βi 6∈ T )
)]
.
There is no deep philosophical meaning in the words ‘nonstandard counterpart’:
This is just what the principle STP is called in the literature (See e.g. [104]). Note
that (4.42) is justWKLst with the ‘st’ dropped in the leading quantifier, while (4.41)
is a version of the axiom of choice limited to Π01-formulas (See [103, Table 4, p. 54]),
and (4.43) is a normal form for STP. Also, STPR expresses the nonstandard com-
pactness of the unit interval by [56, p. 42]. Thus, these nonstandard equivalences
reflect the ‘usual’ equivalences involving WKL from [103, IV].
Now, by [103, IV.2.7], WKL is equivalent to RIEpw and the nonstandard coun-
terparts behave in exactly the same way: letting RIEpwns be the statement every
(pointwise) nonstandard continuous function is nonstandard integrable on the unit
interval, we have the following (expected) theorem.
Theorem 4.19. The system P proves that STPR ↔ RIE
pw
ns .
Proof. For the forward implication, in light of the definitions of (uniform) nonstan-
dard continuity (4.1) and (4.5), the latter follows from the former by STPR, and
RIEpwns follows from Theorem 4.10 and noting that the latter establishes that RIEns
is provable in P. For the reverse implication, assume RIEpwns and suppose STPR is
false, i.e. there is x0 ∈ [0, 1] such that (∀sty ∈ [0, 1])(x 6≈ y). Note that 0≪ x0 ≪ 1
as the endpoints of the unit interval are standard. Fix nonstandard N0 and de-
fine the function sin
(
1
|x−x0|+
1
N
)
. The latter is well-defined for any x ∈ [0, 1] and
nonstandard pointwise continuous, but not nonstandard continuous at x0. 
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While Theorem 4.19 may be expected in light of known Reverse Mathematics
results, applying term extraction as in Theorem 4.2 to the former theorem, we
obtain an object with unexpected properties, namely the special fan functional.
Definition 4.20. [Special fan functional] We define SCF(Θ) as follows for Θ(2→(0×1
∗)):
(∀g2, T 1 ≤1 1)
[
(∀α ∈ Θ(g)(2))(αg(α) 6∈ T )→ (∀β ≤1 1)(∃i ≤ Θ(g)(1))(βi 6∈ T )
]
.
Any functional Θ satisfying SCF(Θ) is referred to as a special fan functional.
Note that there is no unique special fan functional, i.e. it is in principle incorrect
to make statements about ‘the’ special fan functional. As pointed out in [79], from a
computability theoretic perspective, the main property of the special fan functional
is the selection of Θ(g)(2) as a finite sequence of binary sequences 〈f0, . . . , fn〉 such
that the neighbourhoods defined from fig(fi) for i ≤ n form a cover of Cantor
space; almost as a by-product, Θ(g)(1) can then be chosen to be the maximal value
of g(fi) + 1 for i ≤ n. As discussed in Section 6.4, the special fan functional is also
quite natural from the point of view of Tao’s notion of metastability.
Let RIEpwef (t) be the statement that t(g) is a modulus of Riemann integration for
f if g is a modulus of pointwise continuity for f . We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.21. From any proof P ⊢ [STP → RIEpwns ], a term t can be extracted
such that E-PAω proves (∀Θ)[SCF(Θ)→ RIEpwef (t(Θ))].
Proof. A normal form for STP is given by (4.43) while a normal form for RIEpwns is
similar to the normal for (4.24) for RIEns. The rest of the proof is now straightfor-
ward in light of Remark 4.8. 
The result of the previous theorem is similar to what one would expect from the
previous sections. However, the special fan functional has rather exotic computa-
tional properties, as we discuss in the next section.
Finally, we point out one entertaining property of Standard Part with regard
to the law of excluded middle: When working in P, there are in general three
possibilities for any internal formula A(x): (i) A(x) holds for all x, (ii) there is
standard x such that ¬A(x), and (iii) there is y such that ¬A(y), but no such
standard number exists. Hence, in the extended language of P there is a third26
possibility alongside of the two usual ones, namely that there is a counterexample,
but it is not standard. Now, the Standard Part axiom S excludes the latter third
possibility in certain cases, i.e. in P + STP we have (∃stx1 ≤1 1)¬A(x) ∨ (∀x1 ≤1
1)A(x) assuming A ‘is nonstandard continuous’ as follows:
(∀stf1)(∀g1)(f ≈1 g → (A(g)→ A(f))), (4.44)
which expresses27 that A only depends on some (standard) initial segment of a
(standard) witness, similar to Brouwer’s axiom WC-N ([4]). Formulas behaving
as in (4.44) are readily found in computability theory; take for example A(f) ≡
(ϕfe,s(n) = m) with standard numerical parameters. Thus, the following typical
example of Transfer also follows from STP thanks to the above considerations:
(∀ste, s,m, n)
[
(∃B1)(ϕBe,s(n) = m)→ (∃
stB1)(ϕBe,s(n) = m)
]
.
26Recall Footnote 25 concerning the truth values of intuitionistic logic.
27To see this, resolve ‘≈1’ in (4.44) and push the resulting extra standard quantifier to the
front using idealisation.
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In conclusion, as in Section 4.1 and the previous one, we observe that the fundamen-
tal change from mainstream Peano arithmetic E-PAω to the system of Nonstandard
Analysis P has an influence on the associated logic: The ‘usual’ law of excluded
middle included in P allows for three possibilities as above, while Standard Part
reduces this spectrum to two in certain cases, i.e. the latter can play the role of the
law of excluded middle in the extended language of Nonstandard Analysis.
4.4.2. Computational properties of the special fan functional. We discuss the exotic
computational properties of the special fan functional. As it turns out, the latter
is extremely hard to compute in classical mathematics, while easy to compute in
intuitionistic mathematics. All results on the special fan functional are from [79,94].
First of all, the ‘usual’ fan functional Φ3 was introduced by Tait (See e.g. [72,81])
as an example of a functional not computable (in the sense of Kleene’s S1-S9;
[72,81]) over the total continuous functionals. The usual fan functional Φ returns a
modulus of uniform continuity Φ(Y ) on Cantor space on input a continuous func-
tional Y 2. Since Cantor space and the unit interval are isomorphic, it is clear that
the usual fan functional Φ also computes a modulus of Riemann integration for
(pointwise) continuous functionals on the unit interval. With some effort, these
kinds of results follow from the implication WKLst → (RIEpw)st. In particular,
WKLst is translated to (something similar to) the usual fan functional after term
extraction as in Theorem 4.2. Furthermore, the usual fan functional may be com-
puted (via a term in Go¨del’s T ) from (µ2) by combining the results in [68, 69].
Secondly, the special fan functional fulfils a role similar to the usual fan func-
tional in Theorem 4.21: it computes a modulus of Riemann integration for f from
a modulus of pointwise continuity from f . However, (µ2) cannot compute (in the
sense of Kleene’s S1-S9) any Θ as in SCF(Θ); the same holds for any type two func-
tional, including the Suslin functional which corresponds to Π11-CA0, the strongest
Big Five system ([67]). Thus, it seems one needs the functional (E2):
(∃ξ3)(∀Y 2)
[
(∃f1)(Y (f) = 0)↔ ξ(Y ) = 0
]
, (E2)
to compute Θ such that SCF(Θ). But (E2) implies second-order arithmetic, which
is off-the-chart qua computational strength compared to (µ2), i.e. the special fan
functional is extremely hard to compute in classical mathematics, while the intu-
itionistic fan functional MUC from [67] computes the special fan functional. The
fact that (µ2) does not compute the special fan functional translates to the non-
standard fact that P+Π01-TRANS does not prove STP, in contrast to the situation
for the standard counterparts ACA0 and WKL0 from Reverse Mathematics where
the former implies the latter. Furthermore, STP+Π01-TRANS implies ATR0 relative
to ‘st’ which translates to the fact that the special fan functional Θ and Feferman’s
mu compute a realiser for ATR0 (via a term of Go¨del’s T ).
Thirdly, by contrast, E-PAω+(∃Θ)SCF(Θ) is a conservative extension of E-PAω+
WKL, i.e. the special fan functional has quite weak first-order strength in isolation.
This conservation result requires the intuitionistic fan functional Ω3 as follows:
(∀Y 2)(∀f1, g1 ≤1 1)(fΩ(Y ) =0 gΩ(Y )→ Y (f) =0 Y (g)) (MUC(Ω))
which results in a conservative extension of E-PAω +WKL by [67, Theorem 3.15].
Now, the intuitionistic fan functional computes the special one via a term of Go¨del’s
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T by Theorem 4.22 and its corollary. Thus, the special fan functional is rather easy
to compute in intuitionistic mathematics. Proofs may be found in Section A.5.
Theorem 4.22. The axiom STP can be proved in P plus the axiom
(∀stY 2)(∀f1, g1 ≤1 1)(f ≈1 g → Y (f) =0 Y (g)). (NUC)
In particular P+ (∃stΩ3)MUC(Ω) proves STP.
Corollary 4.23. From the proof in P that NUC → STP, a term t3→3 can be
extracted such that E-PAω proves (∀Ω3)
[
MUC(Ω)→ SCF(t(Ω))].
We point out that Kohlenbach ([68, §5]) has introduced axiom schemas with
properties similar to the special fan functional Θ. These schemas are logical in
nature in that they are formulated using comprehension over formula classes. By
contrast, Θ is ‘purely mathematical’ as it emerges from the normal form of STP.
Finally, we point out an anecdote by Friedman regarding Robinson from 1966.
I remember sitting in Gerald Sacks’ office at MIT and telling him
about this [version of Nonstandard Analysis based on PA] and the
conservative extension proof. He was interested, and spoke to A.
Robinson about it, Sacks told me that A. Robinson was disap-
pointed that it was a conservative extension. [42]
In light of this quote, we believe Robinson would have enjoyed learning about the
‘new’ mathematical object that is the special fan functional originating from Non-
standard Analysis. As it happens, many theorems of second-order arithmetic can
be modified to yield similar ‘special’ functionals with extreme computable hardness.
In conclusion, we provided an example of a nonstandard proof involving Standard
Part (STP in particular) which gives rise to a rather exotic relative computability
result, namely involving the special fan functional which is extremely hard to com-
pute classically, and rather easy to compute intuitionistically. This observation is
particularly surprising as by (4.42) STP is so similar to WKL relative to ‘st’, and
the latter behaves completely ‘standard’.
4.4.3. Non-exotic computability results and Standard Part. As discussed at the
end of Section 1, part of this paper’s Catch22 is that we cannot show too much
‘strange stuff’ emerging from Nonstandard Analysis lest the reader gets the idea
that Nonstandard Analysis is somehow fundamentally strange. For this reason,
we discuss in this section how the above results involving the (admittedly strange)
special fan functional give rise to ‘normal’ results with more computational content.
For reasons of space, we only provide a sketch while technical details are in [79].
First of all, consider the following nonstandard version of the axiom of choice:
(∀stn0)(∃stxρ)Φ(n, x)→ (∃stF 0→ρ)(∀stn0)Φ(n, F (n)), (AC0ns)
where Φ can be any formula in the language of P. As shown in [9, 37], the system
P+ AC0ns satisfies a version of Theorem 4.2 but with t defined using bar recursion,
an advanced computation scheme which (somehow) embodies the computational
content of the axiom of choice (See [66] for details on bar recursion). Hence, since
AC0ns readily implies STPR by Theorem A.14, we may consider the proof P+AC
0
ns ⊢
RIEpwns . Instead of Theorem 4.21, we obtain a bar recursive term t such that RIE
pw
ef (t).
While the special fan functional is gone, we now have a term depending on bar
recursion, which seems somewhat excessive for the modest theorem RIEpw.
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Secondly, Kohlenbach discusses the ECF-translation for the base theory RCAω0 of
higher-order Reverse Mathematics from [67]. The original ECF-translation may be
found in [114, §2.6.5, p. 141] and is somewhat technical in nature. Intuitively, the
ECF-translation replaces all objects of type two or higher by type one associates,
also known as Reverse Mathematics codes. In particular, as shown by Kohlenbach in
[67, §3], if RCAω0 ⊢ A, then RCA
2
0 ⊢ [A]ECF, where A is any formula in the language
of finite types, [A]ECF is the ECF-translation of A, and RCA
2
0 is essentially the base
theory RCA0 of Reverse Mathematics. Serendipitously, the ECF-translation applied
to the conclusion of Theorem 4.21 gives rise to (a statement equivalent to) WKL→
RIEpw (See [79]). In other words, while STP translates to the (arguably strange)
special fan functional, the latter becomes ‘plain old’ WKL when applying the ECF-
translation! To use an imaginary proverb: All’s standard that ends standard!
In conclusion, we have shown how results involving the (admittedly strange)
special fan functional from the previous section give rise to ‘normal’ results. The
ECF-approach is preferable over the one involving bar recursion, in our opinion.
4.4.4. Non-exotic computability results and Standard Part II. As discussed after its
introduction in Definition 4.20, the functional Θ can be viewed as a kind of realiser
for the compactness of Cantor space. In Theorem 4.24, we show the equivalence
between the existence of Θ and a version of the Heine-Borel compactness theorem
in the general28 case, i.e. the statement that any (possibly uncountable) open cover
of the unit interval has a finite sub-cover. Now, any functional Ψ2 gives rise to
the ‘canonical’ open cover ∪x∈[0,1](x−
1
Ψ(x)+1 , x+
1
Ψ(x)+1 ) of the unit interval, and
hence the (general) Heine-Borel theorem implies:
(∀Ψ2)(∃w1
∗
)(∀x1 ∈ [0, 1])(∃y ∈ w)(|x − y| < 1Ψ(y)+1 ). (HBU)
The naturalness of HBU, as well its essential role in the development of the gauge
integral, is discussed in Remark 4.25 below. We first have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.24. The system RCAω0 + (∃
2) + QF-AC proves (∃Θ)SCF(Θ)↔ HBU.
Proof. The theorem is implicit in the results from [11], and is proved in [80]. 
The base theory in Theorem 4.24 is a Π12-conservative extension of ACA0 by
[92, Theorem 2.2]. The equivalences STP ↔ HBU and STP ↔ (∃Θ)SCF(Θ) are
proved in a different conservative extension of ACA0 in [11]. Hence, Θ, STP, and
HBU are intrinsically linked, and we now discuss how the latter (and hence all of
them) are essential for the development of the gauge integral.
Remark 4.25 (Mainstream mathematics and Θ). Perhaps surprisingly, HBU dates
back around 125 years, and is essential for the development of mathematical
physics. Furthermore, discontinuous functions date back almost two hundred years,
and the combination of these two elements gives rise to Θ, as discussed now.
First of all, HBU immediately follows from Cousin’s lemma ([29, p. 22]), which
was proved before 1893 by Pierre Cousin, as discussed in [34]. Hence, HBU essen-
tially predates set theory, and as such counts as ‘non-set theoretical’ or ‘ordinary
mathematics’, in the sense of RM as stipulated by Simpson in [103, I.1].
28The Heine-Borel theorem in second-order arithmetic (and hence Friedman-Simpson Reverse
Mathematics) is ‘by definition’ restricted to countable covers ([103, IV.1]).
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Secondly, Cousin’s lemma (and hence HBU) is essential for the development of
the gauge integral, aka Henstock-Kurzweil integral, as discussed in [109, p. 5]. For
instance, the uniqueness of the gauge integral already implies HBU; the existence
of a function which is not gauge integrable also implies HBU. As to its history,
the gauge integral was introduced around 1912 by Denjoy (in a different form) as
a generalisation of the Lebesgue integral, which was in turn introduced around
1900. Since Lebesgue integration is studied extensively in RM (See [103, X.1] for
an overview), gauge integrals would seem to be the obvious kind of topic studied
in RM as well. Moreover, the gauge integral provides a formal framework for the
Feynman path integral (See [25,75]), i.e. gauge integrals are also highly relevant in
(the foundations of) physics.
Finally, as to discontinuous functions, Dirichlet introduces the characteristic
function of the rationals around 1829 in [33], while thirty years later Riemann
defines a function with countably many discontinuities via a series in his Habilita-
tionsschrift (See [65, p. 115]). As proved in [67, §3], the existence of discontinuous
functions on the reals gives rise to (∃2) (via so-called Grilliot’s trick), and Theo-
rem 4.24 thus suggests that Θ could have been derived a century ago.
In conclusion, the naturalness of Cousin’s lemma bestows the same status upon
HBU, Θ, and STP, which are even equivalent in the system from [11].
4.5. There and back again. The examples of local constructivity discussed in
Sections 4.2 to 4.4 are by design such that theorems in Nonstandard Analysis are
converted to theorems of computable or constructive mathematics. As suggested
by the title, it is then a natural question whether the latter also again imply the
former, i.e. do theorems of computable mathematics also (somehow) imply theorems
of Nonstandard Analysis? Are they (somehow) equivalent?
At the theoretical level, the answer is a resounding ‘yes’, as is clear from the
following theorem which is the ‘inverse’ of term extraction as in Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.26. Let ϕ be internal and t a term. The system P proves
(∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ϕ(x, y)→ (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y). (4.45)
Furthermore, if E-PAω ⊢ (∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ϕ(x, y), then P ⊢ (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y).
Proof. Both claims follow immediately by noting that every term t is standard in
P by the basic axioms in Definition A.3, and that the latter also implies that t(x)
is standard for standard x. 
At the practical level things are slightly more complicated: While normal forms
follow from computational statements like in (4.45), these normals forms are often
weaker than the original nonstandard theorem. Indeed, consider the proof of The-
orem 4.7 and Remark 4.8 in which we weakened the antecedents of resp. (4.8) and
(4.16) to resp. (4.9) and (4.17). We now obtain a version of RIEef(t) from RIEns
from Section 4.2.2 without this weakening.
Theorem 4.27. From P ⊢ RIEns, terms i, o can be extracted s.t. E-PA
ω proves:
(∀f, g, k′)
[
(∀k ≤ i(g, k′))(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])(|x− y| < 1
g(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| ≤
1
k
)
→ (∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
(
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ < 1
o(g,k′) → |Spi(f)− Spi(f)| ≤
1
k′
)]
. (4.46)
Furthermore, P ⊢ [(4.46)→ RIEns] and from E-PA
ω ⊢ (4.46), one obtains P ⊢ RIEns.
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Proof. The second part follows from the proof of Theorem 4.26 as follows: For
standard g and k′, we note that i(g, k′) and o(g, k′) are also standard. Hence, we
may strengthen the antecedent of (4.46) as follows:
(∀f)(∀stg, k′)
[
(∀stk)(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])(|x− y| < 1
g(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| ≤
1
k
)
→ (∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
(
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ < 1
o(g,k′) → |Spi(f)− Spi(f)| ≤
1
k′
)]
. (4.47)
Note that the antecedent of (4.47) does not depend on k′ and push inside this
associated quantifier as follows:
(∀f)(∀stg)
[
(∀stk)(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])(|x− y| < 1
g(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| ≤
1
k
)
→ (∀stk′)(∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
(
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ < 1
o(g,k′) → |Spi(f)− Spi(f)| ≤
1
k′
)]
.
In turn, we may strengthen ‘‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ < 1
o(g,k′) ’ to ‘‖pi‖, ‖pi
′‖ ≈ 0’ to obtain
(∀f)(∀stg)
[
(∀stk)(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])(|x− y| < 1
g(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| ≤
1
k
) (4.48)
→ (∀stk′)(∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
(
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ ≈ 0→ |Spi(f)− Spi(f)| ≤
1
k′
)]
.
As k′ (resp. g) only appears in the final formula of the consequent (resp. the an-
tecedent), we may push the associated quantifier inside to obtain
(∀f)
[
(∃stg)(∀stk)(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])(|x− y| < 1
g(k) → |f(x)− f(y)| ≤
1
k
) (4.49)
→ (∀pi, pi′ ∈ P ([0, 1]))
(
‖pi‖, ‖pi′‖ ≈ 0→ (∀stk′)(|Spi(f)− Spi(f)| ≤
1
k′
)
)]
.
The consequent of (4.49) is the definition of nonstandard integrability as in Defini-
tion 4.9 while the antecedent implies nonstandard uniform continuity (4.5). Now,
the latter also implies the antecedent of (4.49), as can be seen by applying HACint
to the normal form (4.6) and taking the maximum of the resulting functional.
For the first part, recall that RIEns implies (4.21), which yields
(∀f : R → R)(∀stg)
[
(∀stk)A(f, g(k), k)→ (∀stk′)(∃stN ′)B(k′, N ′, f)
]
. (4.50)
Bringing all standard quantifiers outside in (4.50), we obtain
(∀stk′, g)(∀f : R → R)(∃stN ′, k)
[
A(f, g(k), k)→ (∃stN ′)B(k′, N ′, f)
]
. (4.51)
Applying Idealisation to (4.51) like in the proof of Theorem 4.11, we obtain
(∀stk′, g)(∃stN ′, k)(∀f : R → R)
[
A(f, g(k), k)→ (∃stN ′)B(k′, N ′, f)
]
. (4.52)
Applying Theorem 4.2 to ‘P ⊢ (4.52)’ (and taking the maximum of the resulting
terms as usual), one immediately obtains (4.46), as required. 
Corollary 4.28. The system P+(∃stt)RIEef(t) proves that a function with a stan-
dard modulus of uniform continuity on [0, 1] is nonstandard integrable there.
Proof. Repeat the proof of the second part of the theorem with (∃stt)RIEef(t) re-
placed by (4.46). 
By the previous, RIEef(t) gives rise to a nonstandard theorem strictly weaker than
RIEns. In particular, it is easy to prove that the statement a standard function which
is nonstandard-uniformly-continuous on the unit interval has a standard modulus
of uniform continuity implies Π01-TRANS. Similar results may now be obtained for
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any nonstandard theorem (like e.g. MCTns). The only difference is the omission of
the weakening of the antecedent of (4.16) to (4.17) in Remark 4.8.
In conclusion, we have shown that the nonstandard RIEns gives rise to the
‘highly constructive’ theorem (4.46). In turn, the latter gives rise to RIEns as in
Theorem 4.27. In general, every theorem of pure Nonstandard Analysis is ‘meta-
equivalent’ as in Theorem 4.27 to a ‘highly constructive’ theorem like (4.46). Ex-
perience however bears out that this ‘meta-equivalence’ is usually less elegant than
the one from Theorem 4.27.
4.6. A template for the computational content of Nonstandard Analysis.
In this section, we introduce pure Nonstandard Analysis, i.e. that part of the latter
falling within the scope of Theorem 4.2. We also formulate a template for obtaining
computational content from theorems of pure Nonstandard Analysis.
Definition 4.29. [Pure Nonstandard Analysis] A theorem of pure Nonstandard
Analysis is built up as follows.
(i) Only nonstandard definitions (of continuity, compactness, . . . ) are used;
no epsilon-delta definitions are used. The former have (nice) normal forms
and give rise to the associated constructive definitions from Figure 2.
(ii) Normal forms are closed under implication by Remark 4.8 and internal
universal quantifiers due to Idealisation as in (2.1).
(iii) Normal forms are closed under prefixing a quantifier over all infinitesimals
by Theorem 4.12, i.e. if Φ(ε) has a normal form, so does (∀ε ≈ 0)Φ(ε).
(iv) Fragments of the axioms Transfer and Standard Part have normal forms.
(v) Formulas involving the Loeb measure (See Section 5.1) have normal forms.
We stress that item (v) should be interpreted in a specific narrow technical sense,
namely as discussed in Section 5.1. We ask the reader to defer judgement until the
latter section has been consulted.
Finally, the following template provides a way of obtaining the computational
content of theorems of pure Nonstandard Analysis.
Template 4.30. To obtain the computational content of a theorem of pure Non-
standard Analysis, perform the following steps.
(i) Convert all nonstandard definitions, formulas involving the Loeb measure,
and axioms to normal forms using Figure 2 on the next page.
(ii) Starting with the most deeply nested implication, convert implications be-
tween normal forms into normal forms using Remark 4.8.
(ii′) If ‘meta-equivalence’ as in Section 4.5 is desired, omit the weakening from
(4.15) to (4.17) in Remark 4.8.
(iii) When encountering quantifiers over all infinitesimals, use Theorem 4.12 to
obtain a normal form. When encountering internal universal quantifiers,
apply Idealisation as in (2.1).
(iv) When a normal form has been obtained, apply Theorem 4.2 and modify the
resulting term as necessary, usually by taking the maximum of the finite
sequence at hand.
Now, Definition 4.29 is only an approximation of all theorems within the scope
of Theorem 4.2, but nonetheless covers large parts of Nonstandard Analysis. Re-
garding item (i) and as noted in Example 4.3, nonstandard definitions give rise to
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the associated constructive definition-with-a-modulus. The following list provides
an overview for common notions29, where Π11-TRANS is Transfer limited to Π
1
1-
formulas (See [97, §4]) and (µ1) is the functional version of Π11-CA0 (See [5]).
Nonstandard Analysis definition Constructive/functional definition
nonstandard convergence convergence with a modulus
nonstandard continuity continuity with a modulus
nonstandard uniform continuity uniform continuity with a modulus
F-compactness29 totally boundedness
nonstandard compactness of [0, 1] The special fan functional Θ
nonstandard differentiability as in (5.10) differentiability with a modulus
and the derivative given
nonstandard Riemann integration Riemann integration with a modulus
Π01-TRANS Feferman’s mu-operator (µ
2)
Π11-TRANS Feferman’s second mu-operator (µ1)
STP The special fan functional Θ
Figure 2. Nonstandard and constructive defitions
We have now completed the main part of this paper, namely to establish the ba-
sic claims made in the introduction. For the rest of this paper, we will consider
related more advanced results. We finish this section with the observation by Hao
Wang that constructive mathematics may be viewed as a “mathematics of doing”
while classical mathematics is a “mathematics of being” (See e.g. [88, Preface]).
Nonstandard Analysis then fits into this view as follows: In the second chapter of
the Tao Te Ching, the philosopher Lao Tse writes the sage acts by doing nothing,
and one could view the associated notion of wu wei as the founding principle of
Nonstandard Analysis.
5. A grab-bag of Nonstandard Analysis
We discuss various advanced results regarding Nonstandard Analysis and its
(local) constructivity.
5.1. The computational content of measure theory. We discuss the role NSA
plays in the (computational) development of measure theory (inside P).
First of all, of central importance is the Loeb measure ([56,124]) which is one of
the cornerstones of NSA and provides a highly general approach to measure theory.
The traditional development of the Loeb measure makes use of the non-constructive
axiom Saturation and external sets (not present in IST pur sang). Furthermore,
as for most fields of mathematics, NSA provides a highly elegant and conceptually
simple development of known measures, such as the Lebesgue measure.
Secondly, as to prior art, a special case of the Loeb measure is introduced in a
weak fragment of Robinsonian NSA in [104] using external sets, but without the use
of Saturation; the definition of measure from Reverse Mathematics (See [103, X.1]
29A space is F-compact in NSA if there is a discrete grid which approximates every point
of the space up to infinitesimal error, i.e. the intuitive notion of compactness from physics and
engineering (See [97, §4]).
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and below) is used. On the internal side, the system P extended with the (count-
able) axiom Saturation CSAT can be given computational meaning; in particular
Theorem 4.2 holds for the extension P + CSAT (See [9, 37]), but t then involves
bar recursion, an advanced computation scheme which (somehow) embodies the
computational content of the axiom of choice ([66]).
Now, we have established in the previous sections that pure Nonstandard Analy-
sis contains plenty of computational content not involving bar recursion; We believe
that the study of measure theory should be similarly elementary, lest history repeat
itself in the form of incorrect claims that NSA is somehow non-constructive ([98]),
this time around based on the use of bar recursion in the study of the Loeb measure.
Thirdly, classical measure theory seems hopelessly non-constructive at first glance:
we know from Reverse Mathematics that the existence of the Lebesgue measure
λ(A) for open sets A already gives rise to the Turing jump ([103, X.1]). Indeed,
the definition of λ on [0, 1] in Reverse Mathematics is as follows:
Definition 5.1. [Lebesgue measure λ] For ‖g‖ :=
∫ 1
0
g(x)dx, U ⊆ [0, 1],
λ(U) := sup{‖g‖ : g ∈ C([0, 1]) ∧ 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 ∧ (∀x ∈ [0, 1] \ U)(g(x) = 0)}.
The existence of this supremum cannot be proved in computable mathematics,
like the base theory RCA0 of Reverse Mathematics from [103, I], or constructive
mathematics. However, there is a way around this ‘non-existence problem’ pio-
neered in [126, 127]: the formulas λ(U) >R 0 and λ(U) =R 0 make perfect
30 sense,
even if the supremum in Definition 5.1 does not exist. Furthermore, most theorems
of measure theory only involve the Lebesgue measure (and other measures) via such
formulas. In other words, even if the Lebesgue measure cannot be defined in general,
we can still write down most theorems of measure theory without any problems,
even in the language of second-order arithmetic typical of Reverse Mathematics.
Fourth, the Loeb measure L is also defined as a supremum or infimum (See
e.g. [56, 124]), while the Lebesgue measure may be represented via a nonstandard
measure λ∗, which is a supremum involving only the counting measure for (nonstan-
dard) finite sets. Similar to the Lebesgue measure, such suprema do not necessarily
exist in weak systems of Robinsonian Nonstandard Analysis. However, formulas
like ‘L(A)≫ 0’ or ‘L(A) ≈ 0’ make perfect sense in such weak systems, in the same
way as for the (usual) Lebesgue measure, as explored in [100, 104]. Hence, most
theorems involving the Loeb measure may be studied in this ‘Reverse Mathematics’
way, even though the Loeb measure does not necessarily exist in general.
In light of the previous, we believe that measure theory may be developed as
follows in P (See [100] for a first case study): For a measure κ from NSA:
(i) The formula ‘κ(A)≫ 0’ or ‘κ(A) ≈ 0’ makes perfect sense in P, even when
A is a set definable by an external formula.
(ii) If moreover the set A is definable by a normal form, then ‘κ(A) ≫ 0’ or
‘κ(A) ≈ 0’ also has a normal form.
The first item implies that the possibly external formulation of the measure κ (e.g.
using the standard part map) can be expressed as a formula in the language of P.
30In particular, λ(U) >R 0 is (∃g ∈ C([0, 1]))(‖g‖ >R 0∧0 ≤ g ≤ 1∧(∀x ∈ [0, 1]\U)(g(x) = 0)),
and similar for λ(U) =R 0.
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The second item means that if (∀z ∈ R)(z ∈ A↔ (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(z, y, z)) where ϕ is
internal, then the formula ‘κ(A)≫ 0’ or ‘κ(A) ≈ 0’ has a normal form in P.
In conclusion, we can study most theorems regarding the Loeb measure in the
system P, in much the same way as is done in Reverse Mathematics, by item (i).
Furthermore, these theorems have lots of computational content by item (ii), in
light of the generality of the class of normal forms as discussed in Section 4.6.
5.2. Constructive features of Nonstandard Analysis. In this section, we dis-
cuss some constructive features of Nonstandard Analysis.
5.2.1. Metamathematical properties. While there is no official formal definition of
what makes a logical system ‘constructive’, there are a number of metamathematical
properties which are often considered to be hallmarks of intuitionistic/constructive
theories. Rathjen explores these properties in [86] forConstructive Zermelo-Fraenkel
Set Theory CZF, one of the main foundational systems for constructive mathemat-
ics. We discuss in this section to what extent the system P and its extensions
entertain nonstandard versions of the nine properties listed in [86, §1].
First of all, a system S is said to have the existence property EP if it satisfies the
following: Let ϕ(x) be a formula with at most one free variable x; if S ⊢ (∃x)ϕ(x)
then there is some formula θ(x) with only x free such that S ⊢ (∃!x)(θ(x) ∧ ϕ(x)),
where the ‘!’ denotes unique existence. Now, P has the following nonstandard
existence property: If P ⊢ (∃stxρ)ϕ(x) with ϕ(x) internal and at most one free
variable x, then there is an internal formula θ(x) such that P ⊢ (∃st!xρ)(θ(x)∧ϕ(x)).
Indeed, applying Theorem 4.2 to ‘P ⊢ (∃stxρ)ϕ(x)’, we obtain a term tρ
∗
such that
E-PAω ⊢ (∃xρ ∈ t)ϕ(x) and can define θ(x) := (∃j < |t|)(x =ρ t(j) ∧ (∀i <
j)¬ϕ(t(i)). Since t (and |t| and t(j) for j < |t|) is standard in P by the basic
axioms from Definition A.3, θ(x) implies that st(x). The previous also holds for
any internal extension of P, as for the below properties we consider now.
Secondly, a system S is said to have the numerical existence property NEP if
it satisfies the following: Let ϕ(x) be a formula with at most one free variable x;
if S ⊢ (∃n0)ϕ(n) then there is some numeral n such that S ⊢ ϕ(n). Now, P has
the following nonstandard numerical existence property: If P ⊢ (∃stx0)ϕ(x) with
ϕ(x) internal and at most one free variable x, then there is a numeral n such that
P ⊢ (∃x0 ≤ n)ϕ(x). The latter is proved in the same way as the previous property.
Thirdly, a system S is said closed under Church’s rule CR if it satisfies the
following: Let ϕ(x, y) be a formula with at most the free variables shown; if S ⊢
(∀m0)(∃n0)ϕ(m,n) then there is some numeral e such that S ⊢ (∀m0)ϕ(m, {e}(m))
where {e}(n) is the value of the e-th Turing machine with input n. Now, P is
closed under nonstandard Church’s rule: If P ⊢ (∀stm0)(∃stn0)ϕ(m,n) with ϕ(x, y)
internal and at most the free variables shown, then there is a numeral e such that
P ⊢ (∀m0)(∃n0 ≤ {e}(n))ϕ(m,n). The latter is proved in the same way as the
previous property; the term produced in this way is ε0-computable as it is a term
definable in Peano arithmetic. A similar nonstandard version of the first variant of
Church’s rule CR1 and Extended Church’s rule ECR can be obtained, assuming
the antecedent in the latter has the form (∀sty)ϕ(y, x0) for internal ϕ.
On a related note, P and H prove the following nonstandard version of Church’s
thesis: (∀stf1)(∃e0)(∀stx0)(f(x) = ϕe(x)). This can be proved by applying Ideali-
sation to the trivial formula (∀stf1, x0)(∃e0)(f(x) = ϕe(x)), or simply noting that
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there are NN different (primitive recursive) functions mapping {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} to
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} (and zero otherwise). Hence, nonstandard Church’s thesis merely
expresses that from the point of view of the nonstandard universe all standard
functions are computable when limited to the standard universe.
Fourth, since disjunction ‘∨’ gives rise to internal formulas, this symbol has no
computational content (in contrast to ‘(∃st)’). As a result the Disjunction property
DP and Unzerlegbarkeits rule UZR do not apply to P. The Uniformity rule UR
is similar to idealisation, but only with essential modification.
In conclusion, we again emphasise that we do not claim that P is somehow
part of constructive mathematics; we merely point out that the standard universe
of P satisfies versions of the typical properties of logical systems of constructive
mathematics. In other words, we again observe that P is ‘too constructive’ to be
called non-constructive (but does include LEM and is hence not constructive either).
5.2.2. The axiom of extensionality. We discuss the constructive status of the axiom
of extensionality, and how this axiom relates to our system P.
First of all, Martin-Lo¨f has proposed his intuitionistic type theory as a founda-
tion for (constructive) mathematics ([73]). These systems are close to computer
programming and form the basis for various proof assistants, including Coq, Agda,
and Nuprl ([123]). Martin Lo¨f’s early type theories were extensional (as is Nurpl),
but the later systems were intensional (as is Agda).
An advantage of intensional mathematics is the decidability of type checking,
while a disadvantage is that every (even very obvious) equality has to be proved
separately. The practice of Nuprl suggests however that checking whether an ex-
pression is correctly typed, is usually straightforward to perform by hand in prac-
tice, i.e. decidable type checking is not a conditio sine qua non when formalising
mathematics.
Secondly, the system P of Nonstandard Analysis obviously includes the internal
axiom of extensionality. However, internal axioms are ignored by the term extrac-
tion algorithm in Theorem 4.2. In particular, computational content is extracted
from certain statements about the standard universe, and it is a natural question
whether the latter satisfies the ‘standard’ axiom of extensionality (E)st as follows:
(∀stxρ, yρ, ϕρ→τ )
[
x ≈ρ y → ϕ(x) ≈τ ϕ(y)
]
.
where the notations are taken from Remark A.12. Clearly, the previous sentence
follows immediately from the (internal) axiom of extensionality by Transfer, which
is however absent in P. In particular, the standard universe in P is actually highly
intensional in the sense of the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let ∆int be any collection of internal formulas such that P + ∆int
is consistent. Then the latter cannot prove the following:
(∀stF 2, f1, g1)(f ≈1 g → F (f) =0 F (g)) (5.1)
Proof. Since f ≈1 g is just (∀stN)(fN =0 gN), (5.1) implies the normal form
(∀stF 2, f1, g1)(∃stN)(fN =0 gN → F (f) =0 F (g)). (5.2)
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A proof of (5.2) in P + ∆int provides a term t from Go¨del’s T which realises the
axiom of extensionality for type two functionals (over E-PAω +∆int) as follows:
(∀F 2, f1, g1)(∃N ≤ t(F, f, g))(fN =0 gN → F (f) =0 F (g)). (5.3)
However, Howard has shown in [53] that a term as in (5.3) does not exist. 
Howard’s results in [53] also imply that standard extensionality as in (5.1) for
type three functionals cannot be proved in any extension of P which is conservative
over Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF. Furthermore, we can classify (5.1) as follows,
where TJ(ϕ, f) is (∃2) from Section 4.3 without the two outermost quantifiers.
Theorem 5.3. The system P proves Π01-TRANS↔ [(5.1) ∧(∃
stϕ2)(∀stf1)TJ(ϕ, f)].
Proof. For the forward implication, Π01-TRANS applied to the internal axiom of
extensionality for standard F 2, f1, g1 immediately yields (5.2). Also, Π01-TRANS
implies (4.34), and latter yields the second conjunct in the right-hand side of the
equivalence. For the reverse implication, suppose Π01-TRANS is false, i.e. there is
standard h1 such that (∀stn0)(h(n) = 1) ∧ (∃m0)(h(m) = 0). Clearly, h ≈1 11 . . .
while for ϕ as in (∀stf1)TJ(ϕ, f) we have ϕ(h) = 0 6= ϕ(11 . . . ), contradicting
extensionality as in (5.1), and Π01-TRANS follows. 
In conclusion, the standard universe of P is highly intensional in the sense of the
previous theorem. Thus, if one believes that intensionality is essential/important/. . . for
the constructive nature of a logical system, then the above results provide a partial
explanation why P has so much computational content.
5.2.3. Decomposing the continuum. In this section, we discuss the indecomposable
nature of the continuum in intuitionism. We will show that the continuum in
Nonstandard Analysis is indecomposable from the point of view of the standard
universe, and decomposable from the point of view of the nonstandard universe.
The continuum, i.e. the set of real numbers R, is indecomposable in intuitionistic
mathematics, which means that if R = A ∪ B and A ∩ B = ∅, then A = R or
B = R. Brouwer first published this result in [23] (See also [118, p. 490]) and a
modern treatment by van Dalen may be found in [117]. This in-decomposability
result of course hinges on the absence of the law of excluded middle in intuitionistic
mathematics, as e.g. (∀x ∈ R)(x > 0 ∨ x ≤ 0) allows us to split R as {x ∈ R : x >
0} ∪ {x ∈ R : x ≤ 0}. An intuitive description of the above is as follows:
In intuitionistic mathematics the situation is different; the contin-
uum has, as it were, a syrupy nature, one cannot simply take away
one point. In the classical continuum one can, thanks to the prin-
ciple of the excluded third, do so. To put it picturesquely, the
classical continuum is the frozen intuitionistic continuum. If one
removes one point from the intuitionistic continuum, there still are
all those points for which it is unknown whether or not they belong
to the remaining part. ([117, p. 1147])
We now show that the continuum in Nonstandard Analysis is indecomposable in one
sense, and decomposable in another sense. To this end, let N ∈ N be nonstandard
and let [x](N) be the N -th rational approximation of x. Since inequality on Q is
decidable (as opposed to the situation for ‘<R’), we have
R = {x ∈ R : [x](N) >Q 0} ∪ {x ∈ R : [x](N) ≤Q 0}, (D)
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where the first set is denoted AN and the second one BN . While (D) provides a
(decidable) decomposition of R, there are problems: the decomposition is funda-
mentally arbitrary and based on a nonstandard algorithm in an essential way.
First, as to the arbitrariness of (D), it is intuitively clear that for x ≈ 0 we can
have x ∈ AN but x ∈ BM for nonstandardN 6=M , i.e. the decomposition (D) seems
non-canonical or arbitrary as it depends on the choice of nonstandard number. To
see that this arbitrariness is fundamental, consider (5.4) which expresses that (D)
is not arbitrary in the aforementioned sense for standard reals:
(∀stx ∈ R)(∀N,M ∈ N)
(
(¬st(N) ∧ ¬st(M))→ x ∈ AN ↔ x ∈ AM
)
. (5.4)
By the following theorem, (5.4) is Transfer in disguise, and hence fundamentally
non-constructive by Corollary 4.17. As a consequence, the decomposition (D) is
always fundamentally arbitrary in any system where the Turing jump as in (µ2) is
absent, like e.g. in constructive mathematics or P.
Theorem 5.4. The system P proves Π01-TRANS↔ (5.4).
Proof. For the forward direction, note that for a standard real x, [x](N) > 0 im-
plies (∃stn)([x](n) > 0) by Transfer, and (5.4) is immediate. For the reverse di-
rection, suppose ¬Π01-TRANS, i.e. there is standard h
1 such that (∀stn0)(h(n) =
0) ∧ (∃m0)(h(m) 6= 0), and define the real x0 as: [x0](k) = 0 if (∀i ≤ k)(h(i) = 0),
and 1
2i0
if i0 is the least i ≤ k such that h(i) 6= 0. Clearly, x ∈ BN for small enough
nonstandard N , and x ∈ AN for large enough nonstandard N . This contradiction
with (5.4) yields the reverse direction. 
The real x0 defined in the proof of the theorem is an example of the aforemen-
tioned ‘syrupy’ nature of the continuum: this real (and many like it) can be zero
or positive in different models of P, depending on whether Transfer holds.
Secondly, as to the ‘nonstandardness’ of (D), there clearly exists F 2 with
(∀x ∈ R)(F (x) = 0→ x ∈ AN ∧ F (x) = 1→ x ∈ BN ), (5.5)
and F is even given by an algorithm (involving nonstandard numbers). However, by
Theorem 4.2, we can only obtain computational information from standard objects,
and it is thus a natural question if there is standard F as in (5.5). Now, from the
existence of such F , one readily derives WKLst, i.e. weak Ko¨nig’s lemma ([103, IV])
relative to ‘st’, which is fundamentally non-constructive and cannot be derived in
P. The same derivation goes through for AN , BN replaced by any internal A,B.
Thus, while (D) constitutes a decidable decomposition of R, the associated decision
procedure is fundamentally nonstandard.
In conclusion, while R has a decidable decomposition (D) in the system P, the
decomposition is fundamentally arbitrary and based on a nonstandard algorithm in
an essential way. If one requires a decomposition be canonical or to have computa-
tional content (and therefore be standard), then (D) is disqualified.
Let us rephrase this situation as follows: the continuum in Nonstandard Analysis
is indecomposable from the point of view of the standard universe, and decompos-
able from the point of view of the nonstandard universe. Since we can only extract
computational information from the standard universe, our results are in line with
intuitionistic mathematics.
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5.2.4. Tennenbaum’s theorem. We discuss the (non-)constructive nature of Non-
standard Analysis in light of Tennenbaum’s theorem (See e.g. [62, §11.3]).
As noted in Section 3.5, even fragments of Robinson’s Nonstandard Analysis
based on arithmetic seem fundamentally non-constructive. Indeed, Tennenbaum’s
theorem as formulated in [62, §11.3] ‘literally’ states that any nonstandard model
of Peano Arithmetic is not computable.
What is meant is that for a nonstandard model M of Peano Arithmetic, the
operations +M and ×M cannot be computably defined in terms of the operations
+N and ×N of the standard model N of Peano Arithmetic. Similar results exist
for fragments ([62, §11.8]) and Nonstandard Analysis thus seems fundamentally
non-constructive even at the level of basic arithmetic.
Now, while certain nonstandard models indeed require non-constructive tools to
build, models are not part of Nelson’s axiomatic approach to Nonstandard Analysis
via IST. What is more, the latter explicitly disallows the formation of external sets
like ‘the operation + restricted to the standard numbers ’. Nelson specifically calls
attention to this rule on the first page of [76] introducing IST:
We may not use external predicates to define subsets. We call the
violation of this rule illegal set formation. (Emphasis in original)
To be absolutely clear, one of the fundamental components of Tennenbaum’s the-
orem, namely the external set ‘+ restricted to the standard naturals’ is missing
from internal set theory IST, as the latter (what’s in a name?) exclusively deals
with internal sets. Thus, we may claim that Tennenbaum’s theorem is merely an
artefact of the model-theoretic approach to Nonstandard Analysis.
Finally, Connes’ critique of Nonstandard Analysis mentioned in Section 3.5 seems
to be based on similarly incorrect observations, namely that the models generally
used in Robinsonian Nonstandard Analysis are fundamentally non-constructive and
therefore Nonstandard Analysis is too. By way of an analogy: non-constructive
mathematics (including models) is used in physics all the time, but does that imply
that physical reality is therefore non-constructive (in the sense that there exist
non-computable objects out there)?
5.2.5. Bishop’s numerical implication. We discuss the (intimate) connection be-
tween Bishop’s numerical implication from [17, p. 60] and some of the axioms of H
from Definition A.7. The starting point is Bishop’s claim from [17, p. 56-57] that
the numerical meaning of the BHK-implication is unclear in general:
The most urgent foundational problem of constructive mathematics
concerns the numerical meaning of implication. [. . . ] the numerical
meaning of [BHK] implication is a priori unclear [. . . ]
Thus, numerical implication (aka Go¨del implication) is an alternative, based on
Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation ([45]), to the usual implication from intuitionistic
logic with the associated BHK interpretation. Bishop points out that numerical
implication and BHK-implication amount to the same thing in practice, and even
derives the former from the latter, however using two non-constructive steps (See
[17, p. 56-60]). In particular, [17, (4) → (5)] is an instance of the independence of
premises principle, while [17, (7)→ (12)] is a generalisation of Markov’s principle.
44 TO BE OR NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE
Now, the term extraction property of P and H is based on a nonstandard version
of the Dialectica interpretation, called the nonstandard Dialectica interpretation
Dst (See [10, §5]). Furthermore, the system H includes (See Definition A.7) the
axiom HIP∀st , a version of the independence of premises principle, and the axiom
HGMPst, a generalisation of Markov’s principle. By the following theorem, the
latter two principles are exactly the ones needed to show (inside H) that the class of
normal forms is closed under implication, similar to Bishop’s derivation of numerical
implication from BHK-implication in [17].
Theorem 5.5. The system H proves that a normal form can be derived from an
implication between normal forms.
Proof. Similar to the derivation in Remark 4.8, we work in H and consider
(∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y)→ (∀stz)(∃stw)ψ(z, w), (5.6)
where ϕ, ψ are internal. Since standard functionals yield standard output from
standard input, (5.6) implies (∀stζ)
[
(∀stx)ϕ(x, ζ(x)) → (∀stz)(∃stw)ψ(z, w)
]
. We
can bring outside the quantifier over z (even in H) as follows:
(∀stζ, z)
[
(∀stx)ϕ(x, ζ(x)) → (∃stw)ψ(z, w)
]
, (5.7)
and applying HIP∀st to the formula in square brackets yields:
(∀stζ, z)(∃stW )
[
(∀stx)ϕ(x, ζ(x)) → (∃w ∈W )ψ(z, w)
]
, (5.8)
which in turn has exactly the right form to apply HGMPst, yielding
(∀stζ, z)(∃stV,W )
[
(∀x ∈ V )ϕ(x, ζ(x)) → (∃w ∈W )ψ(z, w)
]
, (5.9)
which is a normal form since the formula in square brackets in (5.9) is internal. 
In conclusion, the previous points to similarities between Bishop’s numerical
implication and Nonstandard Analysis, but we do not have any deeper insights
beyond the observed analogies.
5.2.6. The meaning of Nonstandard Analysis. In this section, we discuss a possible
interpretation of the predicate ‘x is standard’ from Nonstandard Analysis. In par-
ticular, we point out similarities between this predicate and predicates pertaining
to computational efficiency in constructive mathematics.
First of all, set theory for instance typically does not deal with questions like
‘What is a set?’ or the meaning of the symbol ‘∈’ for elementhood. These questions
do come up, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, but are mostly absent
from the mathematics itself. The same holds for the ‘st’ predicate in Nonstandard
Analysis (and e.g. infinitesimals), as summarised by Nelson as follows:
In addition to the usual undefined binary predicate ∈ of set theory
we adjoin a new undefined unary predicate standard. [. . . ] To
assert that x is a standard set has no meaning within conventional
mathematics-it is a new undefined notion. ([76, p. 1165])
Nonetheless, experience bears out that many newcomers to Nonstandard Analysis
do ask questions regarding the meaning of ‘st’ and infinitesimals. While the author
mostly agrees with Nelson’s quote, we did formulate an intuitive way of understand-
ing infinitesimals in Section 4.1, namely as an elegant shorthand for computational
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content like moduli. Paying homage to the imaginary proverb ‘in for an infini-
tesimal, in for the entire framework’, we now accommodate the aforementioned
newcomers and indulge in the quest for the meaning of the new predicate ‘st’.
Secondly, by the nature of the BHK-interpretation, all connectives have compu-
tational content in constructive mathematics. However, for a given theorem stating
the existence of x, it is possible one does not need all this computational content
to compute x, i.e. some of this computational content is superfluous. By way of
an example, one only needs a modulus of uniform continuity of f to compute the
modulus of integration of f in RIEef(t) from Section 4.2.2, i.e. one does not need f
itself. Hence, if one is interested in efficient computation, it makes sense to ignore
all superfluous computational content, and develop a mechanism which can perform
this task (by hand or automatically).
Now, the previous considerations are the motivation for Berger’s Uniform Heyt-
ing arithmetic ([12]) in which quantifiers ‘∃c’ and ‘∃nc’ are introduced which may
be read as ‘computationally relevant’ and ‘computationally irrelevant’ existence.
The computational content of connectives decorated with ‘nc’ is ignored, leading
to more efficient algorithms. The proof-assistant Minlog ([105]) even sports a deco-
ration algorithm to automatically decorate a proof with the ‘c’ and ‘nc’ predicates.
Furthermore, the proof-assistant Agda ([1]) has the ‘dot notation’ which has the
same functionality as the ‘nc’ predicate, while homotopy type theory ([128]) includes
‘truncated existence’ ‖Σ‖ also similar to ‘∃nc’. Finally, aspects of the previous may
already be found in the work of Lifschitz ([71]).
As discussed in [97], [10, p. 1963], and [47, §4], the predicate ‘st’ in P seems
to behave very similarly to the predicate ‘c’ for ‘computational relevance’, while
the role of ‘∀nc’ from Minlog is played by ‘∀’ in Nonstandard Analysis. By way of
an example, consider RIEns from Section 4.2.2 and observe that in the latter the
quantifier ‘(∀f)’ is present, rather than ‘(∀stf)’. As a result, the extracted term
t in RIEef(t) does not depend on f , i.e. ‘(∀f)’ is not computationally relevant,
while (∀stf) would be. Furthermore, the connectives ‘∨’ and ‘→’ retain their usual
classical/non-constructive behaviour in P, which corresponds to ∨nc and →nc in
Minlog. Thus, we obtain an informal analogy between constructive mathematics
and classical Nonstandard Analysis (without Transfer) as summarised in the fol-
lowing table. We cannot stress the heuristic nature of this comparison enough.
Homotopy Minlog / Nonstandard Analysis
Type Theory Uniform HA as in system P
Σ ∃c ∃st
Π ∀c ∀st
‖Σ‖ ∃nc ∃
∀nc ∀
∨nc ∨
→nc →
We again stress that we do not claim P to be a constructive system, but we do
point out that P sports too many of properties of constructive mathematics to be
dismissed as non-constructive. Therefore, it occupies the twilight zone between the
constructive and non-constructive.
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5.2.7. Efficient algorithms and Nonstandard Analysis. While most of this paper
is foundational in nature, we now argue that Theorem 4.2 holds the promise of
providing efficient terms via term extraction applied to formalised proofs. The
implementation in the proof assistant Agda of the term extraction algorithm of
Theorem 4.2 is underway by the author and Chuangjie Xu in [125]. The Dst
interpretation from [10] has been implemented and tested on basic examples.
First of all, Nonstandard Analysis generally involves very short proofs (compared
to proofs in mainstream mathematics). Short proofs are one heuristic (among
others) for extracting efficient terms in proof mining ([68]).
Secondly, as noted in Theorem 4.2, internal axioms do not contribute to the
extracted term. In particular, the extracted terms are determined only by the
external axioms of P; all axioms of ‘usual’ mathematics, including mathematical
induction, do not influence the extracted term. Note that external induction IAst
(See Definition A.3) is rarely used in the practice of Nonstandard Analysis.
Thirdly, as can be gleaned from the proof of [10, Theorem 5.5], terms extracted
from external axioms of H and P other than external induction are of trivial com-
plexity, except for one relating to the (∀st)-quantifier (See [10, p. 1982]) which
involves sequence concatenation. Furthermore, one rarely uses external induc-
tion in practice while certain31 ‘basic’ applications of external induction yield low-
complexity terms too.
In conclusion, the three previous observations hold the promise of providing
efficient terms via term extraction applied to formalised proofs as in Theorem 4.2.
5.3. Constructive Nonstandard Analysis versus local constructivity. While
most of this paper deals with classical Nonstandard Analysis, we now discuss con-
structive Nonstandard Analysis and its connection to local constructivity. We al-
ready have the system H as an example of the syntactic approach to constructive
Nonstandard Analysis, and we now discuss the semantic approach.
Intuitively, the semantic approach to Nonstandard Analysis pioneered by Robin-
son ([89]) consists in somehow building a nonstandard model of a given structure
(say the set of real numbers R) and proving that the original structure is a strict sub-
set of the nonstandard model (usually called the set of hyperreal numbers ∗R) while
establishing properties similar to Transfer, Idealisation and Standardisation as the-
orems of this model and the original structure. Historically, Nelson and Hrbacek
of course studied Robinson’s work and independently axiomatised the semantic
approach in their logical systems ([55, 76]). The most common way of building a
suitable nonstandard model is using a free ultrafilter (See e.g. [56, 124]). The exis-
tence of the latter is a rather strong non-constructive assumption, slightly weaker
than the axiom of choice of ZFC.
As it turns out, building nonstandard models with properties like Transfer can
also be done constructively: Palmgren in [85, Section 2] and [84] constructs a
nonstandard modelM (also called a ‘sheaf’ model) satisfying the Extended Transfer
Principle by [85, Corollary 4 and Theorem 5] (See also [74]). As noted by Palmgren
([85, p. 235]), the construction ofM can be formalised in Martin-Lo¨f’s constructive
31As explored in [125], applying Theorem 4.1 to if m ≤0 n for standard n, then m is standard
yields a function g0→0
∗
such that g(n) = 〈0, 1, . . . , n〉. The latter function is standard as the
recursor constants and 0 and + are, and thus yields a proof of the original nonstandard statement.
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type theory ([73]). The latter was developed independently of Bishop’s constructive
mathematics, but can be viewed as a foundation of the latter.
It should be clear by now that there is a fundamental difference between our ap-
proach and that of Palmgren and Moerdijk: The latter attempt to mimic Robinson’s
approach as much as is possible inside a framework for constructive mathematics,
while we attempt to bring out the (apparently copious) computational content of
classical Nonstandard Analysis itself using the system P and its extensions. The
constructivist Stolzenberg has qualified the former ‘mimicking’ approach as para-
sitic (or scavenger) as follows, though we do not share his view.
Nowadays, what is called “constructive” mathematical practice con-
sists in taking a classical theorem or theory that is a product of
ordinary classical mathematical practice and trying to produce a
“good” constructive counterpart to it. Obviously, this enterprise is
parasitic on the theorems and theories of ordinary classical practice.
([108])
We only mention Stolzenberg’s view as a means of launching a discussion concerning
which place our results on Nonstandard Analysis have in the (apparently rather
emotionally charged) constructive pantheon.
Next, we establish that our approach cannot easily be reconciled with the ap-
proach by Palmgren and Moerdijk. To this end, we show that principles (built
into the Palmgren-Moerdijk framework) connecting epsilon-delta and nonstandard
definitions give rise to non-constructive oracles when considered in our framework.
To this end, let NSD be the statement a standard f : R → R differentiable at zero
is also nonstandard differentiable there, where the latter is as follows.
Definition 5.6. A function f is nonstandard differentiable at a if
(∀ε, ε′ 6= 0)
(
ε, ε′ ≈ 0→ f(a+ε)−f(a)
ε
≈ f(a+ε
′)−f(a)
ε′
)
, (5.10)
Now, NSD is a theorem of IST but we also have the following implication.
Theorem 5.7. The system P+ NSD proves Π01-TRANS.
Proof. Working in P+NSD, suppose ¬Π01-TRANS, i.e. there is standard h
1
0 such that
(∀stn)h0(n) = 0 and (∃m0)h(m0) 6= 0. Define the standard real x0 as
∑∞
n=0
h(n)
2n .
Since 0 ≈ x0 >R 0 the standard function f0(x) := sin(
x
x0
) is clearly well-defined
and differentiable in the usual internal ‘epsilon-delta’ sense. However,
f0(x0)−f0(0)
x0
=R
sin(1)
x0
6≈ 2
pix0
=R
f0(
pi
2
x0)−f0(0)
pi
2
x0
which implies that f0 is not nonstandard differentiable at zero. This contradiction
yields Π01-TRANS, and we are done. 
Let DIF(Ξ) be the statement that if a function f is differentiable at zero, then
Ξ(f) is a modulus of differentiability for f as zero.
Corollary 5.8. From the proof that P ⊢ NSD → Π01-TRANS, a term t can be
extracted such that E-PAω ⊢ (∀Ξ3)
(
DIF(Ξ)→ MU(t(Ξ)))
Proof. A normal form for (5.10) is easy to obtain and as follows:
(∀stk0)(∃stN0)(∀ε, ε′ 6= 0)
(
|ε|, |ε′| < 1
N
→
∣∣∣ f(a+ε)−f(a)ε − f(a+ε′)−f(a)ε′ ∣∣∣ < 1k ),
The proof is straightforward and analogous to the proof of equation (4.36). 
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Note that it is easy to define the derivate from the previous normal form of non-
standard differentiability by using HACint to obtain a ‘modulus of differentiability’.
Finally, as part of constructive approaches to Nonstandard Analysis, we should
point out the existence of synthetic differential geometry (SDG) which constitutes
an attempt at formalising the intuitive infinitesimal calculus based on intuitionistic
logic and nilpotent infinitesimals. We note that SDG is inconsistent with classical
mathematics and refer to [8] for a detailed discussion and references. We stress
that Giordano has formulated an alternative to SDG in classical NSA as follows:
In this work we want to modify the [Kock-Lawvere axiom] so as
to obtain a theory with final results similar to SDG’s ones, but in
a classical context and without great logical problems or difficult
models. ([43, p. 76])
Hence, classical NSA can deal perfectly well with nilpotent infinitesimals. The
latter are present in the original works of e.g. Leibniz, Lie, and Cartan.
5.4. Classical computability theory. In the previous sections, we established
that theorems in Nonstandard Analysis give rise to results in computability theory
like (4.36) or Theorem 4.11. Now, a distinction32 exists between higher-order and
classical computability theory. The latter (resp. the former) deals with computabil-
ity on objects of type zero and one (resp. of any type) and it is clear that our above
results are part of higher-order computability theory. In this section, we provide a
generic example of how NSA gives rise to results in classical computability theory.
More examples (e.g. Ramsey’s theorem and MCT) are treated in [99].
In this section, we study Ko¨nig’s lemma (KOE for short), which is the statement
that every finitely branching infinite tree has a path; KOE is equivalent to ACA0
over RCA0 by [103, III.7]. Let KOEns be the statement that every standard tree
as in KOE has a standard path. As expected, we shall prove Π01-TRANS ↔ KOEns
over P (Theorem 5.9), and obtain results in classical and higher-order computability
theory from this equivalence (Theorems 5.10 and 5.11).
Theorem 5.9. The system P proves Π01-TRANS↔ KOEns.
Proof. As noted before, we actually have an equivalence in (4.34), i.e. the standard
functional µ2 as in the latter allows us to decide existential formulas as long as a
standard function describes the quantifier-free part as in the antecedent of (4.34).
Now, if a standard tree T 1 is infinite and finitely branching, there is n0 such that
(∀m0)(∃β0
∗
)(〈n〉 ∗ β ∈ T ∧ |β| = m). Since T is standard, the latter universal
formula can be decided using µ2 from (4.34). Say we have
(∀stn)
[
g(n) = 0↔ (∀m0)(∃β0
∗
)(〈n〉 ∗ β ∈ T ∧ |β| = m)
]
where g is standard (and involves µ). Then (∃n0)(g(n) = 0) implies (∃n0 ≤
µ(g))(g(n) = 0), i.e. a search bounded by µ(g) provides a standard number n0 such
that the subtree of T starting with 〈n〉 is infinite. Since this subtree is also infinite,
we can repeat this process to find a standard sequence α1 such that (∀stn0)(αn ∈ T ).
Applying Π01-TRANS to the latter now yields KOEns.
32The distinction between ‘higher-order’ and ‘classical’ computability theory is not completely
strict: Continuous functions on the real numbers are represented in second-order arithmetic by
type one associates (aka Reverse Mathematics codes), as discussed in [68, §4].
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Now assume KOEns and suppose Π
0
1-TRANS is false, i.e. there is standard h
1
such that (∀stn0)(h(n) = 0) ∧ (∃m)(h(m) 6= 0). Define the tree T0 as: σ ∈ T0 if
(∀i < |σ| − 1)(σ(i) = σ(i + 1)) ∧ h(σ(0)) 6= 0 ∧ (∀i < σ(0))(h(i) = 0). (5.11)
Clearly T0 is standard, finitely branching, and infinite, but has no standard path,
a contradiction. Hence Π01-TRANS follows and we are done. 
We refer to the previous proof as the ‘textbook proof’ of KOEns → Π01-TRANS.
The proof of this implication is indeed similar to the proof of KOE → ACA0 in
Simpson’s textbook on RM, as found in [103, III.7]. This ‘textbook proof’ is special
in a specific technical sense, as will become clear below.
We first prove the associated higher-order result. Let KOEef(t) be the statement
that t(T ) is a path though T if the latter is an infinite and finitely branching tree.
Theorem 5.10. From any proof of KOEns ↔ Π01-TRANS in P, two terms s, u can
be extracted such that E-PAω proves:
(∀µ2)
[
MU(µ)→ KOEef(s(µ))
]
∧ (∀t1→1)
[
KOEef(t)→ MU(u(t))
]
. (5.12)
Proof. We establish the second implication in (5.12) and leave the remaining one
to the reader. To this end, note that KOEns → Π01-TRANS implies that
(∀stT 1)(∃stα1)A(T, α)→ (∀stf1)(∃stn)B(f, n), (5.13)
where B is the formula in square brackets in (4.32) and A(T, α) is the internal
formula expressing that α is a path in the finitely branching and infinite tree T . A
standard functional provides standard output on standard input, and (5.13) yields
(∀stt1→1)
[
(∀T 1)A(T, t(T ))→ (∀stf1)(∃stn)B(f, n)
]
. (5.14)
Bringing outside all standard quantifiers, we obtain:
(∀stt1→1, f1)(∃stn0)
[
(∀T 1)A(T, t(T ))→ B(f, n)
]
. (5.15)
Applying Theorem 4.2 to ‘P ⊢ (5.15)’, we obtain a term u such that E-PAω proves
(∀t1→1, f1)(∃n0 ∈ u(t, f))
[
(∀T 1)A(T, t(T ))→ B(f, n)
]
. (5.16)
Taking the maximum of u, we obtain the second conjunct of (5.12). 
To obtain the counterpart of the previous theorem in classical computability
theory, consider the following ‘second-order’ version of (µ2):
(∃m, s)(ϕAe,s(n) = m)→ (∃m, s ≤ ν(e, n))(ϕ
A
e,s(n) = m). (MU
A(ν, e, n))
Furthermore, let KOEAef(t, e) be the statement that if an A-computable tree with
index e0 is infinite and finitely branching, then t1 is a path through this tree.
Theorem 5.11. From the ‘textbook proof’ of KOEns → Π01-TRANS in P, terms s, u
can be extracted such that E-PAω proves:
(∀e0, n0, C1, β1)
[
KOECef (β, u(e, n))→ MU
C(t(β,C, e, n), e, n)
]
. (5.17)
Proof. We make essential use of the proofs of Theorems 5.9 and 5.10, and the
associated notations. In particular, define the term t1→1 by letting t(h) be the tree
T0 from (5.11). Clearly, what is proved in the proof of Theorem 5.10 is in fact
(∀stf1)
[
(∃stα1)A(t(f), α)→ (∃stn)B(f, n)
]
, (5.18)
50 TO BE OR NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE
where we used the notations from the proof of Theorem 5.10. Indeed, KOEns is only
applied for T = t(f) = T0 in the proof of Theorem 5.10. Now (5.18) yields:
(∀stf1, α1)(∃stn0)
[
A(t(f), α)→ B(f, n)
]
. (5.19)
Applying Theorem 4.2 to ‘P ⊢ (5.19)’, we obtain a term v such that E-PAω proves
(∀f1, α1)(∃n ∈ v(f, α))
[
A(t(f), α)→ B(f, n)
]
,
and define u(f, α) as the maximum of all v(f, α)(i) for i < |v(f, α)|. We obtain:
(∀f1, α1)
[
A(t(f), α)→ B(f, u(f, α)))
]
, (5.20)
We nowmodify (5.20) to obtain (5.17). To this end, define f20 as follows: f0(e, n, C, k) =
0 if (∃m, s ≤ k)(ϕCe,s(n) = m), and 1 otherwise. For this choice of function, namely
taking f1 =1 λk.f0, the sentence (5.20) implies that
(∀C1, e0, n0, α1)
[
A(t(λk.f0), α)→ B(λk.f0, u(λk.f0, α)))
]
. (5.21)
Now there are obvious (primitive recursive) terms x1, v1 such that for any finite
sequence σ, we have σ ∈ t(λk.f0) if and only if ϕCx(e,n),v(e,n)(σ) = 1; the definition
of x1, v1 is implicit in the definition of t and f0. Hence, with these terms, the
antecedent and consequent of (5.21) are as required to yield (5.17). 
Note that all objects in (5.17) are type zero or one, except the extracted terms.
For those familiar with the concept, applying the so-called ECF-translation (See
[114]) to (5.17) only changes these terms (to computable associates) and results in
a ‘pure’ statement of second-order arithmetic, i.e. classical computability theory.
Let KOEns(T ) and Π
0
1-TRANS(f) be KOEns and Π
0
1-TRANS without the quan-
tifiers over f and T . The crux of the previous proof is that the ‘textbook’ proof
of Theorem 5.9 establishes (∀stf1)[KOEns(t(f)) → Π01-TRANS(f)] as in (5.18). In
particular, the corresponding normal form (5.19) only involves type zero and one
objects, rather than type two as in e.g. (4.38) for Π01-TRANS → MCTns. Thus,
thanks to the textbook proof all objects in (5.18) are ‘of low enough type’ to yield
classical computability theory as in (5.17).
We are now ready to reveal the intended ‘deeper’ meaning of the term ‘textbook
proof’: Intuitively, the latter refers to a proof (which may not exist) of an impli-
cation (∀stf)A(f)→ (∀stg)B(g) which also establishes (∀stg)[A(t(g))→ B(g)], and
in which the formula in square brackets has a normal form involving only standard
quantifiers of type zero and one. Following the proof of Theorem 5.11, such a ‘text-
book proof’ gives rise to results in classical computability theory. Such ‘textbook
proofs’ also exist for MCT and Ramsey’s theorem, as explored in [99].
In a nutshell, to obtain the previous theorem, one first establishes the ‘non-
standard uniform’ version (5.18) of KOEns → Π01-TRANS, which yields the ‘super-
pointwise’ version (5.20). The latter is then modified to (5.21); this modification
should be almost identical for other similar implications. In particular, versions of
Theorems 5.11 and (5.18) are obtained in [99] for Ko¨nig’s lemma and Ramsey’s
theorem ([103, III.7]). Similar or related results for the Reverse Mathematics of
WKL0 and ACA0 should be straightforward to obtain.
In conclusion, higher-order computability results can be obtained from arbitrary
proofs of KOEns → Π01-TRANS, while the textbook proof as in the proof of Theo-
rem 5.9 yields classical computability theory as in (5.17).
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6. Nonstandard Analysis and intuitionistic mathematics
We have observed that the system P inhabits the twilight zone between the
constructive and non-constructive: P is not the former as it (explicitly) includes
the law of excluded middle, but P also has ‘too many’ constructive properties to
be dismissed as merely the latter. In Sections 6.1 to 6.3, we provide a possible
explanation for the observed behaviour of P based on the foundational views of
Brouwer and Troelstra. Finally, we discuss in Section 6.4 a new connection between
intuitionistic analysis and Nonstandard Analysis via Tao’s notion of metastability.
6.1. Nonstandard Analysis and Brouwer’s view on logic. In this section,
we offer an alternative interpretation of our results based on Brouwer’s claim that
logic is dependent on mathematics. Indeed, Brouwer already explicitly stated in his
dissertation that logic depends upon mathematics as follows:
While thus mathematics is independent of logic, logic does depend
upon mathematics: in the first place intuitive logical reasoning is
that special kind of mathematical reasoning which remains if, con-
sidering mathematical structures, one restricts oneself to relations
of whole and part; ([22, p. 127]; emphasis in the Dutch original)
According to Brouwer, logic is thus abstracted frommathematics, and he even found
it conceivable that under different circumstances, a different abstraction would
emerge from the same mathematics.
Therefore it is easily conceivable that, given the same organization
of the human intellect and consequently the same mathematics, a
different language would have been formed, into which the language
of logical reasoning, well known to us, would not fit. ([22, p. 129])
Building on Brouwer’s viewpoint, it seems reasonable that different kinds of logical
reasoning can emerge when the ‘source’, i.e. the underlying mathematics, is differ-
ent. Indeed, Brouwer found it conceivable that a different logical language could
emerge from the same mathematics, suggesting that changing mathematics in a
fundamental way, a different kind of logical reasoning is (more?) likely to emerge.
This leads us to our alternative interpretation: If one fundamentally changes
mathematics, as one arguably does when introducing Nonstandard Analysis, the
logic will change along as the latter depends on the former in Brouwer’s view. Since
classical logic cannot really become ‘more non-constructive’, it stands to reason
that the logic of (classical) Nonstandard Analysis actually is more constructive
than plain classical logic. We present two strands of evidence for this claim.
First of all, we have observed in Section 4.1 that when introducing the notion of
‘being standard’ fundamental to Nonstandard Analysis, the law of excluded mid-
dle of classical mathematics moves from ‘the original sin of non-constructivity’ to
a computationally inert principle which does not have any real non-constructive
consequences anymore. In particular, adding LEM to E-HAω leads to the classical
system E-PAω, while adding LEM (and even LEMns) to H results in the system P
which has exactly the same term extraction theorem as H by Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
The latter even explicitly state that LEM does not influence the extracted term!
In this way, our results on Nonstandard Analysis vindicate Brouwer’s thesis that
logic depends upon mathematics: Changing classical mathematics fundamentally
by introducing the ‘standard versus nonstandard’ distinction from Nonstandard
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Analysis, the associated logic moves from classical logic to a new, more construc-
tive, logic in which ‘there exists a standard’ has computational meaning akin to
constructive mathematics and its BHK-interpretation.
As it happens, the observation that the introduction of the framework of Non-
standard Analysis changes the associated logic has been made by the pioneers of
Nonstandard Analysis Robinson and Nelson. The latter has indeed qualified Non-
standard Analysis as a full-fledged new logic as follows.
What Abraham Robinson invented is nothing less than a new logic.
([77, §1.6])
The previous claim is based on the following similar one by Robinson from his
original monograph Non-standard Analysis ([89]).
Returning now to the theory of this book, we observe that it is
presented, naturally, within the framework of contemporary Math-
ematics, and thus appears to affirm the existence of all sorts of
infinitary entities. However, from a formalist point of view we may
look at our theory syntactically and may consider that what we
have done is to introduce new deductive procedures rather than
new mathematical entities. ([89, §10.7]; emphasis in original)
Thus, Robinson and Nelson already had the view that introducing the ‘standard
versus nonstandard’ distinction from Nonstandard Analysis, the associated logic
moves from classical logic to a new ‘nonstandard’ logic. Our goal in this paper has
been to show that this new logic has constructive content.
Finally, a word of warning is in order: it is fair to say that both Robinson and
Nelson had ‘nonstandard’ foundational views: Robinson subscribed to formalism
([90]) while Nelson even rejected the totality of the exponential function ([78]).
6.2. Nonstandard Analysis and Troelstra’s view of mathematics. In this
section, we offer an alternative interpretation of our results based on Troelstra’s
views on intuitionism.
First of all, Robinson-style Nonstandard Analysis involves a nonstandard model
of a structure in which the latter is embedded, the textbook example being the
real numbers R which form a subset of the ‘hyperreal’ numbers ∗R. At the risk
of pointing out the obvious, one thus studies the real numbers R from the outside,
namely as embedded into the (much) larger structure ∗R.
Secondly, according to Nelson33 , Nonstandard Analysis as in IST does not in-
troduce a new structure like ∗R, but imposes a new predicate ‘is standard’ onto the
existing structure R. As discussed above, the set of all standard real numbers can-
not be formed in IST. Thus, in Nelson’s view, IST is also fundamentally based on
the ‘standard versus nonstandard’ distinction, but one does not view mathematics
‘from the outside’, but performs a kind of ‘introspection’ via the ‘st’ predicate.
Thirdly, while the above observations are not exactly new, the reader may be
surprised to learn that Troelstra made similar claims regarding the nature of intu-
itionism, as follows.
33As noted above and discussed at length in [39], one does not have to share Nelson’s view to
study IST: the latter is a logical system while the former is a possible philosophical point of view
regarding IST. However, like Nelson, we view the mathematics and this point of view as one.
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We may start with very simple concrete constructions, such as the
natural numbers, and then gradually build up more complicated,
but nevertheless “concrete” or “visualizable” structures. Finitism is
concerned with such constructions only ([70, 3.4]). In intuitionism,
we also want to exploit the idea that there is an intuitive concept
of “constructive”, by reflection on the properties of “constructions
which are implicitely involved in the concept”. (I.e. we attempt to
discover principles by introspection.)
Finitist constructions build up “from below”; reflecting on the gen-
eral notion represents, so to speak, an approach “from the outside”,
“from above”. ([113, §1.1])
In a nutshell, according to Troelstra, intuitionism deals with the study of concrete
structures via a kind of ‘introspection’ or ‘study from the outside’. Thus, we observe
a remarkable similarity between the methods of study in intuitionism and Nonstan-
dard Analysis: Nonstandard Analysis seems to originate from classical mathematics
when applying to the latter the methodological techniques of intuitionism, namely
‘introspection’ (Nelson’s IST) and ‘study from the outside’ (Robinsonian nonstan-
dard models). Now, if all this sounds outrageous to the reader, we are not the first
to make this claim: Wallet writes the following about Harthong-Reeb in [121, §7]:
On the other hand, Harthong and Reeb explains in [49] that, far
from being an artefact, nonstandard analysis necessarily results of
an intuitionnistic [sic] interpretation of the classical mathematical
formalism (see also [93]).
The references mentioned by Wallet are in French (and hard to come by), and
we therefore do not go into more detail. Nonetheless, the message is loud and
clear: There is a clear methodological connection between Nonstandard Analysis
and intuitionism, as observed above and independently by Harthong-Reeb. Thus,
as the French are wont to say: Discutez!
6.3. Nonstandard Analysis and the awareness of time. In this section, we
formulate a motivation for Nonstandard Analysis based on a fundamental intu-
itionist notion, namely the awareness of time. As to the latter’s central status,
Brouwer’s first act of intuitionism reads as follows:
Completely separating mathematics from mathematical language
and hence from the phenomena of language described by theoretical
logic, recognizing that intuitionistic mathematics is an essentially
languageless activity of the mind having its origin in the perception
of a move of time. This perception of a move of time may be
described as the falling apart of a life moment into two distinct
things, one of which gives way to the other, but is retained by
memory. If the twoity thus born is divested of all quality, it passes
into the empty form of the common substratum of all twoities. And
it is this common substratum, this empty form, which is the basic
intuition of mathematics. ([24], p. 4-5)
Needless to say, intuitionism is fundamentally rooted in the awareness of time. As
such, the aforementioned first act of intuitionism gives rise to the natural numbers
(considered as a kind of potential infinity obtained by adjoining units), while the
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second act (See [24, p. 8]) gives rise to the continuum. In particular, Brouwer’s
twoity simultaniously yields discrete units and an inexhaustible continuum.
In the following chapters we shall go further into the basic intuition
of mathematics (and of every intellectual activity) as the substra-
tum, divested of all quality, of any perception of change, a unity of
continuity and discreteness, a possibility of thinking together sev-
eral entities, connected by a ‘between’, which is never exhausted by
the insertion of new entities. Since continuity and discreteness oc-
cur as inseparable complements, both having equal rights and being
equally clear, it is impossible to avoid one of them as a primitive
entity, [. . . ] ([20, p. 17])
We shall not comment on Brouwer’s claims here, but instead make the following
observation regarding Nonstandard Analysis inspired by the first act. Like Brouwer,
we assume the natural numbers to be given (by the first act or otherwise).
Observation 6.1 (Nonstandard Analysis and the awareness of time). In intu-
itionism, the natural numbers (as a potential infinity) are obtained from Brouwer’s
fundamental concept twoity which is rooted in the awareness of time, in particular
in the passage of time from one moment to the next. As a thought experiment, the
reader should attempt to imagine a long period of time, say a day, a week, or even
a decade, as built up from units of time, say seconds.
While one knowns there are only finitely34 many seconds which make up this long
period of time, one cannot really conceive of the latter as a whole built up from said
units. In other words, despite the variable perception of time (‘time flies’ versus ‘it
took an eternity’), there are periods of time which cannot be grasped ‘all at once’
in terms of much smaller periods. Thus, there is a tension between one’s subjective
perception of time and objective time as follows: If one introduces a unit of time,
then there are periods of time which cannot be grasped fully and all at once only in
terms of these units. Alternatively, making discrete units small enough, the result
starts looking like the underlying continuum, i.e. there is a holistic property to a
large collection of units which in particular cannot be reduced to the underlying
units. A similar observation holds35 for space, but we consider time since Brouwer
took the awareness of time to be fundamental, as sketched above.
Thus, one observes an intuitive distinction between short and long time peri-
ods, i.e. ones which can be directly conceived as built up from units of time, and
one which cannot. If a time period is short (resp. long) in this way, adjoining
(resp. removing) another unit of time yields another short (resp. long) time period.
If the distinction ‘long versus short’ is divested of all quality, one arrives at the
usual notion of ‘standard versus nonstandard’ natural number from NSA. Thus,
the standardness predicate becomes grounded in one’s awareness of time, namely
in the intuitive distinction between long versus short periods of time.
By the previous observation, the fundamental notion ‘standard versus nonstan-
dard’ from NSA can be grounded elegantly in one’s awareness of time, the tension
34As it turns out, there are 315,360,000 seconds in a decade.
35While Brouwer makes a fundamental distinction between the continuous and the discrete,
packing enough smaller and smaller discrete units together into the same area inevitably results
in something that looks like a continuum (which is also the basis of computer displays). There
are of course plenty of collections of discrete units which still look discrete.
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between subjective and objective time in particular. We leave it to the reader’s
own imagination what other properties (like e.g. Definition A.7) one can bestow
upon the standardness predicate in the same way, i.e. motivated by the awareness
of time. We point out that we avoided (the trap of) ultrafinitism (See [115, p. 29])
by considering the natural numbers as given.
In our opinion, Observation 6.1 is merely the ‘next logical step’ following Brouwer’s
first act inspired by NSA. As such, this observation could have been made long time
ago. Reasons for this apparent gap in the literature may be found in the rejection
of NSA by e.g. Bishop (See Section 3.5). Now, regarding a related ‘future logical
step’ for NSA, it stands to reason that advances in artificial intelligence will lead to
programs which, if concrete inputs and contexts are specified for a theorem, provide
numerical estimates for vague notions ‘long’ and ‘small’ related to the theorem.
By way of an example, the fundamental theorem of calculus states that Riemann
integration and differentiation cancel each other out. The aforementioned programs
would produce numerical estimates for the statement If the mesh ‖pi‖ of a partition
pi is very small compared to ε in f(x+ε)−f(x)
ε
, then the function f is very close
to the Riemann sum of λx. f(x+ε)−f(x)
ε
and pi. However, the latter may also be
obtained via term extraction from the nonstandard version of the fundamental
theorem of calculus (See [97, §4]). Time will tell if any cross-over will take place.
6.4. Intuitionistic analysis, metastability, and Nonstandard Analysis. We
discuss the connection between intuitionistic and Nonstandard Analysis provided by
Tao’s metastability (See [112, §2.3.1] or [66, §2.29]). We note that Anil Nerode first
suggested the possibility of a connection between intuitionistic and Nonstandard
Analysis based on his student Scowcroft’s work on intuitionistic analysis.
First of all, metastability is a version of convergence which intuitively speaking
swaps ‘convergence in the limit’ for the weaker ‘convergence on finite but arbitrarily
large domains’. An advantage is that the weakening from ‘epsilon delta’ convergence
to ‘metastability’ however yields highly uniform computational content. We show
in this section that intuitionistic analysis and Nonstandard Analysis give rise to
the very same highly uniform computational content by introducing finite but
arbitrarily large domains in the same way as for metastability. We shall provide an
example of the aforementioned phenomenon and refer to [80] for general results.
Secondly, we consider the ‘textbook example’ of metastability in Example 6.2.
Example 6.2 (Metastability and convergence). The monotone convergence the-
orem states that any non-decreasing sequence in the unit interval converges, and
hence is Cauchy. The usual ‘ε-δ’ definition of a Cauchy sequence a0→1(·) is as follows:
(∀ε >R 0)(∃N
0)(∀n0,m0 ≥ N)(|an − am| ≤ ε), (6.1)
which is equivalent to the well-known ‘metastable’ version:
(∀ε >R 0, F )(∃M
0)(∀n0,m0 ∈ [M,F (M)])(|an − am| ≤ ε), (6.2)
where the formula starting with ‘(∀n,m)’ is equivalent to a quantifier-free one,
since the latter quantifier is bounded. Now, while (6.1) and (6.2) are equivalent,
their computational behaviour is quite different: On one hand, there is no way to
compute an upper bound on N0 in the usual definition (6.1), as this would provide
a computable solution to the Halting problem. On the other hand, an upper bound
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for M0 as in (6.2) is F ⌈
1
ε
⌉+1(0), which is the result of iterating F for ⌈ 1
ε
⌉+1-many
times and then evaluating at 0. Moreover, M0 as in (6.2) is one of the values in
the finite sequence 〈0, F (0), F (F (0)), . . . , F ⌈
1
ε
⌉+1(0)〉. Thus, we obtain:
(∃θ(0×1)→0
∗
)(∀k0, F, a(·) ∈ I([0, 1]))(∃M ∈ θ(k, F )) (6.3)
(∀n,m ∈ [M,F (M)])(|an − am| ≤
1
k
)
where ‘a(·) ∈ I([0, 1])’ means that a(·) is a non-decreasing sequence in [0, 1].
In the previous example, we witness the power of metastability: while the latter
only provides computational information about a finite (but arbitrarily large) do-
main, namely [M,F (M)] for any F as in (6.2), this information is highly uniform
in that θ from (6.3) does not even depend on the choice of sequence a(.).
Thirdly, we show that intuitionistic analysis also provides highly uniform results
a` la (6.3) and metastability. To this end, we consider the theorem DNR from
Reverse Mathematics which satisfies the (strict) implication WKL → DNR (See
[46]). Now, DNR stands for ‘diagonal non-recursive’ and is defined as
(∀A1 ≤1 1)(∃f
1)(∀m0, s0, e0)(ϕAe,s(e) = m→ f(e) 6= m), (DNR)
where ‘ϕAe,s(n) = m’ is the usual primitive recursive predicate expressing that the
Turing machine with index e, input n, and oracle A, halts with output m after at
most s steps. As shown in [101], f1 as in DNR cannot be computed from A ≤1 1.
Thus, similar to the equivalence between (6.1) and (6.2), we modify the underlined
pair of quantifiers in DNR as follows:
(∀A1 ≤1 1, G
2)(∃f1)(∀m0, s0, e0 ≤ G(f))(ϕAe,s(e) = m→ f(e) 6= m) (6.4)
Similar to (6.2), what is left in (6.4) is the single underlined quantifier. Let us now
write down the associated version of (6.3) for DNR and (6.4), as follows:
(∀A ≤1 1, G
2)(∃f ∈ ζ(G))(∀m, s, e ≤ G(f))(ϕAe,s(e) = m→ f(e) 6= m). (DNR(ζ))
Note that ζ computes a ‘metastable’ diagonal non-recursive f independent of A,
similar to how θ from (6.3) does not depend on a(·). Although there is no a priori
reason for ζ to exist, intuitionistic mathematics proves its existence as follows.
Theorem 6.3. The system RCAω0 + (∃Ω)MUC(Ω) + QF-AC proves (∃ζ)DNR(ζ).
Proof. By [103, IV.2.3], (∃Ω)MUC(Ω) implies WKL and hence DNR. Now consider
(6.4) and apply QF-AC to obtain Ξ(1×2)→1 which outputs f as in (6.4). Now
consider k0 := Ω(λB.Ξ(G,B)) and define ζ0(G) as the finite sequence of the form
〈Ξ(G, σ0),Ξ(G, σ1), . . . ,Ξ(G, σ2k0 )〉 where σi is the i-th binary sequence of length
k0. Clearly, this functional ζ0 satisfies DNR(ζ0) and we are done. 
Hence, the intuitionistic fan functional guarantees the existence of a highly uni-
form (i.e. independent of A) functional ζ which computes ‘metastable’ diagonal
recursive functions. However, (∃ζ)DNR(ζ) is not a statement of second-order arith-
metic, and there is no a priori reason such ζ would exist in classical mathematics.
Fourth, we shall establish (∃ζ)DNR(ζ) in classical mathematics using STP and
DNRns, where the latter is defined as follows:
(∀stG2)(∃stw1
∗
)(∀A1 ≤1 1)(∃f
1 ∈ w)(∀m0, s0, e0 ≤ G(f))(ϕAe,s(e) = m→ f(e) 6= m).
In particular, ζ as in DNR(ζ) exists in classical mathematics as follows.
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Theorem 6.4. From the proof in P that STP → DNRns, a term t3→3 can be
extracted such that E-PAω proves (∀Θ3)
[
SCF(Θ)→ DNR(t(Θ))].
Proof. See Theorem A.17 
By the theorem, STP and the special fan functional provide a way of obtain-
ing the existence of a highly uniform (i.e. independent of A) functional ζ which
computes ‘metastable’ diagonal recursive functions as in DNR(ζ). Note that we
could apply the same method to e.g. the monotone convergence theorem (See [80]),
although the latter theorem contradicts intuitionistic mathematics.
In conclusion, metastability is a weak version of convergence which gives rise
to highly uniform computational information. Thanks to the intuitionistic fan
functional, we can assert the existence of a highly uniform functional which com-
putes ‘metastable’ diagonal recursive functions. However, the special fan functional,
which is just a realiser for STP, also computes such a highly uniform functional.
Of course, theorems 6.3 and 6.4 are just examples of the following general tem-
plate, to be explored in [80]: The intuitionistic fan functional provides highly uni-
form functionals based on the general heuristic underlying metastability, which is:
Introducing finite but arbitrarily large domains yields highly uni-
form computational results.
These highly uniform functionals are also part of classical mathematics, as estab-
lished thanks to Nonstandard Analysis, and Standardisation and STP in particular.
Finally, we find it fitting that the final section of this paper connects intuitionistic
analysis and Nonstandard Analysis via a mathematical notion, namely metastabil-
ity36, which we imagine would have pleased Brouwer.
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Appendix A. The formal systems P and H
We introduce the systems P and H from [10] in detail in Section A.2 and A.3.
To this end, we first introduce Go¨del’s system T in Section A.1.
A.1. Go¨del’s system T . In this section, we briefly introduce Go¨del’s system T
and the associated systems E-PAω and E-PAω∗. In his famous Dialectica paper
([45]), Go¨del defines an interpretation of intuitionistic arithmetic into a quantifier-
free calculus of functionals. This calculus is now known as ‘Go¨del’s system T ’, and
is essentially just primitive recursive arithmetic ([26, §1.2.10]) with the schema of
recursion expanded to all finite types. The set of all finite types T is:
(i) 0 ∈ T and (ii) If σ, τ ∈ T then (σ → τ) ∈ T,
where 0 is the type of natural numbers, and σ → τ is the type of mappings from
objects of type σ to objects of type τ . Hence, Go¨del’s system T includes ‘recursor’
constants Rρ for every finite type ρ ∈ T, defining primitive recursion as follows:
Rρ(f, g, 0) := f and Rρ(f, g, n+ 1) := g(n,Rρ(f, g, n)), (PR)
for fρ and g0→(ρ→ρ). The system E-PAω is a combination of Peano Arithmetic
and system T , and the full axiom of extensionality (E). The detailed definition
of E-PAω may be found in [66, §3.3]; We do introduce the notion of equality and
extensionality in E-PAω, as these notions are needed below.
Definition A.1. [Equality] The system E-PAω includes equality between natural
numbers ‘=0’ as a primitive. Equality ‘=τ ’ for type τ -objects x, y is then:
[x =τ y] ≡ (∀z
τ1
1 . . . z
τk
k )[xz1 . . . zk =0 yz1 . . . zk] (A.1)
if the type τ is composed as τ ≡ (τ1 → . . . → τk → 0). The usual inequality
predicate ‘≤0’ between numbers has an obvious definition, and the predicate ‘≤τ ’
is just ‘=τ ’ with ‘=0’ replaced by ‘≤0’ in (A.1). The axiom of extensionality is the
statement that for all ρ, τ ∈ T, we have:
(∀xρ, yρ, ϕρ→τ )
[
x =ρ y → ϕ(x) =τ ϕ(y)
]
, (E)
Next, we introduce E-PAω∗, a definitional extension of E-PAω from [10] with a
type for finite sequences. In particular, the set T∗ is defined as:
(i) 0 ∈ T∗, (ii) If σ, τ ∈ T∗ then (σ → τ) ∈ T∗, and (iii) If σ ∈ T∗, then σ∗ ∈ T∗,
where σ∗ is the type of finite sequences of objects of type σ. The system E-PAω∗
includes (PR) for all ρ ∈ T∗, as well as dedicated ‘list recursors’ to handle finite
sequences for any ρ∗ ∈ T∗. A detailed definition of E-PAω∗ may be found in
[10, §2.1]. We now introduce some notations for E-PAω∗, as also used in [10].
Notation A.2 (Finite sequences). The system E-PAω∗ has a dedicated type for
‘finite sequences of objects of type ρ’, namely ρ∗. Since the usual coding of pairs of
numbers goes through in E-PAω∗, we shall not always distinguish between 0 and 0∗.
Similarly, we do not always distinguish between ‘sρ’ and ‘〈sρ〉’, where the former
is ‘the object s of type ρ’, and the latter is ‘the sequence of type ρ∗ with only
element sρ’. The empty sequence for the type ρ∗ is denoted by ‘〈〉ρ’, usually with
the typing omitted. Furthermore, we denote by ‘|s| = n’ the length of the finite
sequence sρ
∗
= 〈sρ0, s
ρ
1, . . . , s
ρ
n−1〉, where |〈〉| = 0, i.e. the empty sequence has length
zero. For sequences sρ
∗
, tρ
∗
, we denote by ‘s ∗ t’ the concatenation of s and t, i.e.
(s ∗ t)(i) = s(i) for i < |s| and (s ∗ t)(j) = t(|s| − j) for |s| ≤ j < |s| + |t|. For a
TO BE OR NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE 59
sequence sρ
∗
, we define sN := 〈s(0), s(1), . . . , s(N)〉 for N0 < |s|. For a sequence
α0→ρ, we also write αN = 〈α(0), α(1), . . . , α(N)〉 for any N0. By way of shorthand,
qρ ∈ Qρ
∗
abbreviates (∃i < |Q|)(Q(i) =ρ q). Finally, we shall use x, y, t, . . . as short
for tuples xσ00 , . . . x
σk
k of possibly different type σi.
We have used E-PAω and E-PAω∗ interchangeably in this paper. Our motivation
is the ‘star morphism’ used in Robinson’s approach to Nonstandard Analysis, and
the ensuing potential for confusion.
A.2. The classical system P. In this section, we introduce the system P, a con-
servative extension of E-PAω with fragments of Nelson’s IST.
To this end, we first introduce the base system E-PAω∗st . We use the same def-
inition as [10, Def. 6.1], where E-PAω∗ is the definitional extension of E-PAω with
types for finite sequences as in [10, §2] and the previous section. The language of
E-PAω∗st (and P) is the language of E-PA
ω∗ extended with a new symbol ‘stρ’ for any
finite type ρ ∈ T∗ in the language of E-PAω∗; The typing of ‘st’ is always omitted.
Definition A.3. The set T ∗ is defined as the collection of all the terms in the
language of E-PAω∗. The system E-PAω∗st is defined as E-PA
ω∗ + T ∗st + IA
st, where
T ∗st consists of the following axiom schemas.
(i) The schema37 st(x) ∧ x = y → st(y),
(ii) The schema providing for each closed38 term t ∈ T∗ the axiom st(t).
(iii) The schema st(f) ∧ st(x)→ st(f(x)).
The external induction axiom IAst is as follows.
Φ(0) ∧ (∀stn0)(Φ(n)→ Φ(n+ 1))→ (∀stn0)Φ(n). (IAst)
Secondly, we introduce some essential fragments of IST studied in [10].
Definition A.4. [External axioms of P]
(1) HACint: For any internal formula ϕ, we have
(∀stxρ)(∃styτ )ϕ(x, y)→
(
∃stF ρ→τ
∗)
(∀stxρ)(∃yτ ∈ F (x))ϕ(x, y), (A.2)
(2) I: For any internal formula ϕ, we have
(∀stxσ
∗
)(∃yτ )(∀zσ ∈ x)ϕ(z, y)→ (∃yτ )(∀stxσ)ϕ(x, y),
(3) The system P is E-PAω∗st + I+ HACint.
Note that I and HACint are fragments of Nelson’s axioms Idealisation and Stan-
dard part. By definition, F in (A.2) only provides a finite sequence of witnesses to
(∃sty), explaining its name Herbrandized Axiom of Choice.
The system P is connected to E-PAω by the following theorem. Here, the super-
script ‘Sst’ is the syntactic translation defined in [10, Def. 7.1]. By the definition
of Sst, ϕ in the following theorem is internal.
37The language of E-PAω∗st contains a symbol stσ for each finite type σ, but the subscript is
essentially always omitted. Hence T∗st is an axiom schema and not an axiom.
38A term is called closed in [10] (and in this paper) if all variables are bound via lambda
abstraction. Thus, if x, y are the only variables occurring in the term t, the term (λx)(λy)t(x, y)
is closed while (λx)t(x, y) is not. The second axiom in Definition A.3 thus expresses that
stτ
(
(λx)(λy)t(x, y)
)
if (λx)(λy)t(x, y) is of type τ . We usually omit lambda abstraction for brevity.
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Theorem A.5. Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-PAω∗st and suppose
Φ(a)Sst ≡ ∀stx∃sty ϕ(x, y, a). If ∆int is a collection of internal formulas and
P+∆int ⊢ Φ(a), (A.3)
then one can extract from the proof a sequence of closed39 terms t in T ∗ such that
E-PAω∗ +∆int ⊢ ∀x∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y, a). (A.4)
Proof. Immediate by [10, Theorem 7.7]. 
The proofs of the soundness theorems in [10, §5-7] provide an algorithm to obtain
the term t from the theorem. In particular, these terms can be ‘read off’ from the
nonstandard proofs. The translation Sst can be formalised in any reasonable
40
system of constructive mathematics. In fact, the formalisation of the results in [10]
in the proof assistant Agda (based on Martin-Lo¨f’s constructive type theory [73]) is
underway in [125]. The Dst interpretation (Sst is the latter followed by the Kuroda
negative translation) from [10] has been verified and tested on basic examples.
In light of the above results and those in [97], the following corollary (which is not
present in [10]) is essential to our results. Indeed, the following corollary expresses
that we may obtain effective results as in (A.6) from any theorem of Nonstandard
Analysis which has the same form as in (A.5). It was shown in [95,97,101] that the
scope of this corollary includes the Big Five systems of Reverse Mathematics and
the associated ‘zoo’ ([35]).
Corollary A.6. If ∆int is a collection of internal formulas and ψ is internal, and
P+∆int ⊢ (∀
stx)(∃sty)ψ(x, y, a), (A.5)
then one can extract from the proof a sequence of closed39 terms t in T ∗ such that
E-PAω∗ +∆int ⊢ (∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ψ(x, y, a). (A.6)
Proof. Clearly, if for internal ψ and Φ(a) ≡ (∀stx)(∃sty)ψ(x, y, a), we have [Φ(a)]Sst ≡
Φ(a), then the corollary follows immediately from the theorem. A tedious but
straightforward verification using the clauses (i)-(v) in [10, Def. 7.1] establishes that
indeed Φ(a)Sst ≡ Φ(a). We undertake this verification in Section A.5 below. 
A.3. The constructive system H. In this section, we define the system H, the
constructive counterpart of P. The system H was first introduced in [10, §5.2], and
constitutes a conservative extension of Heyting arithmetic E-HAω by [10, Cor. 5.6].
We now study the system H in more detail.
Similar to Definition A.3, we define E-HAω∗st as E-HA
ω∗+T∗st+IA
st, where E-HAω∗
is just E-PAω∗ without the law of excluded middle. Furthermore, we define
H ≡ E-HAω∗st + HAC+ I+ NCR+ HIP∀st + HGMP
st,
where HAC is HACint without any restriction on the formula, and where the remain-
ing axioms are defined in the following definition.
Definition A.7. [Three axioms of H]
39Recall the definition of closed terms from [10] as sketched in Footnote 38.
40Here, a ‘reasonable’ system is one which can prove the usual properties of finite lists, for
which the presence of the exponential function suffices.
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(1) HIP∀st
[(∀stx)φ(x)→ (∃sty)Ψ(y)]→ (∃sty′)[(∀stx)φ(x)→ (∃y ∈ y′)Ψ(y)],
where Ψ(y) is any formula and φ(x) is an internal formula of E-HAω∗.
(2) HGMPst
[(∀stx)φ(x)→ ψ]→ (∃stx′)[(∀x ∈ x′)φ(x)→ ψ]
where φ(x) and ψ are internal formulas in the language of E-HAω∗.
(3) NCR
(∀yτ )(∃stxρ)Φ(x, y)→ (∃stxρ
∗
)(∀yτ )(∃x′ ∈ x)Φ(x′, y),
where Φ is any formula of E-HAω∗
Intuitively speaking, the first two axioms of Definition A.7 allow us to perform
a number of non-constructive operations (namely Markov’s principle and indepen-
dence of premises) on the standard objects of the system H, provided we introduce
a ‘Herbrandisation’ as in the consequent of HAC, i.e. a finite list of possible wit-
nesses rather than one single witness. Furthermore, while H includes idealisation
I, one often uses the latter’s classical contraposition, explaining why NCR is useful
(and even essential) in the context of intuitionistic logic.
Surprisingly, the axioms from Definition A.7 are exactly what is needed to con-
vert nonstandard definitions (of continuity, integrability, convergence, et cetera)
into the normal form (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y) for internal ϕ, as is clear from Theo-
rem 5.5. This normal form plays an equally important role in the constructive case
as in the classical case by the following theorem.
Theorem A.8. If ∆int is a collection of internal formulas, ϕ is internal, and
H+∆int ⊢ ∀
stx∃sty ϕ(x, y, a), (A.7)
then one can extract from the proof a sequence of closed41 terms t in T ∗ such that
E-HAω∗ +∆int ⊢ ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y, a). (A.8)
Proof. Immediate by [10, Theorem 5.9]. 
The proofs of the soundness theorems in [10, §5-7] provide an algorithm to obtain
the term t from the theorem. Finally, we point out one very useful principle to which
we have access.
Theorem A.9. The systems P,H prove overspill, i.e.
(∀stxρ)ϕ(x)→ (∃yρ)
[
¬st(y) ∧ ϕ(y)
]
, (OS)
for any internal formula ϕ.
Proof. See [10, Prop. 3.3]. 
In conclusion, we have introduced the systems H and P which are conservative
extensions of Peano and Heyting arithmetic with fragments of Nelson’s internal set
theory. We have observed that central to the conservation results (Corollary A.6
and Theorem A.5) is the normal form (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y) for internal ϕ.
41Recall the definition of closed terms from [10] as sketched in Footnote 38.
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A.4. Notations and definitions in H and P. In this section, we introduce no-
tations and definitions relating to H and P.
First of all, we mostly use the same notations as in [10].
Remark A.10 (Notations). We write (∀stxτ )Φ(xτ ) and (∃stxσ)Ψ(xσ) as short for
(∀xτ )
[
st(xτ ) → Φ(xτ )
]
and (∃xσ)
[
st(xσ) ∧ Ψ(xσ)
]
. A formula A is ‘internal’ if it
does not involve st, and external otherwise. The formula Ast is defined from A by
appending ‘st’ to all quantifiers (except bounded number quantifiers).
Secondly, we will use the usual notations for natural, rational and real numbers
and functions as introduced in [67, p. 288-289]. (and [103, I.8.1] for the former). We
only list the definition of real number and related notions in P and related systems.
Definition A.11 (Real numbers and related notions).
(1) Natural numbers correspond to type zero objects, and we use ‘n0’ and
‘n ∈ N’ interchangeably. Rational numbers are defined in the usual way as
quotients of natural numbers, and ‘q ∈ Q’ has its usual meaning.
(2) A (standard) real number x is a (standard) fast-converging Cauchy sequence
q1(·), i.e. (∀n
0, i0)(|qn − qn+i)| <0
1
2n ). We use Kohlenbach’s ‘hat function’
from [67, p. 289] to guarantee that every sequence f1 is a real.
(3) We write ‘x ∈ R’ to express that x1 = (q1(·)) is a real as in the previous item
and [x](k) := qk for the k-th approximation of x.
(4) Two reals x, y represented by q(·) and r(·) are equal, denoted x =R y, if
(∀n0)(|qn − rn| ≤
1
2n ). Inequality <R is defined similarly.
(5) We write x ≈ y if (∀stn0)(|qn − rn| ≤
1
2n ) and x≫ y if x > y ∧ x 6≈ y.
(6) Functions F : R → R mapping reals to reals are represented by functionals
Φ1→1 mapping equal reals to equal reals, i.e.
(∀x, y)(x =R y → Φ(x) =R Φ(y)). (RE)
(7) Sets of objects of type ρ are denoted Xρ→0, Y ρ→0, Zρ→0, . . . and are given
by their characteristic functions fρ→0X , i.e. (∀x
ρ)[x ∈ X ↔ fX(x) =0 1],
where fρ→0X is assumed to output zero or one.
Thirdly, the usual extensional notion of equality has nonstandard variations.
Remark A.12 (Equality). The systems P and H include equality between natural
numbers ‘=0’ as a primitive. Equality ‘=τ ’ for type τ -objects x, y is defined as in
(A.1). In the spirit of Nonstandard Analysis, we define ‘approximate equality ≈τ ’:
[x ≈τ y] ≡ (∀
stzτ11 . . . z
τk
k )[xz1 . . . zk =0 yz1 . . . zk] (A.9)
with the type τ as in (A.1). Furthermore, our systems include the axiom of ex-
tensionality (E), but as noted in [10, p. 1973], the so-called axiom of standard
extensionality (E)st is problematic and cannot be included in P or H. In particular,
we cannot have term extraction as in Theorem 4.2 in the presence of (E)st.
Finally, we note that equality on the reals ‘=R’ is a defined notion and not an
equality ‘=τ ’ of P. Hence, the first item of Definition A.3 does not apply to ‘=R’.
In fact, P+ (∀x, y ∈ R)((x =R y ∧ st(x))→ st(y)) proves
42 a contradiction.
42Fix nonstandard N0 and define x =1 0 and y := (r(·)) where rk =
1
2k+N
. Then x =R y and
st1(x) while r0 clearly is nonstandard.
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A.5. Technical results. In this section, we have gathered the proofs of some of
the above theorems too lengthy to fit the body of the text.
First of all, for completeness, we prove our ‘term extraction’ result in detail.
Theorem A.13. If ∆int is a collection of internal formulas and ψ is internal, and
P+∆int ⊢ (∀
stx)(∃sty)ψ(x, y, a), (A.10)
then one can extract from the proof a sequence of closed43 terms t in T ∗ such that
E-PAω∗ + QF-AC1,0 +∆int ⊢ (∀x)(∃y ∈ t(x))ψ(x, y, a). (A.11)
Proof. Clearly, if for internal ψ and Φ(a) ≡ (∀stx)(∃sty)ψ(x, y, a), we have [Φ(a)]Sst ≡
Φ(a), then the corollary follows immediately from Theorem A.5. A tedious but
straightforward verification using the clauses (i)-(v) in [10, Def. 7.1] establishes
that indeed Φ(a)Sst ≡ Φ(a). For completeness, we now list these five inductive
clauses and perform this verification.
Hence, suppose Φ(a) and Ψ(b) in the language of P have the interpretations
Φ(a)Sst ≡ (∀stx)(∃sty)ϕ(x, y, a) and Ψ(b)Sst ≡ (∀stu)(∃stv)ψ(u, v, b), (A.12)
for internal ψ, ϕ. These formulas then behave as follows by [10, Def. 7.1]:
(i) ψSst := ψ for atomic internal ψ.
(ii)
(
st(z)
)Sst
:= (∃stx)(z = x).
(iii) (¬Φ)Sst := (∀stY )(∃stx)(∀y ∈ Y [x])¬ϕ(x, y, a).
(iv) (Φ ∨Ψ)Sst := (∀stx, u)(∃sty, v)[ϕ(x, y, a) ∨ ψ(u, v, b)]
(v)
(
(∀z)Φ
)Sst
:= (∀stx)(∃sty)(∀z)(∃y′ ∈ y)ϕ(x, y′, z)
Hence, fix Φ0(a) ≡ (∀stx)(∃sty)ψ0(x, y, a) with internal ψ0, and note that φSst ≡ φ
for any internal formula. We have [st(y)]Sst ≡ (∃stw)(w = y) and also
[¬st(y)]Sst ≡ (∀stW )(∃stx)(∀w ∈W [x])¬(w = y) ≡ (∀stw)(w 6= y).
Hence, [¬st(y) ∨ ¬ψ0(x, y, a)]Sst is just (∀stw)[(w 6= y) ∨ ¬ψ0(x, y, a)], and[
(∀y)[¬st(y) ∨ ¬ψ0(x, y, a)]
]Sst
≡ (∀stw)(∃stv)(∀y)(∃v′ ∈ v)[w 6= y ∨ ¬ψ0(x, y, a)].
which is just (∀stw)(∀y)[(w 6= y) ∨ ¬ψ0(x, y, a)]. Furthermore, we have[
(∃sty)ψ0(x, y, a)
]Sst ≡ [¬(∀y)[¬st(y) ∨ ¬ψ0(x, y, a)]]Sst
≡ (∀stV )(∃stw)(∀v ∈ V [w])¬[(∀y)[(w 6= y) ∨ ¬ψ0(x, y, a)]].
≡ (∃stw)(∃y)[(w = y) ∧ ψ0(x, y, a)]] ≡ (∃
stw)ψ0(x,w, a).
Hence, we have proved so far that (∃sty)ψ0(x, y, a) is invariant under Sst. By the
previous, we also obtain:[
¬st(x) ∨ (∃sty)ψ0(x, y, a)
]Sst ≡ (∀stw′)(∃stw)[(w′ 6= x) ∨ ψ0(x,w, a)].
Our final computation now yields the desired result:[
(∀stx)(∃sty)ψ0(x, y, a)
]Sst ≡ [(∀x)(¬st(x) ∨ (∃sty)ψ0(x, y, a))]Sst
≡ (∀stw′)(∃stw)(∀x)(∃w′′ ∈ w)[(w′ 6= x) ∨ ψ0(x,w
′′, a)].
≡ (∀stw′)(∃stw)(∃w′′ ∈ w)ψ0(w
′, w′′, a).
43Recall the definition of closed terms from [10] as sketched in Footnote 38.
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The last step is obtained by taking x = w′. Hence, we may conclude that the
normal form (∀stx)(∃sty)ψ0(x, y, a) is invariant under Sst, and we are done. 
Next, we prove two theorems which provide a normal form for STP and estab-
lishes the latter’s relationship with the special and intuitionistic fan functional. The
function g1 from (A.14) is called a standard part of f1.
Theorem A.14. In P, both STP and STPR are equivalent to either of the following:
(∀stg2)(∃stw)
[
(∀T 1 ≤1 1)
(
(∀α1 ∈ w(1))(αg(α) 6∈ T ) (A.13)
→ (∀β ≤1 1)(∃i
0 ≤ w(2))(βi 6∈ T )
)]
,
(∀f1)(∃stg1)
(
(∀stn0)(∃stm0)(f(n) = m)→ f ≈1 g
)
. (A.14)
Furthermore, P proves (∃stΘ)SCF(Θ)→ STP.
Proof. First of all, since any individual real can be given a binary representation
(See [52]), the equivalence between STP and STPR is immediate. Next, STP is
easily seen to be equivalent to
(∀T 1 ≤1 1)
[
(∀stn)(∃β0)(|β| = n ∧ β ∈ T )
→ (∃stα1 ≤1 1)(∀
stn0)(αn ∈ T )
]
, (A.15)
and this equivalence may also be found in [94, Theorem 3.2]. For completeness,
we first prove the equivalence STP ↔ (A.15). Assume STP and apply overspill to
(∀stn)(∃β0)(|β| = n ∧ β ∈ T ) to obtain β00 ∈ T with nonstandard length |β0|. Now
apply STP to β1 := β0 ∗ 00 . . . to obtain a standard α1 ≤1 1 such that α ≈1 β and
hence (∀stn)(αn ∈ T ). For the reverse direction, let f1 be a binary sequence, and
define a binary tree Tf which contains all initial segments of f . Now apply (A.15)
for T = Tf to obtain STP.
For the implication (A.13)→(A.15), note that (A.13) implies for all standard g2
(∀T 1 ≤1 1)(∃
st(α1 ≤1 1, k
0)
[
(αg(α) 6∈ T )→ (∀β ≤1 1)(∃i ≤ k)(βi 6∈ T )
]
, (A.16)
which in turn yields, by bringing all standard quantifiers inside again, that:
(∀T ≤1 1)
[
(∃stg2)(∀stα ≤1 1)(αg(α) 6∈ T )→ (∃
stk)(∀β ≤1 1)(βk 6∈ T )
]
, (A.17)
To obtain (A.15) from (A.17), apply HACint to (∀stα1 ≤1 1)(∃stn)(αn 6∈ T ) to
obtain standard Ψ1→0
∗
with (∀stα1 ≤1 1)(∃n ∈ Ψ(α))(αn 6∈ T ), and defining
g(α) := maxi<|Ψ|Ψ(α)(i) we obtain g as in the antecedent of (A.17). We obtain:
(∀T 1 ≤1 1)
[
(∀stα1 ≤1 1)(∃
stn)(αn 6∈ T )→ (∃stk)(∀β ≤1 1)(βi 6∈ T )
]
, (A.18)
which is the contraposition of (A.15), using classical logic. For the implication
(A.15) → (A.13), consider the contraposition of (A.15), i.e. (A.18), and note that
the latter implies (A.17). Now push all standard quantifiers outside as follows:
(∀stg2)(∀T 1 ≤1 1)(∃
st(α1 ≤1 1, k
0)
[
(αg(α) 6∈ T )→ (∀β ≤1 1)(∃i ≤ k)(βi 6∈ T )
]
,
and applying idealisation I yields (A.13) by taking the maximum of all elements
pertaining to k. The equivalence involving (A.13) also immediately establishes the
final part of the theorem.
For the remaining equivalence, the implication (A.14) → STP is trivial, and
for the reverse implication, fix f1 such that (∀stn)(∃stm)f(n) = m and let h1 be
such that (∀n,m)(f(n) = m ↔ h(n,m) = 1). Applying HACint to the former
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formula, there is standard Φ0→0
∗
such that (∀stn)(∃m ∈ Φ(n))f(n) = m, and
define Ψ(n) := maxi<|Φ(n)| Φ(n)(i). Now define the sequence α0 ≤1 1 as follows:
α0(0) := h(0, 0), α0(1) := h(0, 1), . . . , α0(Ψ(0)) := h(0,Ψ(0)), α0(Ψ(0) + 1) :=
h(1, 0), α0(Ψ(0)+ 2) := h(1, 1), . . . , α0(Ψ(0)+Ψ(1)) := h(1,Ψ(1)), et cetera. Now
let β10 ≤1 1 be the standard part of α0 provided by STP and define g(n) := (µm ≤
Ψ(n))
[
β0(
∑n−1
i=0 Ψ(i) +m) = 1
]
. By definition, g1 is standard and f ≈1 g. 
Theorem A.15. The axiom STP can be proved in P plus the axiom
(∀stY 2)(∀f1, g1 ≤1 1)(f ≈1 g → Y (f) =0 Y (g)). (NUC)
Proof. Resolving ‘≈1’, NUC implies that
(∀stY 2)(∀f1, g1 ≤1 1)(∃
stN0)(fN =0 gN → Y (f) =0 Y (g)). (A.19)
Applying Idealisation I to (A.19), we obtain that
(∀stY 2)(∃stx0
∗
)(∀f1, g1 ≤1 1)(∃N
0 ∈ x)(fN =0 gN → Y (f) =0 Y (g)). (A.20)
which immediately yields that
(∀stY 2)(∃stN00 )(∀f
1, g1 ≤1 1)(fN0 =0 gN0 → Y (f) =0 Y (g)), (A.21)
by takingN0 in (A.21) to be maxi<|x| x(i) for x as in (A.20). Now that fN0∗00 . . . is
standard for any f1 and standard N0 by the basic axioms of P (See Definition A.3).
Hence, Y (fN0 ∗ 00 . . . ) is also standard and (A.21) becomes
(∀stY 2)(∀f1 ≤1 1)(∃
stM00 )(Y (f) ≤M0), (A.22)
if we take M0 = Y (fN0 ∗ 00 . . . ). Applying Idealisation to (A.22), we obtain
(∀stY 2)(∃sty0
∗
)(∀f1 ≤1 1)(∃M
0
0 ∈ y)(Y (f) ≤M0), (A.23)
and defining N as the maximum of all elements in y in (A.23), we obtain
(∀stY 2)(∃stN0)(∀f1 ≤1 1)(Y (f) ≤ N), (A.24)
Now fix some standard g2 in (A.13) and let N1 be its standard upper bound on
Cantor space from (A.24). Define the required (standard) w as follows: w(2) is N1
and w(1) is the finite sequence consisting of all binary sequences α1i = σ
0∗
i ∗ 00 . . .
for i ≤ 2N1 and |σi| = N1. Then STP follows from Theorem A.14. 
Corollary A.16. From the proof in P that NUC → STP, a term t3→3 can be
extracted such that E-PAω∗ + QF-AC1,0 proves (∀Ω3)
[
MUC(Ω)→ SCF(t(Ω))].
Proof. The proof amounts to nothing more than applying Remark 4.8. Indeed,
by the proof of the theorem, NUC is equivalent to the normal form (A.21), while
(A.13) is a normal form for STP and we abbreviate the latter normal form as
(∀stg2)(∃stw1
∗
)B(g, w). Hence, NUC → STP becomes (∀stY 2)(∃stN0)A(Y,N) →
(∀stg2)(∃stw1
∗
)B(g, w), which yields[
(∃stΩ3)(∀Y 2)A(Y,Ω(Y ))→ (∀stg2)(∃stw1
∗
)B(g, w)
]
, (A.25)
by strengthening the antecedent. Bringing all standard quantifiers up front:
(∀stΩ3, g2)(∃stw1
∗
)
[
(∀Y 2)A(Y,Ω(Y ))→ B(g, w)
]
; (A.26)
Applying Corollary A.6 to ‘P ⊢ (A.26)’, we obtain a term t3→3 such that
(∀Ω3, g2)(∃w ∈ t(Ω, g))
[
(∀Y 2)A(Y,Ω(Y ))→ B(g, w)
]
(A.27)
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is provable in E-PAω∗+QF-AC1,0. Bringing all quantifiers inside again, (A.27) yields
(∀Ω3)
[
(∀Y 2)A(Y,Ω(Y ))→ (∀g2)(∃w ∈ t(Ω, g))B(g, w)
]
, (A.28)
Clearly, the antecedent of (A.28) expresses that Ω3 is the fan functional. To define
a functional Θ as in SCF(Θ) from t(Ω, g), note that the latter is a finite sequence of
numbers and binary sequences by (A.13); Using basic sequence coding, we may as-
sume that t(Ω, g) = t0(Ω, g)∗t1(Ω, g), where the first (resp. second) part contains the
binary sequences (resp. numbers). Now define Θ(g)(1) as maxi<|t1(Ω,g)| t1(Ω, g)(i)
and Θ(g)(2) := t0(Ω, g), and note that Θ indeed satisfies SCF(Θ). 
Finally, we prove Theorem 6.4 from the final section of this paper.
Theorem A.17. From the proof in P that STP → DNRns, a term t3→3 can be
extracted such that E-PAω proves (∀Θ3)
[
SCF(Θ)→ DNR(t(Θ))].
Proof. By Definition 4.18, STP proves WKLst, which implies DNRst as follows:
(∀stA1 ≤1 1)(∃
stf1)(∀stm0, s0, e0)(ϕAe,s(e) = m→ f(e) 6= m),
which immediately yields the following equivalent ‘metastable’ version:
(∀stA1 ≤1 1, G
2)(∃stf1)(∀m0, s0, e0 ≤ G(f))(ϕAe,s(e) = m→ f(e) 6= m), (A.29)
Since A1 only occurs as ‘call by standard value’ in (A.29), and since for every
B ≤1 1 there is standard A ≈1 B by STP, (A.29) becomes
(∀stG2)(∀A1 ≤1 1)(∃
stf1)(∀m0, s0, e0 ≤ G(f))(ϕAe,s(e) = m→ f(e) 6= m),
and applying Idealisation to the previous formula, we obtain DNRns. Since both
DNRns and STP have normal forms, we may apply term extraction as in Theorem 4.2
to the proof ‘P ⊢ STP→ DNRns’, and obtain a term which computes ζ in terms of
the special fan functional Θ. 
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